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H. STUART HUGHES
The End of Political Ideology

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

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POWER POLITICS

Quincy Wright

TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW of the nineteenth century assumed the sovereignty of states and the balance of power. Each state occupied a well-defined territory within which its law was supreme, and formulated foreign policies which it was free to prosecute even by war. In time of peace the right of a state to use force was limited. Coercive methods short of war, as they were called, were only permissible by a state in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction; in necessary self-defense, which included defense of its territory, its agencies, and its nationals; in police action within the territory of a state which had expressly consented to such use; or as a measure of reprisal after peaceful means had proved inadequate to gain reparation for an injury or to stop a continuing injury.

Every state, however, had the legal capacity to initiate a state of war, and if it did so, both it and its enemy could employ armed force subject only to the limitations imposed by the law of war. The qualifications which had been accepted in the Middle Ages and in the early modern period that war could be legally initiated only for just causes and with proper motives had been largely abandoned. Reason of state had come to be considered adequate legal justification for war.

It is therefore clear that the object of nineteenth-century international law was not to prevent armed violence, but to restrict it in time, place, and method. International law sought to restrict hostilities to the periods of time when formal war existed, thus drawing a sharp line between "time of war" and "time of peace." In the latter time, international law sought, as has been noted, to reduce uses of armed force in international relations to special circumstances. In

time of war, on the other hand, the normal law was inoperative, and all states were either belligerents or neutrals, with special rights and duties, special powers and liabilities, pertaining to those statuses.

As the concept of war sought to limit international violence in time, so the concept of neutrality sought to limit it in space. States were free to remain neutral, unless bound to a belligerent by special alliance or guaranty, and belligerents were bound to respect that neutrality so long as the neutral lived up to its obligations of impartiality, abstention of its government from aid to either belligerent, and prevention of certain types of aid by individuals from its territory. It was assumed that a belligerent would not wish to multiply its enemies, and that, therefore, it would not declare war on neutrals unless they obviously aided its enemies or hampered its own efforts. Neutrals, it was thought, would usually prefer to observe the somewhat burdensome law of neutrality because of their interest in avoiding war and in helping their nationals to profit by trade with both belligerents, subject only to the risk of maritime capture for carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, or unneutral service. The maintenance of this balance of neutral and belligerent interest was a somewhat delicate matter, and the appropriate compromise varied with the number and character of belligerents and the prevailing military technique. Thus, the precise rules which would maintain this equilibrium were always subject to controversy. But however uncertain might be the precise law of neutrality, the concept was considered a useful device for preventing the spread of war; during the nineteenth century some wars were actually localized to the two original belligerents.

These concepts of war and neutrality came to be so favored during the relatively peaceful nineteenth century that many treaties were made to extend these time and space limitations. Thus many international boundary areas and several whole states such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were permanently neutralized. This meant that all states were forbidden to make war upon a state enjoying this status, or to engage in hostilities, even in time of war, in a neutralized area. Cooling-off treaties also came into vogue, whereby states agreed that they would not resort to hostilities until a specified period of time had elapsed during which various procedures of pacific settlement were to be tried. The Bryan treaties made by the United States with many countries in 1913 were of this type, and the idea played a part in the League of Nations Covenant.

The methods of war which had been regulated by custom and practice since earliest times received increasing attention in national

regulations and international conventions of the nineteenth century, particularly after the subject had been codified in a general order of the United States Army drawn up by Francis Lieber during the Civil War. The object of these regulations was to prevent inhumanities not justified by military necessity, and to assure certain standards of good faith mutually convenient to the belligerents, such as respect for flags of truce and armistices.

In addition to these restrictions upon the use of force, international law sought to define the rights of states in time of peace. It defined the methods for acquiring status, territory, nationals, and jurisdiction, and the precise scope and implications of each of these fundamental rights. International law also sought to facilitate peaceful methods for securing rights, forwarding policy, and settling controversies.

It was clear to international jurists that this system, while it promoted national independence and international competition and was not unfavorable to human progress under the conditions which prevailed during much of the modern period, manifested a very inchoate and primitive society. The member nations were separated by formidable barriers to international trade and communication, they recognized comparatively few moral and political standards in common, they co-operated for few common objectives which were considered important, and they were organized by institutions that were so limited in scope or membership or so decentralized as hardly to deserve the name "organization." Under these conditions, international law was sanctioned only by habit, reciprocal interest, and fear of reprisals. These sanctions were internal rather than external, moral rather than legal. While states might be influenced by a world public opinion which frowned upon illegal behavior, that opinion was so unorganized, so lacking in agencies for expression and action, that its appeal, in so far as it had any, was to the conscience of peoples and statesmen, rather than to the expectation of immediate community action to remedy illegal behavior. Such fears as the law violator might have concerned not the reaction of the society of nations in response to a world opinion behind the law, but the possibility of retaliation by the state immediately injured by its illegal behavior. If that state was obviously too weak to take effective measures, this fear was unimportant unless, indeed, the injured state had more potent friends upon whom it could rely. As a consequence, international law could protect the weaker members of the society of nations only in so far as it could rely upon the operation of balance-of-power policies; that is, upon the pursuit by all important

states of the policy of preventing aggrandizement by the most powerful of their number at the expense of its weaker neighbors. Such a policy might be expected because such aggrandizement could initiate a chain of events whereby the aggrandizing state, strengthened by one successful aggression, would be more likely to succeed in a second, until the existence of every state would be threatened—a possibility which all European governments had in mind through their knowledge of the course of ancient history ending in the triumph of Rome.

The principle of the balance of power, which urged states to intervene against any one of their number which threatened to become too powerful, was balanced against the principle of neutrality, which urged nonparticipation in every controversy in order to avoid and localize war. If claims were so moderate that their satisfaction would not greatly increase the power of the state which made them, neutrality was likely to be followed by states not immediately involved. But whenever a powerful state made a demand or pursued policies which if achieved would upset the balance of power, third states tended to join forces against it. If they failed to do so, the basic stability of the world society would be so shaken that a period of lawlessness was to be expected, such as occurred during the period of the Thirty Years' War, during the latter part of the reign of Louis XIV, during the period of Napoleon, and during the period of German aggression in the twentieth century. Each of these periods of war lasted for about thirty years and registered an extremely serious shock to the balance of power. The eventual overthrow in each case of the state which had grown overpowerful by successful aggressions created a certain confidence in the fundamental stability of a system which rested primarily on an equilibrium of military power. The last of these experiences, however, has aroused serious doubt whether that system can any longer be relied upon. The shrinking world, the acceleration of history, the rise of democracy, the increasing destructiveness of war, the rising capacity of the offensive compared with the defensive in military operations, and the diminution in the number of great powers present conditions which, judged both by analysis and by experience, may require the society of nations to change its law and organization, if it is to protect the states and individuals whose security and progress is its reason for being.

These circumstances account for the radical changes in international law which have been introduced by formal consent of most of the states of the world during the past generation. This new inter-

national law has not been provided with effective sanctions. It is too early to be certain that it will endure in the face of the opposition to be expected from certain nations, governments, and other vested interests. It represents the aspirations of peoples and states which their representatives have publicly declared and formally accepted, but which will require judicious accommodation to existing rights to become workable, detailed juristic analysis to become precise, and significant strengthening of international organization to become effective.

THE NEW CONCEPT OF WAR

The first of these changes is in the concept of war. In nineteenth-century international law, war was a legal condition which equally permitted two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force. War was not an outbreak of lawlessness, but a condition or institution which the law defined and regulated, and which permitted the participants to utilize armed force against one another. The most significant characteristic, however, was the equality of the parties. Third states were bound, unless they became belligerent, to treat the two sides of the conflict alike. While "benevolent" and "unfriendly" neutrality were given a certain recognition in the juristic writings and practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nineteenth-century international law, prompted in no small measure by the attitude taken by the United States in the 1790's, and formally codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907, held that neutrals must be impartial except in so far as they could justify discriminations or reprisals because of injuries resulting from illegal behavior by one of the belligerents. Thus the concept of neutrality defined the concept of war. The essence of war was the equality of the belligerents. Obviously, with this concept of war, discussion of the policies which the belligerents were seeking to promote or the circumstances under which the war originated were irrelevant to any legal consideration of the rights and duties of states, whether belligerent or neutral. War was a duel the results of which determined the justice of the claims of the participants.

The change in the concept of war is to be seen in the legal elimination of the duties of neutrality, first those of abstention and then those of impartiality. The process began in the Hague Convention of 1899, which recognized that all states had an interest in "obviating recourse to force" and that therefore states should "use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international difficulties."

States not party to a dispute were urged "on their own initiative" to tender their good offices or mediation to potential or actual belligerents. Such action was not obligatory, nor were the disputing states bound to accept the offer. Third states were not authorized to intervene in the technical sense of dictatorial interference, but there was a general recognition that every state had an interest in every war or threat of war. War had ceased to be a duel in which only the combatants were interested.

The League of Nations Covenant made more emphatic the general interest in wars and threats of wars. Such occurrences were declared a matter of concern to the whole League, which was required to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." This made action by the League both obligatory and authoritative. The members of the League committed themselves to collective intervention. Subsequent articles not only eliminated the disinterestedness of the neutral, but eliminated his impartiality if a resort to war had taken place in violation of the Covenant. In such circumstances all the members of the League were bound to subject the aggressor "to the severance of all trade and financial relations" and to give consideration to recommendations of the Council for use of armed force "to protect the Covenants of the League."

These provisions eliminated neutrality for League members if war originated in a breach of the Covenant. Furthermore, it eliminated the conception of war as a condition in which the belligerents are equal. Under these provisions, the Covenant-breaker was an outlawed aggressor, while its innocent victim was a lawful defender. There were, it is true, gaps in the Covenant as a result of which lawful war might occur, carrying with it the rights and duties of neutrality, even for League members. But these gaps were in principle closed by the almost universally accepted Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Under that instrument the parties condemned war, renounced it as an instrument of national policy, and agreed never to seek the settlement of any dispute or controversy except by peaceful means. Furthermore, states which violated the pact and utilized nonpacific means, that is, measures involving the use of armed force, for promoting national policy or settling disputes, ceased, according to the Preamble, to enjoy the benefits of the Pact, and could properly be discriminated against or attacked by any state. The unofficial Budapest Articles of Interpretation and the international discussions concerning the Manchurian invasion by Japan, the Ethiopian attack by Italy, and the German aggressions accepted the principle that

states were permitted, but not obliged by the Pact, to discriminate against the Pact violator. It was this principle which justified the United States while still "nonbelligerent" in aiding the Allies with lend-lease. The principle *jus ex injuria non oritur* ("rights do not arise from wrongs") was invoked to demonstrate that the Pact violator acquired none of the traditional rights of a belligerent against its enemies or against "neutrals," though the defender should apply the rules of war forbidding inhumanity and perfidy even to an aggressor.

The United Nations Charter made the obsolescence of the nineteenth-century concepts of war and neutrality even more clear. The major purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" (Art. 1). Members of the United Nations are bound "to settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Furthermore, members are bound to assist the United Nations "in action it takes in accordance with the Charter," and to "refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action" (Art. 2). Discrimination against an aggressor is, therefore, obligatory. Impartiality is forbidden.

If these commitments are taken at their face value, war and neutrality no longer exist as legal institutions. A state that resorts to armed force is either an aggressor who should be suppressed, a defender who should be assisted, or a participant in international sanctions permitted or authorized by the United Nations. All members of the United Nations are bound by the Charter to regulate their action by these distinctions, not by the traditional concept of states of war and neutrality. The basic distinction of international law has, therefore, ceased to be that between times of war and times of peace, and it has become that between lawful uses of force and unlawful uses of force.

SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The sovereignty of the state meant, in nineteenth-century international law, not only that the state could initiate war at discretion,

but also that it could make law applicable in its own territory at discretion. It is true that if that law and its administration denied justice to resident nationals of another state, that state could protest and demand reparation. Furthermore, the state's law must recognize certain exemptions which international law explicitly established in favor of foreign diplomats and other officials performing their functions in the state's territory. In respect to its own nationals in its own territory, however, sovereignty was omnipotent, except in so far as the state may have expressly consented by treaty to qualify its exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. The state could treat its nationals unjustly or even barbarously; it could deny them fair trials or execute them without trial; it could permit discrimination, starvation, or massacre, and violate no rule of international law. It is true that, during the nineteenth century, states sometimes made representations against excesses of inhumanity and brutality which shocked the conscience of mankind; and occasionally intervention was justified on humanitarian grounds, as, for example, American intervention in Cuba in 1898, the British representation against brutal treatment of natives in the Congo in 1908, and the representations made by various powers about pogroms in Russia in the early twentieth century. Such representations were made in the name of general morality and humanity, rather than as recognition of any specific rights enjoyed by the individual under international law. In theory, the individual was not a subject, but only an object, of international law. If he sometimes gained compensation for injuries which he received in foreign lands after the local courts had denied him justice, it was not in his own right but as a consequence of the rights of his state to protect him and, if it wished, to give him the reparation which it had in its own right received for the injury to its national. The individual had no access to international procedures himself, and had no power to compel his state to intercede in his behalf. His state took up his cause at discretion, and the state alleged to have been responsible for his injury could refuse to listen to the claim until the complaining state demonstrated that the individual had been its national when the injury was received and continued to be such.

There were jurists who insisted that this theory was artificial, that in fact the individual was a subject of international law, and that his state acted as his agent in protecting him. Such jurists pointed out that the individual clearly enjoyed certain exceptional rights under international law when serving as ambassador or other official agent of his country. They called attention to the principle applied by courts in some states that international law is part of national law

and should be applied for the benefit of individuals in appropriate cases. They also pointed out that if an individual committed piracy or other offense against the law of nations, he was liable under that law in any tribunal that had him in custody. These views, while generally accepted by the early publicists and supported by judicial opinions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were generally rejected by nineteenth-century writers, influenced by concepts of legal positivism.

According to the positivists, who sought to save the concept of state sovereignty by judicious interpretation, piracy and other offenses against the law of nations were not acts which imposed an international liability upon the individual but acts which international law permitted, or in some cases required, any state to bring within its jurisdiction. These concepts defined, therefore, from the point of view of international law, not the individual's offense but the state's jurisdiction. If they also defined the individual's offense, it was only because they were incorporated in the municipal law of a particular state.

The positivists also asserted that the principle requiring courts to apply international law in appropriate cases was to be interpreted merely as a convenient rule of the municipal law of certain states incorporating a body of doctrine in block, and that the international law thus incorporated was always subject to overruling national legislation. The individual's rights and liabilities, therefore, were not derived from international law directly but from the rule of municipal law which incorporated certain international rules.

It is always possible to interpret the state as sovereign, protecting or punishing individuals in its own interest under such guidance as it chooses to accept from international law, but it is also possible to interpret the individual as a jural personality with rights under international law which he can pursue only through the agency of his state and with duties under international law which the society of nations can enforce only through the agency of the state having jurisdiction over him. The state, in other words, may be construed (1) as a sovereign entity valuable in itself, or (2) as an agent on the one hand of the individuals that compose it and on the other of the universal society embracing all humanity.

While nineteenth-century international law generally accepted the first interpretation, the second is more consistent with the principles which states have accepted during the past generation. The transition began with the multiplication of general treaties which specified rights of aborigines, of minorities, of workers, of women, of children,

and of other classes of persons who were in danger of oppression. Such treaties were sometimes supplemented by procedures whereby violations could be brought to the attention of international agencies. Thus petitions from the inhabitants of mandated territories and from minorities protected by international treaties were submissible to appropriate organs of the League of Nations. While such petitions did not initiate a procedure, they did provide information upon which any member of the League could initiate action in the League organs.

There were also provisions in the treaties ending the First World War for presentation by individuals of claims for war damages before mixed commissions and for trial in international tribunals of certain war criminals. In the latter case, the Kaiser, although indicted by the Treaty of Versailles, was not tried at all, and the jurisdiction to try other German war criminals was transferred to a German court at Leipzig, which dealt with only a few cases. A new principle was, however, in process of formation. The Permanent Court of International Justice gave its support to the tendency by cautious recognition that a treaty might make individuals subjects of international law, entitled to rights defined in the treaty, if that was the intention of the parties to the treaty.

The United Nations Charter reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights in its Preamble, and asserts as one of its purposes: "to achieve international co-operation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms of all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (Art. 1). The General Assembly is obliged to initiate studies and make recommendations to this end (Art. 13), the United Nations as a whole is bound "to promote universal respect for and observance of" these rights, and the members "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement" of that purpose (Arts. 55, 56). The General Assembly has made a declaration of human rights; and the Human Rights Commission has progressed toward a covenant which will create specific obligations to respect certain of these rights and has discussed various international procedures enabling the individual to initiate action to assure observance of his rights. These provisions and achievements make it clear that the new international law recognizes the individual, whatever his nationality or lack of nationality, as a subject of international law with certain rights which are in principle under the protection of the society of nations, anything in the law of the state of his nationality or residence to the contrary notwithstanding.

A similar conclusion must be drawn concerning the individual's liability under international law. The charter for the trial of major war criminals of the European Axis countries described certain crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, for which those responsible were subject to trial and punishment by the international military tribunal established at Nuremberg. It was expressly recognized that the official position of the defendant, whether as head of state or as a responsible official in a government department, or the fact that he acted on orders from his government or his superior should not free him of responsibility, although the latter might be considered in mitigation of punishment.

The Nuremberg Tribunal recognized the principles stated in its charter as declaratory of pre-existing international law and applied them in the trial of Göring and other high Nazi officials. It recognized that acts which had the character of piracy, banditry, or mass murder, except that they were committed in pursuance of an "act of state" alleged to create a "state of war," reverted to their character of crimes against international law if the "act of state" authorized aggression in violation of the state's obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Such an illegal act of state could not confer an immunity upon the defendants. Since the Pact was ratified by Germany long before the beginning of World War II, the suggestion that the Tribunal applied *ex post facto* law was not justified. The Tokyo Tribunal, acting under a similar charter, quoted with approval the Nuremberg opinion on this matter. The same principle has been applied by other military tribunals, both national and international, in Europe and in the East. Furthermore, the General Assembly of the United Nations has endorsed these principles and instructed the International Law Commission, established at its third session, to prepare a code on the subject and to consider the establishment of an international criminal court for the trial of such offenses. A convention has already been opened to ratification, defining the international crime of genocide and declaring that persons committing genocide "shall be punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals."

It is clear that if these instruments and opinions are accepted as law, the sovereign state no longer has the capacity to deny human rights to persons in its control even if they are its nationals, or the capacity to grant immunity from prosecution to individuals who commit crimes against the law of nations, even if they do so in the name of the state and under its authority. Individual rights and liabilities are established directly under international law, quite apart

from the law of any national state. This important development suggests that, in principle, the society of nations has acquired aspects of a true federation implying a functional division of authority over individuals between world and national governments. The principle is established, but it remains to realize it through appropriate organizations.

INTERESTS OF THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS

Traditional international law excluded the society of nations as well as the individual from the position of subject of international law. International agreements were generally bilateral, and international controversies were considered of concern to the parties alone. The facts were often otherwise. Under conditions of power politics, many treaties, the solution of many controversies, and most wars affected the stability of the equilibrium of power, and therefore were a subject of political interest to all states. The law, however, usually neglected this fact of community interest.

The multiplication of general treaties has broken down the traditional bilateralism of international law. Every party to such a treaty has a right to expect that every state party to that treaty shall, in its relations with every other party, observe its obligations; it is, therefore, entitled to intervene in controversies involving the construction of the convention, as indicated by Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

But beyond this interest of all states in the basic principles established by general treaties to which they are parties and by customary international law, the society of nations as a unit has acquired legal interests which it can protect and promote in so far as it is organized for action. The United Nations, which is designed to serve as the organization of the society of nations, has, through appropriate organs, power to make agreements with its members on the supply of armed forces, the immunities of its officials and its headquarters, and upon other matters. It also has power to make agreements with specialized agencies establishing their relations with it. Numerous such agreements have been made. In addition to its power to make agreements, the United Nations has powers of recommendation, decision, and enforcement. The characteristics of a jural person with powers and responsibilities are more emphasized in the Charter of the United Nations than they were in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The jural personality of the United Nations and its capacity to demand reparations for injuries to its agents has been recognized

by the International Court of Justice. The constitutions of the specialized agencies establish them as jural persons. The organized community of nations has been acquiring legal rights and duties, powers and responsibilities, and defining the public interests of the world society distinct from the interests of its member states. The sovereignty of those members obviously becomes qualified as this process continues.

LAW AND PRACTICE

The old international law, which recognized the sovereign state to the exclusion of almost everything else, has been undergoing radical changes with the outlawing of war and neutrality, the recognition of the individual, the recognition of the public interest of the world society in many transactions, and the establishment of the jural personality of international organizations, with rights and powers embodying that public interest. The state is assuming more modest proportions in law as the positions of the individual and the world society rise in importance. This is the legal situation, but in practice some national states with their efficient controls of thought, economy, and military action appear, in fact, more independent, powerful, and dangerous than ever. Is it possible that the new principles of international law can be realized in practice? There is in fact a great gap between international law and international practice. International law, as expressed in formal documents, has accepted principles similar to those of the municipal law of civilized states. It has assumed that there is a society of men and states capable of preventing self-willed violence by its members, protecting accepted individual and national interests, maintaining its own basic standards, and forwarding its own objectives even when opposed by individual or national demands except in so far as the latter have been recognized as legal rights.

On the other hand, the past generation has witnessed two world wars which devastated important areas of the world and increased the antagonism between national groups. National states utilizing modern devices of public administration, economic control, political education, and propaganda have made more vigorous efforts to become self-sufficient and have been, in some cases, more willing to resort to violence and fraud to increase their power than ever before. The national state seems to have increased in solidarity more rapidly than has the society of nations. As a consequence of general war and of the changes in military technique, the disparity in power between great and little states has increased, smaller states have felt obliged or

been compelled to seek shelter in the sphere of a great neighbor, and the world has tended to organize around two poles, the United States and the Soviet Union, between which hangs an iron curtain of suspicion, and around each of which political organization and military preparation proceed. Germany and Japan remain in undetermined status; hostilities have occurred in Korea, China, Kashmir, Indonesia, Palestine, and Greece; and economic recovery is hampered in spite of strenuous efforts by the United States to distribute the surplus of its economy. Certainly the conditions of the world bear little resemblance to the expectation set forth in legal documents.

Such a disparity between law and conditions, if long continued, may create a general contempt for international law and international institutions, encourage disorder and violence by the dissatisfied, and lead to a general deterioration of civilization out of which tyranny, whether of the extreme right or the extreme left, can grow. Such have been the consequences of similar conditions in the Chinese period of "warring states," ended by the conquest of the Ts'in Emperor in the third century B.C.; in the Hellenistic period, ended by conquest of the Mediterranean area by Rome in the first century B.C.; and in the later Middle Ages, ended in the East by the vast conquests of the Ottomans and in the West by the vaster but less permanent acquisitions of the Hapsburgs during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Today the possibilities of conquest are extended by modern technology beyond the areas of empires of the past to the whole world. If the states of the modern world cannot consent to the development of the United Nations into an organization capable of actually maintaining its law, new wars culminating in universal conquest may occur. Can such a result be avoided? Can the new international law be made effective in spite of the discouraging condition of international politics at the moment?

THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW

In its broadest sense, law implies a realized generalization. In the sense in which the natural sciences use the term, the reality controls the generalization. If facts are observed contrary to existing scientific generalizations, these generalizations must be altered to accord with the facts. On the other hand, in the sense in which jurisprudence uses the term "law," the generalization is intended to control the reality. Generalizations are law if they are enforced. It is, however, recognized that enforcement may be imperfect. It is the essence of a jural law that it may be violated, whereas a scientific law cannot be

violated. If a supposed scientific law is violated, that proves it was not law. Jural law does not follow the facts so closely. Nevertheless, if a supposed jural law is too frequently violated over a period of time, it ceases to be law.

The gap which always exists between jural law and social reality may become so wide that the accepted generalization ceases to be law. The suggestion that there can be such a gap indicates that the sources of jural law are not social behavior. There may be sociological laws, parallel to physical laws, which accurately reflect observed social behavior. They, however, differ from jural law, whose source lies not in the behavior of the society and its members, but in the prevailing opinion of what that behavior ought to be. The ultimate source of jural law is the public opinion within a society concerning values, but it must not be supposed that all the values which public opinion supports are law. Law includes only those values which can be discovered in accepted legal sources and which may be enforced by accepted legal sanctions.

Jural law differs from moral law by the precision of its sources and the objectivity of its sanctions. It also differs from practical law, which describes the methods for achieving particular results. Such law has its source in scientific law and its sanction in the value of its objectives. Jural law, it is true, has sometimes been conceived as a description of the means for the achievement of major social values such as peace, order, prosperity, democracy, the maximization of individual liberty, or, even more generally, "the good society" or "the good man." Such a description, however, while it may justify particular legal rules, especially new legislation, does not indicate the character of the system of jural law as a whole. A system of jural law serves many, often conflicting, ends, both social and individual. Taken as a whole, jural law seeks to do for a society what scientific law does for nature. It seeks to establish certain relatively permanent relationships which, in so far as they can be relied upon, permit prediction within a limited range of probability and thus makes rational planning by individuals and groups possible.

Jural law, therefore, involves four elements—public opinion, jural sources, jural sanctions, and actual enforcement. To be law a rule should be acceptable, just, valid, and effective. The first and last are in a sense outside the jural system, but they provide conditions under which such a system can function. Public opinion attributing a value to certain individual and social interests is the ultimate source of law in any society. Unless there is a relative consensus of opinion on some values, standards, or objectives, there cannot be a society

nor can there be a legal system, but until public opinion has settled upon methods and materials (jural sources) for distinguishing relatively permanent principles of justice from the changing expressions of opinion, there can be no law. Opinion must be disciplined and controlled by jural method and by experts in its application if it is to provide generalizations which will be considered just in the society. But even if accepted sources of law yield propositions embodying justice, there is no law unless the sources, reflecting public opinion, indicate that the just rule, principle, or standard ought to be enforced by the society. Such recognition constitutes the sanction of the generalization, making it a valid rule of law. If however, in spite of such recognition, force is not sufficient, or not sufficiently organized, or not sufficiently applied to make the sanction generally effective, the generalization ceases to be law—the law becomes obsolete.

What has just been said constitutes the democratic or idealistic concept of law. Opinion creates justice, justice creates law, and law develops force for its effective maintenance. There is, however, an autocratic or realistic conception of law which starts at the other end. An authority establishes itself by effective force in a society and, having done so, finds it convenient to govern with rules of a more general application than the special order or decree. So law is born as the relatively permanent and general commands of the ruler. Law in this sense, however, is easier to enforce if it conforms to the society's sense of justice, and justice is discovered through institutions and methods permitting discussion and the generation of a public opinion.

In actual societies, both concepts of law play some part, their relative importance depending on the extent to which individual freedom and social institutions permit, or even encourage, public opinion to form outside government institutions. Where the government, controlling predominant force, also controls instruments of communication and prevents free discussion, law is largely the command of the government. Sovereignty is vested in the ruler, not in the people. Most modern legal systems have, in fact, developed by the autocratic method at first; but at a certain stage order becomes a habit, courts administer justice, individual freedom increases, public opinion develops from extragovernmental sources, and institutions are established to formulate the law. The democratic process then has greater weight. The two processes are well illustrated in the British Constitution. Formally, all law proceeds from the King, who theoretically controls the army and the civil service and is merely advised by the Parliament and the Privy Council. But in fact, law

proceeds from the people who elect Parliament, whose will the King must sanction. The normal sequence, under which a legal order develops through the creation first of executive authority to keep the peace, then judicial authority to settle disputes, and finally legislative and administrative authority, illustrates this process. Public opinion cannot be closely related to law in a dynamic society until "democratic" legislative and administrative procedures have been established.

International law, differing from most systems of municipal law, developed by the democratic process in its early stages, but among autocratic governments rather than among peoples. It has grown primarily from the consent of governments, manifested expressly by treaties or tacitly by custom. The opinion of the people, however, has had some influence through the conception of "natural law" and maxims of justice which formulate systems of rules, principles, and standards reflecting the general opinion as shaped by the prevailing religious, ethical, and philosophical thought. In the early history of international law, when it applied only in the society of the Christian states of Europe, "natural law" was a very important influence on its development.

The sanctions of international law have, however, been inadequate. Opinion, both popular and governmental, distinguished international law from international morality by assuming that states could in principle resort to reprisals to enforce their rights and that collective action to prevent grave breaches of international law was permissible and desirable. Yet no positive arrangements for enforcement were established by general or customary international law, and few such arrangements were established by particular treaties. There was no force of the society of nations as a whole to deal with recalcitrant states, and international law left it to the states to deal with recalcitrant individuals. It has been the objective of the League of Nations and of the United Nations to provide more adequate sanctions by organizing forces superior to those of any state.

It has, however, always been clear that the application of force against very powerful organizations, whatever may be its theory, is more likely in fact to resemble war than police action. The effectiveness of law enforcement depends upon the disparity between the force at the disposal of the legal order and the force at the disposal of the lawbreaker. If this disparity is of the order of a million to one, as it is when modern states deal with individuals within their jurisdiction, law enforcement is not difficult. When, however, the ratio is of the order of only three or four to one, the situation is

very different. The victory of the legal order over the lawbreaking state is by no means certain, and resistance by that state may require the legal order to resort to hostilities which have all the material characteristics of war. When the participants approach equality in actual power, war in the material sense results, even though they differ greatly in legal position.

This situation can be observed within states as well as within the society of states. A state faced by a violation of law by a huge corporation or a huge labor union has great difficulty in law enforcement; and when a state is faced by large groups of armed rebels or insurgents, civil war may result. Consequently, it is clear that if effective sanctions are to be established for the maintenance of law, not only must there be an organization of the entire society of nations placing major forces at its disposal; enforcement must also be against individuals rather than against states. It is true that the guilty individual, if a member of a government or a chief of state, may be able to utilize the state's forces to protect himself from seizure. There is, however, the possibility that most of the population can be induced to accept the opinion that such an individual, having violated international law, has also violated the state's constitution and no longer deserves protection.

The launching of sanctions against the individual, therefore, provides a greater possibility of depriving him of the aid of the state's forces than if the sanctions were directed against the state itself. This development has been recognized in principle in the Nuremberg trials and in the Genocide Convention; but the forces of international politics, anxious to maintain the solidarity of the national state, oppose the realization of this development. The state, it is said, must be kept united at all costs in order to preserve internal order and to prevent external invasion. Thus the national legal order may be in conflict with the international legal order, and since the national legal orders have been supported by powerful sentiments of nationalism in most states, the international legal order has been weak. Do the conditions of international politics offer opportunities for modifying this situation?

THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Politics is the art of creating and maintaining groups and of achieving their policies against the opposition of other groups. Politicians who would create new national states or a world state find themselves opposed by other politicians who want to maintain their own states,

the existence of which is threatened by such movements. Politicians who want to achieve the policies of their own states, whether of internal development or of external expansion, find themselves opposed by the politicians of other states pursuing conflicting policies. Such opposition becomes particularly intransigent if certain national politicians think the success of the policy of others will change the relative power position of states to their own disadvantage, and thus in the long run threaten the existence of their states.

The ceaseless play of politics in the modern world operates within a basic structure of some seventy national territorial states claiming to be sovereign in the sense of freedom limited only by international law. It concerns the creation of new states, the maintenance of old states, and the achieving of state policies. The state system which began in Europe with the elimination of the theoretically supreme power of Pope and Emperor in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has resulted in the elimination of many small states, in the extension of the system to include the world, in an increasing disparity in power between small and great states, and in a decreasing number of great states. At the beginning of this development, there are said to have been three thousand European states, and there were certainly a greater number of extra-European chieftains, tribes, kingdoms, and empires, all of them fighting occasionally, but usually locally. Now there are two great centers of power, and the remaining seventy-odd states, with the exception of a few buffer neutrals, gather around them as satellites, allies, or friends. As the tension between the two poles increases, the possibility has to be considered of a war which would, if it occurred, be world-wide and catastrophic.

During this process, there have at times been periods of relative peace and stability, separated by other periods of continuous war and partial anarchy. In so far as stability has existed, it has been because the power and the alliances of states were in such relation that no state could expand without the prospect of facing so many others opposing it that it would certainly fail. Such a condition would clearly be promoted if each state pursued the policy of "balance of power," which meant that it would join with others to weaken any member of the community of nations which was getting so powerful as to threaten the balance. Stability under this system depended on skillful pursuit of such a policy, but it was always recognized that such action might require a country to violate international law. Statesmen were frequently faced by a moral dilemma: if they observed law, the equilibrium might be so disturbed that the system upon which the law rested would be shattered. If, on the other hand, they pursued

policies to prevent disturbances of the equilibrium, they would often have to intervene in a manner contrary to international law and thus contribute to the weakening and perhaps the destruction of that law.

The classical writers on international law—Gentili, Grotius, Vattel—assumed that intervention or war "is only permissible in order to redress an injury received, or to protect ourselves from an injury with which we are threatened" and that "power alone does not constitute a threat of injury" because we cannot be sure it will be used wrongfully. Augmentation of the power of a state does, however, always disturb the equilibrium because of the expectation, justified by experience if not by principle, that the state will commit aggression when it has become sufficiently powerful to do so with impunity. International lawyers have discussed at length the dilemma presented by these assumptions (see *Yale Law Journal, LV* [August 1946], 876 ff.), as have responsible statesmen on numerous occasions. When the younger Pitt sought to justify war with France in 1793 on balance-of-power principles, Sir James Mackintosh and others of the opposition insisted that the war was not just on principles of the law of nations. On the other hand, when Neville Chamberlain one hundred and forty-five years later pursued a policy, deemed legally correct, of nonintervention in the affairs of Hitlerite Germany, he was attacked by Winston Churchill and others for neglecting steps necessary to prevent destruction of the balance of power.

Consideration of this dilemma illustrates the difficulty of getting out of the system of states organized by a balance of power into a system of states organized by effective law. Efforts to make such a change gradually imply that states must reach a stage when they will rely upon an international organization for the enforcement of law before they can be certain that that organization is actually strong enough or workable enough to protect their rights. Such faith may lead to their destruction, as it nearly did in the case of China in 1931, Ethiopia in 1935, and Czechoslovakia in 1938. Reliance by these states upon international law and the League of Nations proved to be more hazardous than would have been acceptance of the system of power politics, and action in accord with its precepts to increase their strength, to find allies, and to defend themselves.

But, on the other hand, efforts to make such a change suddenly by establishing a world government with adequate legal and material power to enforce law throughout the world, somewhat as the United States established its constitution in 1787, seems equally impracticable. By the act of accepting such an effective constitution, states would have to surrender the very sovereignty which it is the prime

purpose of their governments to maintain. Instead of being killed by a disruption of the equilibrium of power through premature reliance upon a nonenforceable law, they would commit suicide by immolating themselves in a world state over which they would exercise only a small degree of control. Sudden establishment of world authority able to maintain law may, it is true, occur not by consent but by compulsion, and that would be likely to leave less of independence to the states than would a federation to which they consented.

States may, therefore, have to consider the following alternatives: (1) an unstable, probably increasingly unstable, balance of power sustained by cold war in a bipolar world; (2) a world federation enforcing law upon individuals in matters of world concern and thus reducing the national sovereignty of all; or (3) world empire established by conquest by that state which emerges from a world stricken by atomic war. Governments following tradition incline to choose the first alternative. The latter would probably be regarded as the worst of the alternatives. Many would say the second is the best but unachievable either suddenly or gradually. The answer to the dilemma, if there is one, cannot be found by logic, but only by history. Steps in the right direction may permit further steps until in time, objectives which seemed impossible may be realized. "Leg after leg," as the saying is, "the dog got to Dover."

BALANCE OF LAW AND POLITICS

The difference between a world regime of law and a world regime of power politics is not that the latter rests on balance of power and the former on union of power, but rather that the latter rests on a simple balance and the former on a complex balance. National states rest on complex equilibria of power. There are balances between parties, between local and national authorities, between departments of government, between regional groups and functional groups, among businesses, churches, universities, societies, government agencies, and other organizations. Even in the most centralized despotisms, equilibria between cliques at the top and classes at the bottom can be detected, and there are always local movements of incipient revolt balancing and qualifying the despotism at the center. The more constitutional and democratic the state, the more complex the equilibrium. Simplicity, which is so dear to the hearts of the masses and so useful to the propagandists, is the road either to despotism or to social disintegration, violence, and anarchy.

The balance of power in world politics has been characterized by its simplicity, and as the number of participating states has been reduced and the great states have become vastly superior to the lesser in power, the system has become simpler and consequently less stable.

If a law-governed world is to develop peacefully from the present situation, statesmen must seek to make the balance more complicated. The building of the power of Western Europe, of the British Commonwealth, of the Middle East, of the Far East, of Latin America, and perhaps eventually of Central Europe, as offsets to the power of the United States and the Soviet Union, would help. Even more, the building of the power of the United Nations as an element in power politics would help. Practices, interpretations, and supplementary conventions may do much to reduce the frustrating influence of the veto and to increase the capacity of the United Nations to act promptly and with material force. Even if amendment of the Charter remains for a long time impossible because of the veto, even if the United Nations for a long time or indefinitely lacks the power to coerce the more powerful states by its own efforts, still it may, by throwing what weight it has always on the side of the law, give an assurance of predominance to that side. It can always be expected that in any emergency some of the important states will defend the law. If the United Nations itself were able to play a vigorous role in world politics, the old dilemma between supporting international law and maintaining the balance of power may be solved. By sustaining the United Nations, they will be sustaining both law and political equilibrium.

But the balance in a stable world must be more than a balance of military power. The development of the functional organizations giving service to peoples and the development of a world public opinion insistent upon the achievement of certain standards and of progress toward certain objectives may make the balance even more complex. World political parties may also prove complicating factors. Rivalries between great religious groups and between world-wide business corporations would also reduce the relative importance of rivalries between states. With the evolution of complexity, a degree of stability may emerge within which law-maintenance institutions may be able to function with greater assurance.

If world-minded statesmen prove as skillful in building the United Nations as national-minded statesmen have been in building national states, much may become possible. But their action will be politics. Law and politics are not in opposition but co-operate as the stabilizing and the dynamic elements in a progressive society. When politics

is complicated, law can predominate as long as it is not so comprehensive, so inflexible, or so unadapted to the situation as to leave no room for the progressive influence of politics. In a stable society politics must function subject to law, but also it must continually change the law. To achieve that result a delicate balance between the political and the juristic organs of society is necessary.

The situation of international law is not hopeless. The atomic bomb has driven into the minds of men everywhere the need for a more cohesive society of nations. International law has formulated these demands in new rules and standards of justice. The United Nations and its specialized agencies exist as visible organs of the world society and as mechanisms for peaceful political action. If United Nations statesmen, regional statesmen, statesmen of the great nations and of the lesser nations, statesmen of each of the functional organizations, statesmen of churches, of business corporations, of universities, of all sorts of organizations and societies all develop their groups so as to maintain a multiplicity of initiatives in the world, some co-operating, some opposing, all limited in their activity by others, the new international law may be realized in fact as well as in aspiration.

THE END OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

H. Stuart Hughes

I SET OUT for Europe last summer with certain fairly clear ideas concerning recent political developments that might be worth investigating, but the outbreak of the Korean war upset many previous calculations. Originally, I intended to look into what I vaguely called neoconservatism, in a political and social sense. The Korean crisis subordinated internal politics to military considerations. Yet this deflection from my original purpose was far from being pure loss. The outbreak of avowed war between the Communist and the Western worlds simplified and clarified my original task as an observer. It established in sharp outline what I had previously sensed as mere drift or hypothesis.

To Western Europe the Korean war could not possibly bring the unquestioning unity with which the United States responded to a sudden external challenge. The philosophical problem of communism and the nightmare of a second military occupation had penetrated too deeply for that. But Korea provided a new basis for reconsidering familiar dilemmas. It offered the occasion for a full-scale ideological examination of conscience. Or, more precisely, it gave the final push in a slow reorientation that had been in progress ever since the end of the Second World War.

Since Korea, the prospect of war has become an immediate reality. That is the most obvious lesson of recent months. Europeans who earlier clung to a narrow hope that peace might be preserved now regard a general war as virtually inevitable. And those who already believed in the imminence of war find themselves facing the realization of their predictions—the awakening to bleak actuality after the heady delights of abstract prophecy. Europeans of both types now confront the distressingly practical question of what they, personally, will do when the terrible day arrives.

To a cultivated middle-class citizen of France, Italy, or Western Germany (and that is what the American observer actually has in mind when he tries to analyze the sentiments of a "European"), war means above all Soviet occupation and communist rule. This is the

real fear, far more than the sensational but more nebulous menace of the atomic bomb. The educated European feels that it is simply impossible to go through another occupation. Even the certainty of an eventual liberation would not alter this conclusion. With the physical and psychological wreckage of 1944-45 in mind, the European has come to the firm conviction that the Continent cannot stand another liberation.

There was a time when a great many noncommunist intellectuals could regard the prospect of Soviet occupation with considerable equanimity. The intellectual, they reasoned, could find his place in any society, and the Soviet government had proved itself notably generous in the favors it had bestowed on its writers, artists, and scientists. Events in the satellite states of Eastern Europe and an increasing comprehension of the realities of Soviet society have virtually swept away these illusions. There is, of course, a minority of intellectuals and even businessmen (perhaps most of whom, characteristically enough, have no past record of left-wing sympathies) who are making confused and timid efforts to establish themselves as future collaborationists. But most of these people—whom one Italian journalist has compared to those who start hoarding groceries at the first rumor of war—will doubtless eventually realize the futility of their present gestures. The same can be said of the intellectually more respectable school of thought known as "neutralism." American commentators have been inclined to take the neutralists somewhat more literally than they themselves intend, perhaps, and have failed to distinguish the part that bravado, oversubtlety, and *esprit de contradiction* have played in their arguments. In sum, the bulk of Western European intellectuals not irrevocably committed to communism see the future in terms neither of dignified neutrality nor of more or less difficult collaboration but of a firing squad or a line of deportees starting off on the long journey to Siberia.

We have spoken of businessmen and intellectuals in the same breath. This is the second lesson of the past few months. With a considerable sense of shock, the mildly leftist European intellectual has come to the realization that he shares the fate of the "capitalist" whom his professional formation had led him to hate, or at least distrust. They both form parts of the same ruling class which a communist regime would necessarily seek to destroy. In the event of military defeat—or even before it, if in the meantime no serious common defense had been organized—they would join in the same stampede of the elites across the Channel or over the Pyrenees.

Both groups share the conviction that a second occupation would

be far worse than the first. Under the Nazis it was possible for most members of the ruling classes to lead reasonably normal lives—with the important exception of those who were of Jewish origin. In the past two or three years, as individuals have begun to talk more frankly of their wartime activities, we have come to realize that the majority of these people neither resisted nor collaborated, that they were able to steer a careful course between heroism and humiliating concession. And in this the predilections of the fascist rulers aided them. In origin, fascism represented an effort to buttress the European elites, and even in its extreme form of Nazism it never quite lost sight of this goal. A Westerner, even a left-wing intellectual, as he thinks back on the fascist experience, recalls a certain air of familiarity, of remaining within the European tradition. At the thought of Soviet occupation, whatever may be his conscious political affiliation, he instinctively shudders as at something barbarous and alien. He is now ready to grant—grudgingly, perhaps—as he might not have done a year ago, that communism is "worse" than fascism. This is the starting point for the ideological reversal of alliances.

A few national comparisons may epitomize the change dramatically. Britain, the shining example, the hope of noncommunist socialism, has found itself under attack by Continental intellectuals for its "isolationist" hesitation to adhere to the Schuman plan or to strengthen the Council of Europe. Britain's antithesis, Franco Spain, has suddenly come within sight of success in its protracted struggle for international acceptance: moderate leftists, who once could scarcely bear the mention of Franco's name, now point to the virtual cessation of resistance activities within Spain itself and grant that there is some merit in Franco's contention that his only sin was to recognize the communist menace somewhat earlier than the rest. Those who persist in excluding Spain from the Western community now fall back on the rather feeble argument that public opinion in France and Britain is not ready for it. Perhaps opinion has changed faster than they think.

The attitudes of the international-minded Frenchman toward his own country and its two most important neighbors demonstrate how far the reorientation has already gone. Regarding Western Germany, he is less inclined to attack the Adenauer government as "reactionary" and nationalistic than he was a year ago. He sees that the latter quality at least may be a positive advantage in a situation in which the German Federal Republic will in due course become the military ally of France. (The extent to which informed, noncommunist French-

men are now ready to accept the principle of German rearmament is perhaps the most striking index of the psychological shift that the past year has brought.) He bewails the industrial slackness and low rate of productivity in his own country—and speaks admiringly of a Germany in which an official policy of ruthless *laissez faire* combined with unemployment has united the entrepreneurial and laboring classes in a common cult of hard work. Traditionally scornful of Italian political competence, the French observer now grants that Italy enjoys a governmental stability that France may well envy and a police force amply capable of suppressing all forms of internal dissent.

In short, the thoughtful Frenchman—of whatever political faith—finds that in certain important respects his country is more deficient than its neighbors in the qualities that the present emergency demands. In particular, he sees that France—the logical leader of the western part of the Continent—for lack of a strong government, cannot properly assume this position of leadership. For nearly a century the French have prided themselves on providing the classic example of the more doctrinaire, ultraindividualistic forms of political democracy. In this sense they have played the role of schoolmasters to the Continent. Yet at the same time, for at least thirty years, they have been witnessing the gradual technical obsolescence of their prevailing radical doctrine—a doctrine to which the Fourth Republic has shown a surprising fidelity despite the losses of organized radicalism. The events of 1950 have at length dramatized this obsolescence for all except the most stubborn political individualists.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that France should find itself in a state of even more than the customary ideological confusion. The search for administrative strength cuts across party lines. Conservative patriots disregard Jules Moch's Socialist affiliations in praising his qualifications as Minister of Defense: as Minister of the Interior in 1947 and 1948 he proved his vigor and competence in taking stern measures against communist strikers. In a party sense, Gaullism has undoubtedly lost strength since reaching a high point in the autumn of 1947, but the technical needs, the mentality which created Gaullism have grown more compelling in the past few months. One might characterize the dominant political philosophy of conservatives and moderates as "Gaullism without De Gaulle."

Throughout Western Europe one senses the same groping, pragmatic search for a political formula that will fit the agonizing needs of the present hour. The psychological temper of the times and the necessity for firm leadership dictate a basic conservatism. But must it be a conservatism which offers no hope to the working classes?

The space devoted by the conservative French press to recent German experiments in worker participation in industrial management *(Mitbestimmungsrecht)* is symptomatic. In the same category is the complaint of a French industrialist that American representatives abroad appear to favor only the *laissez-faire* features of capitalism: why is the Truman administration reluctant to license for export the *dirigisme* that it practices at home? A strong government—primarily that—but a strong government with a "social policy": such is the new-old formula around which revolve the more discerning efforts to reclassify ideologies.

Into this reclassification is tumbled the wreckage of the political faiths that for generations sustained the hopes of thoughtful Europeans. The process of ideological dissolution which began thirty years ago with the first successes of Italian Fascism and which the disillusionments following the Second World War notably accelerated now seems to have reached its logical conclusion. In the words of one of the speakers at the French Radical-Socialist congress last September, "There are only two parties . . . the Communist party and the immense party of fear."

Quite predictably, the Left is the hardest hit. The Left, vociferously ideological and doctrinaire, was more vulnerable to this sort of slow corrosion than the Right, which had learned skepticism and adaptability from its defeats of the last century. In fact, the end of the *mystique* of the Left is the clearest sign of what has happened. The old French political slogan "no enemies to the Left" has now become an obvious affront to common sense. Communism, except for those committed, has virtually lost the vague, vertiginous charm that helped it through three decades of bewildering doctrinal variation. "That great light in the East"—to use the title of a Jules Romains volume—now glimmers most uncertainly.

Socialism as a political faith has very nearly abdicated. Caught in its insoluble dilemmas, organized socialism sees itself attacked by its followers for its flagging ideological militancy, and by outsiders for playing ideology-as-usual while Europe faces its supreme crisis. Critics can point out with impunity that by overthrowing government after government the Socialist party has heavily contributed to the political instability of France since 1945. Socialist militants counter with the complaint that their leaders have become "governmental" at the expense of their principles. The eventual choice appears inescapable. Despite Kurt Schumacher's success in keeping his German Social Democrats in opposition, despite the plucky efforts of Silone and

Romita's little band of Italian "unitary" Socialists to remain independent of both the government and the Communists, the governmental current in Western European socialism has been gaining. The Korean war and the resultant call for Western unity have naturally accelerated this process. Under present circumstances, a party that has chosen the course of participation in government can scarcely avoid the taint of conservatism, the negation of ideology currently associated with political power.

By the same process of reclassification, the word "fascism" has lost most of its terrors. In conservative circles many people avoid the term entirely. If pressed for an explanation, they dismiss it as simply a big noise in the leftist battery of injurious epithets—forgetting, apparently, that Mussolini once trumpeted it with pride. The bolder spirits do not only suggest a rehabilitation of fascist ideals; but in private conversation they will raise the question whether something resembling fascism, shorn of its exaggerated and harmful racist associations, might not answer the needs of the hour. And they will show no hesitation in launching a counteroffensive against those who cry "fascist" or "reactionary" at conservative governments. To quote Raymond Aron, who, despite his Gaullist leanings, is universally esteemed as the most penetrating of French columnists:

". . . They call the Bonn government 'reactionary,' as though all the governments of the world must constantly take an examination in democracy from the men of the Left, as though it were a question, in Asia and in Europe, of a simple ideological rivalry. In reality, here as well as there, we are engaged in a trial of strength."

If it is to be a trial of armed strength, this clairvoyant minority reasons, then the West can afford to neglect no administrative and police procedures—however disreputable a name they may bear—that might speed the work of material and psychological rearmament.

Even the word "democracy" is losing its sacrosanct character, or at least it is undergoing a redefinition. Of the two major parts of the most generalized contemporary definition of democracy—individual freedom and government by universal suffrage—it is only the former that has retained its power to inspire enthusiasm and sacrifice. The prestige of personal liberty has never been higher; the struggle with communism has given it renewed vigor. Even the neofascists pay it respect. No political program which openly proposed a reduction of the traditional Western freedoms would stand a chance in the present political atmosphere. French Gaullists, for example, strenuously deny any intention of whittling down the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

Strictly speaking, however, the tradition of the Western freedoms bears no necessary relation to democracy. Historically, these freedoms belong to the heritage of limited constitutional government and of liberal political philosophy—antedating, and at some periods in conflict with, the aspirations of the democratic parties. In this sense, European intellectuals appear to be returning to an earlier stage of thought. They are trying to re-establish the purity of the liberal tradition without much regard for its later democratic accretions. Not that they reject the machinery of popular representation through universal suffrage. They simply do not pay much attention to it. In this, they reflect the reactions of the average citizen, whose enthusiasm for the electoral process has remained tepid ever since the Communists and fascists first cast doubt on its efficacy.

Here and there an intellectual has begun to subject to critical scrutiny the process of electoral democracy itself. This would not be news if the writers were former fascists or showed neofascist sympathies. The significant new feature is that they are thoroughly "respectable" citizens, of liberal convictions and unblemished antifascist reputation. Last summer the weekly *Il Mondo,* the mouthpiece of the more conservative members of the numerically weak but intellectually eminent Italian Third Force, opened a discussion on electoral democracy with an article by Ernesto Rossi. In boldly paradoxical vein Rossi suggested a revival of the ancient Athenian or Florentine tradition of choosing public officials by lot—but only from a list of specially qualified citizens. The reply of one of the editors, Panfilo Gentile, was remarkable at least as much for what it omitted as for what it said. Passing over all the more optimistic arguments of democratic apologists, Gentile confined himself to a purely negative defense. The democratic principle, he asserted, is not based "on the infallibility of popular judgment, as the classical writers of democracy once claimed . . . but on its very opposite, on the fallibility of all judgments." Since no elite, no matter how talented, can have a monopoly of right thinking, a sense of tolerance and a respect for free discussion will lead us back to the traditional method of choosing public officials by a simple count of heads. Yet Gentile does not dissociate himself entirely from what he calls the "revolt of the notables." In conclusion, he suggests the reinvigoration of the bicameral system—now rendered meaningless, in most countries, by the reforms that have extended the selection of the so-called upper house to the same universal electorate that chooses the popular chamber. Concretely, he envisages the revival of such "undemocratic" practices as co-optation, nomination of senators by

the chief of state, or the award of senatorial seats to the holders of certain exalted public functions. The talents of the Italian Third Force, shut out from effective power by the electoral successes of Christian Democracy, have quite naturally been led to re-examine in more critical temper the whole electoral process.

In Rossi's article we are not surprised to find both Tocqueville and Ortega y Gasset quoted with respect and sympathy. Western European intellectuals apparently are not yet ready for the rehabilitation of the more aggressive antidemocratic thinkers of a generation or two ago, such as Pareto and Spengler. But the process of ideological re-evaluation may soon be moving fast enough to include even the avowed precursors of Italian and German fascism. Meantime, the more gentle, the more liberal-minded, of the critics of democracy enjoy high favor. The cultured, aristocratic skepticism of a Tocqueville, a Mosca, or an Ortega well exemplifies the mood of the mid-century.

Skepticism about electoral democracy, skepticism about Marxism —it is probably the latter that has left the greater void. The extent of this void will become more apparent if we consider for a moment the vision of the future that a clear-sighted European can sensibly entertain.

Such a vision is necessarily based on the hypothesis of a fortunate war—that is, a successful resistance to a Soviet attack on Western Europe—or, preferably, a long period of semimobilization. Neither prospect is particularly attractive. Yet the alternative of Soviet occupation (with or without eventual liberation) is impossible to contemplate. In any case, just at the moment that life was beginning to return to something like normal, the Western European last summer found himself facing the prospect of a new period of stringency and sacrifice—and with no logical end in sight. During the Second World War, even in its most discouraging moments, the technical possibilities of Allied victory and the necessary strategy of that victory were apparent to all. This time such possibilities are far from clear, and the European finds it difficult to think beyond the most basic hope for cultural survival.

Thus he confronts a future in which his life will be dominated by the necessities of war preparation. And he sees that in such a situation, the ideological differences—the issues dividing capitalist and partly socialist states—that now characterize the Western coalition may cease to be of much practical importance. Pressed by the same necessities, these states will doubtless begin to resemble each other, however much they may ostensibly cling to their original ideological

allegiances. A temperamental conservatism and governmental intervention in economic life will both be required. Today they appear to be in conflict. Yet in a few years it may be difficult to distinguish the semisocialism of London from the ultracapitalism of Bonn. The maintenance of a ruling class—the old elite of capitalism either alone or combined with the newer elite of trade-union leadership—in conjunction with a "social" policy aimed at the equalization of sacrifice: this would seem to be the coming formula. Perhaps it will resemble what Mr. Burnham would once have called the "managerial" state.

In this prospect, the Western European finds no room for a rise in living standards. At best, he hopes to hold on to what he already has. The Marshall Plan has saved him from despair. But most of its promises for tangible social betterment have been necessarily deferred, with the virtual merger of the European Recovery Program into the drive for rearmament. Now when the European talks of better times he thinks less of the future than of the past—and more particularly of the era 1900-1910, which glows in remote memory as a kind of golden decade. The general prosperity, the vague and confident hopes for the future, the present triumph of political radicalism and the approaching triumph of socialism: these are the things his grandfather knew and which he has lost forever. It is a weary continent indeed that can hope for nothing better than a return to 1910.

What has really gone glimmering is the promise of social equality. In the year 1950, the only sort of equality that most cultivated Europeans can see before them is a leveling up and down to a lower middle-class standard of respectable grubbiness—the kind of daily living of which George Orwell gave so chilling a description in his *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and of which Britain under the Labour Government has provided a dignified foretaste. This is not the notion of equality which once inspired death on the barricades and the consecrated lives of professional revolutionaries. Having lost its fervor, it frequently appears to be little more than another psychological device at the disposition of governments in preparing their peoples for war. A skeptical generation has lost its confidence in the reality or even perhaps in the desirability of social equality. The whole notion is beginning to be dismissed as a sentimental catchword of outdated ideologists. The common man has lost his aura of saint-hood. Those who a decade ago spoke of the century of the common man were perhaps simply in error by a hundred years: it was the

century that was ending rather than the century that was opening before them.

This is what, in concrete terms, the "end of political ideology" means. It represents a substantial victory for the skeptical political theorists of the early twentieth century, for men like Pareto and Mosca, over a tradition of faith in ideas and in reason at least two hundred years old. It means the triumph of the political concepts associated with force and irrational sentiment, the necessarily elitist organization of society, and the basically illusory character of social reform—and with it the discrediting of politics as reason in action, the virtue of majorities, and progress as a social faith. The course of this victory can be traced through the past half century as a kind of textbook example in the diffusion of ideas. Two generations ago the anti-ideologists won their battle on the theoretical level—in the sense that they proved themselves sharper observers and analysts of the political realities around them than their opponents of the liberal, democratic, and socialist schools. A generation later, with the first communist and fascist revolutions, the same concepts revealed their efficacy in action. At the present time, in the shadow of the Third World War, these ideas have at length passed into the consciousness of the average educated citizen of the West—a totalitarian by neither allegiance nor sentiment, but a "democratically-minded" citizen of a free society driven to unpalatable conclusions against his will.

A penetrating British observer, Isaiah Berlin, has noted a similar "shift of emphasis away from disagreement about political principles (and from party struggles which sprang from genuine differences of moral and spiritual outlook) towards disagreements, ultimately technical, about methods. . . ." And he adds that this "growing lack of interest in long-term political issues . . . on the part of the populations of the Western European continent . . . is occasionally deplored by shocked American and British observers who falsely ascribe it to the growth of cynicism and disenchantment with ideals." The American, whose political vocabulary has remained basically nineteenth-century, can scarcely fail to be disconcerted by the political sophistication of his Continental ally.

This applies particularly to the American "liberal"—to use the term in the special and historically inaccurate sense which it acquired in the New Deal era. His intellectual formation, his political interests have ill prepared him for the effort of adjustment that he is now called upon to make. For twenty years he lived in the conviction that

virtue necessarily lay on the Left. His happiest moments were spent in the innocent occupation of ideology-mongering. During the thirties, the concentration on internal policy characteristic of the first five years of the Roosevelt administration enabled him to screen out from his consciousness the true proportions of the international crisis. Later the struggle against fascism helped create the illusion that all good causes were ultimately reconcilable. The result was the mentality that Lionel Trilling has mercilessly dissected in *The Middle of the Journey*. The war and the liberation of the European continent brought little change in the central focus of interest. It remained ideological—political and moral; each tender new shoot in the garden of European democracy became the object of respectful attention and hope. With the Marshall Plan, social and economic considerations advanced to the front rank. But nearly invariably the military question lay far in the background.

And now, quite unprepared, the American liberal finds himself facing the only, the agonizing current question: Will there be the necessary force—variously estimated at from thirty to seventy-five divisions—on hand for the defense of Western Europe when the critical hour strikes?

In the general war he sees approaching, the European observes two faces. These two faces mirror exactly the paradoxes of his present ideological position.

The first aspect is of course the defense of the Western freedoms. Necessarily this view of the coming war occupies the foreground: it is the "pure" aspect, the only one that can create a genuine, disinterested enthusiasm. And the reality of the European's devotion to liberty found eloquent expression last summer in the two meetings which brought together, first, the intellectuals, and second, the parliamentary leaders of the West: the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin and the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. At both gatherings old political divisions were forgotten, and the delegates reached an impressive unity in pledging themselves to a common resistance against the threat of tyranny.

Unvoiced at Berlin or Strasbourg, yet inextricably bound up with the struggle for freedom, is the second aspect of the coming war: the defense of the established order. Even the intellectuals, who might be supposed to stand exclusively for the abstract cause of liberty, are by a thousand hidden strands, unconsciously perhaps or even against their will, tied in with existing relations of wealth and class.

The organization of education, of the press, of benevolent endowments and private patronage substantially commits the great majority of them to the existing structure of society. Try as he may to dissociate himself from a purely material defense of his heritage, the honest intellectual finds it virtually impossible.

This second aspect of the conflict between East and West is the only one that makes much sense in Asia. There the concept of the defense of inherited liberties can obviously have little meaning. Hence the profound psychological disadvantage at which the Western forces are operating in their series of local wars on the Asiatic continent. Even in Europe, however, this second aspect of the struggle constantly undercuts the abstractly impregnable intellectual position which the defense of freedom implies. For all its electoral losses, for all its transparent dishonesty, communism in France and Italy can still claim to speak for the dispossessed. The militant wing of the poor has remained communist in allegiance. Under such circumstances, a large segment of the defenders of the West will remember enough of their past ideologies to go into battle with an uneasy conscience.

It is perhaps logical that the only Europeans still resolutely ideology-minded are the rank and file of communism. They have remained back with Marx in the era of abstract principles and apocalyptic hopes. They do not seem to know or care that their leaders long ago—some consciously, the majority simply by pragmatic adjustment—abandoned the realms of ideology for the more practical sphere of human manipulation.

To these devoted followers the coming war can appear as a sharply defined conflict between progress and reaction. For more subtle Europeans, however, the struggle will take shape in all its tragic ambiguity: as the defense of a priceless heritage of freedom in essential conjunction with a structure of society in which its guardians themselves no longer have any profound belief. As a possible comfort, they may reflect that a similar lack of clarity characterized both of the previous world wars. And yet they were fought and won through memorable examples of devotion and sacrifice. Viewed in historical perspective, the First World War appears as the last and greatest of the family struggles within the Western society. It lacked ideological form until Wilson imposed one from the outside. In contrast, the Second World War manifested ideology at every turn. Yet it was a three-cornered conflict, in which the two Western contenders were compelled in turn to rely on the Soviet outsider to break their

even balance. In such a situation, it was not surprising that the political education of the American soldier should have proved an impossibility.

This time the West is at length united in a single bloc. Yet the final compound betrays the diversity of the ideological elements that have gone into it. The creeds of "progress"—liberalism, democracy, socialism—have made their peace with what remains of traditional conservatism. And the teachings of the twentieth-century antidemocrats—which transformed the old conservatism in denying the ultimate validity of all ideologies—are winning respectability as they shed their extremist memories and their ugly name. Is it surprising, then, that the new conservatism of 1950, the political philosophy of the last stand, should have fused all ideologies in an unresolved concord in which the one clear note is the name of freedom?

SANITY AND THE COLD WAR

Anatol Rapoport

Gwen Goodrich Rapoport

Alfonso Shimbel

There is no royal road to Utopia.[1] There is, however, one difficult exercise to which we may accustom ourselves as we become increasingly culture conscious. We may train ourselves to pass judgment upon the dominant traits of our own civilization . . .

Appraisal of our own dominant traits has so far waited till the trait in question was no longer a living issue. Religion was not objectively discussed till it was no longer the cultural trait to which our civilization was most deeply committed. Now for the first time the comparative study of religions is free to pursue any point at issue. It is not yet possible to discuss capitalism in the same way, and during wartime, warfare and the problems of international relations are similarly tabu. Yet the dominant traits of our civilization need special scrutiny.

Miss Benedict then goes on to say, in effect, that many of these traits can be described as compulsions to act or react in certain ways. Critical appraisals of the origins of such compulsions often reveal that they are not necessarily indicative of basic and essential human needs but rather of local prejudices and fears which have become overgrown. Or one can put it this way. In a crisis, people attach enormous importance to their outlooks, abstractions, and evaluations, and become incapable of appraising the effectiveness of their own reactions in dealing with the crisis. Later, much later, when the situation is "no longer a living issue," the distortions, delusions, and blind spots can be analyzed.

Thus the futility of the great world wars is most evident in the case of the most ancient wars. The senselessness of the Rome-Carthage struggle is probably evident to most people. The futility of the religious wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is perhaps somewhat less evident. The issues of the 1914-18 affair

[1] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934).

are still debated. But a great many people today are convinced that the recent world war was necessary and justifiable.

Now, five years later, we seem to be on the verge of another world war, again between two "mutually exclusive ideologies." One ventures to guess that the present crisis is psychically harder on the individual than the earlier ones. The Roman citizen, for example, was probably convinced by Cato's slogan *Delenda est Carthago*. We, however, are plagued with ambivalence. It is "moral" for us to disavow war vehemently as a national policy and at the same time to prepare for it with the utmost energy. We abhor the domination of one country by another by force or by threat of force; yet we rely more and more on the threat of force to oppose such domination.

The existence of such contradictions within a cultural pattern usually leads to a "rationale." In our culture, which relies so heavily on verbal expression of attitudes, this rationale is comparatively easy to describe and to examine. In accordance with Ruth Benedict's advice to engage in self-study, we shall attempt to examine this rationale before it is "no longer a living issue."

The rationale pictures the present crisis as a struggle between two "ways of life," labeled Western Democracy and Communist Dictatorship. The relations between the two worlds are described as analogous to those between the "democracies" and the "aggressor nations" in the period 1935–39. At first sight, the analogy seems compelling. One can abstract from the political structure of the communist countries striking similarities to the former political structures of the "aggressor nations," Germany, Italy, and Japan. Usually, however, the analyses of political structure are not far-reaching: they are not based on the social realities which underlay the fascist régimes of the thirties and which underlie the communist two-fifths of the world today. More commonly the newspaper picture of the totalitarian régimes is used, that is, their most publicized features, such as controlled press, concentration camps, official state philosophies, cynical disregard for objectivity, and the obvious manipulation of great masses of people by the use of holy symbols. Because of these common traits, the concept "dictatorship" seems useful. Even though the opposite concept "democracy" is by no means as clear-cut, it nevertheless becomes possible to classify régimes as "dictatorships" and "democracies," if one simply lumps under the latter category those régimes whose leaders oppose the policies of the "dictatorships." The classification thus already implies the division of the world into two opposing camps.

The analogy with 1935–39 is further pursued by recalling that a

hat time the "democracies" followed a policy of "appeasement." Appeasement, it is pointed out, did not stop aggression. Armed resistance did finally stop aggression. Therefore the threat of armed resistance should be effective in stopping aggression and preventing war today.

"Stopping aggression" and "preventing war" are often assumed to be practically synonymous. And in this interchangeability of terms lies the effectiveness of the rationale. Our goal is to prevent war (hence our antiwar feelings are appeased); our means of preventing war is by stopping aggression (hence our preparations for war are justified). One has therefore, at least verbally, a consistent policy.

However, if one could become for just a moment a member of the "other side," one would probably find a rationale strikingly like ours. Whatever the "actual" ambitions of the Communists may be, the citizen of a communist state is led to believe that his government abhors war, but is firm in resisting aggression, etc., down to the well-known conviction about the superiority of "our way of life."

If it is true, as many psychologists and psychiatrists insist, that people act not in accordance with what is, but in accordance with what they believe to be, then it is most important to focus our attention on this dichotomy between the two halves of the world. Our problem is not to determine who is "right" or who is "wrong," but how to find a way out of the impasse.

If the present impasse in international relations is viewed as a *problem to be solved* rather than a case to be tried, then it seems reasonable to ask the following questions:

Is the analysis of the situation in terms of an analogy with 1935–39 the only possible one? And if there are other ways of viewing the situation, are there also other courses of action besides the one currently followed?

We are concerned here not only with describing alternative courses of action but also with evaluating them in terms of their effectiveness in achieving certain ends. We must therefore state those ends. In attempting to answer the questions just posed, we will make our standards of judgment explicit and will try to stick to them.

In our estimation, the preservation of human sanity is the most urgent problem facing us. It is difficult to imagine anything that equals war in the effective destruction of sanity. Therefore we shall assume that a world war is the worst of all *clearly foreseeable* alternatives.

It is, of course, possible to describe situations in terms more

repugnant than the conventional descriptions of war. But such comparisons of verbal descriptions (on which arguments concerning alternatives "worse than war" are usually based) are far removed from a comparison of actual experiences. Such things as slavery, concentration camps, and other features of totalitarian régimes are often thought of as being "worse than war." If this attitude is to be analyzed, it must be made clear just what is being compared. If actual physical experiences associated with war and with tyranny are to be compared, certainly it borders on the bizarre to argue whether death in a gas chamber is worse than death in a bomb shelter. If one compares the respective degrees of depravity, again it is difficult to judge. For an American there is no question that torturing people and pushing them into gas chambers is more wicked than dropping bombs on them. We have learned to consider the organized selective murder of ordinary people (like the German example) to be the worst depravity, but for the Germans (as revealed by postwar polls) and for the Japanese this distinction does not seem to exist. And once we have broken through our self-righteousness, it is difficult to see the *nonselective* murder of ordinary people (e.g., saturation bombing and atomic bombing) on a morally higher plane objectively. We submit that it is impossible to decide which was worse, Buchenwald or Hiroshima, if one uses criteria more general than the moral standards of a specific culture.

However, let us grant for the sake of further analysis that the concomitants of tyranny are even worse than those of war. It is still far from easy to show that by choosing the "lesser evil" it is possible to avoid the greater. If one means that by waging war against tyranny one can diminish the amount of tyranny in the world, the facts of recent history belie this. Imperial Germany (pictured as a tyranny in 1914) was defeated. But the tyrannies which superseded it were worse. Nazi Germany was also defeated, but the USSR, one of the victors, has in the process become even more tyrannical than it was, and the United States has adopted some practices and attitudes characteristic of the régimes it was fighting.

There is yet another interpretation of the "worse than war" argument, namely that one can by waging war prevent the imposition of *foreign* tyranny on one's own country. This argument depends entirely on the possibility of winning the war. If the probability of losing a war is great, or if the waging of one war makes later wars very likely, this argument too loses its force. As will appear below, the chances of winning a war against "communism" are extremely slim, if by "communism" is meant the combined present

and future aspirations of the communist world, and if by "winning a war" is meant the frustration of those aspirations.

Moreover, the danger of domestic tyranny is not to be overlooked. It is frequently forgotten that "slavery," concentration camps, in fact the totalitarian régimes themselves are either direct concomitants of war or can be traced to the prevailing warmindedness among states. If we forego the explanations based on the notions of "good nations" and "bad nations," we are led to consider the totalitarianism of the USSR, for example, as at least partly the result of a perpetual threat of war (real or imagined) in which her leaders lived. During the period 1919–22, there was actual intervention on her soil by armies of fourteen "bourgeois" states, whose explicitly stated aim was to "crush Bolshevism." During the twenties there was a virtual economic boycott (withholding of credit) and the creation of the *cordon sanitaire,* which on a properly colored map looked very much like "capitalist encirclement." In the thirties there was Hitler, whose rearmament was financed by the West and whose open threats of conquest, when they were stated in anti-Communist terms, often found sympathetic interpretation in the Western press.

If the development of Russian totalitarianism is thus seen in the perspective of war, the threat of war (real or imagined) and of *warlike reactions* to the threat of war, it is not too farfetched to be wary of a similar development in the United States as the result of a real or imagined threat of attack—especially since some of the symptoms of such a development are already discernible.

However, the greatest weakness of the "worse than war" argument is that it is based on a total lack of immediate experience. This is especially true of the United States, to which the "worse than war" arguments are almost exclusively confined. Well over 90 per cent of the population of this country fought the last war through the press, the radio, and the newsreel. There were no privations worth the name. The food supply was rather better than in the years immediately preceding the war. The number of bereaved families was not disproportionately larger than the number bereaved in peacetime because of traffic accidents. Some discomforts were suffered by those accustomed to the unlimited mobility of the private motor car, and some real hardship may have been caused by a shortage of medical help. But these hardships were probably more than compensated for psychologically by the sense of collective effort and a confidence in victory.

It is sometimes asserted that the development of the present Soviet régime would have occurred even without intervention, boycott, and

threat of fascist aggression because of the "nature" of political power concentrated in few hands. We do not believe, however, that opinions as to what "would have been" in any historical process can be definitive, because it is impossible to reproduce certain conditions and vary others. Our argument is simply that the actual development of the Soviet régime is *understandable* in the light of what has happened since 1918.

In projecting the experiences of the last war to a next, most Americans will not be able to escape the tacit assumption that it will be fought under similar conditions. This assumption should be carefully examined. For one thing, whereas complete victory was achieved in the last war, no similar victory seems likely in the next. The population score in the last war was 900 million on our side against 200 million on the side of the enemy. In this war (if, as is usually conceded in military circles, Europe is mostly occupied by the Communists), the odds will be nearly reversed (only those populations are counted which at present can be shown to be psychologically committed to an "all out" effort, the Americans, British, Russians, and Chinese). The vast populations of Asia, Africa, and Oceania, although not directly under Soviet influence, will probably be more hostile to the West than to the Communists, because of their historical experience and because of the appeal of communist propaganda in colonial countries.

It is realized that counting noses is a crude way to estimate military power. While the conventionally accepted factors, such as industrial potential and control of strategic areas, are important, morale is at least equally important. And if morale is to be measured by the amount of privation which can be withstood short of the breaking point, we must concede a decisive advantage to the millions on Russia's side. We have only to recall the struggles waged by the militarily "defeated" populations of Russia and China against the Germans and the Japanese. Those people are not heirs to the Western tradition of formal wars with declarations, decisive battles, negotiations, and peace settlements. They regard wars against them as efforts to exterminate or enslave them. To win a war against China or Russia means to impose one's will at the point of a gun on practically every Russian or every Chinese. Their sheer numbers and the extent of their territory make this a practically impossible task.

If we discount the possibility of a military victory (like that won in Germany by actual occupation of the entire country), we must view World War III as simply a progressive destruction of populations and wealth, a destruction lasting for decades, perhaps genera-

tions. It is impossible to foresee what conditions such a war would involve. We can, perhaps, imagine the effects of a failure of the sewage system or of the water supply in Chicago or New York, but these would be just immediate effects; the long-term effects are anybody's guess.

What is most important, the possible psychological effects of *perpetual* warfare are all but ignored. It might be instructive to speculate on those, including the possible effects of destruction on the *destroyers.* The recent pronouncement of a high army official that one of our pressing needs is "to train a lot of young killers" provoked no exciting comment, buried as it was in the more obscure pages of the newspapers. Yet it is highly relevant to inquire what will happen to young Americans who are at this writing razing Korean villages and may have to raze innumerable Chinese villages or perhaps participate in mass executions. It is relevant to ask whether a guilt feeling about Hiroshima has any bearing on the current paranoid behavior of the American public (witch hunts, projection of all guilt on the Communists, etc.).

In terms of these possible psychological effects, one may well assume that *every* war, no matter how "peaceful" may be the ends for which it is fought, carries within it seeds of future violence. These seeds escape detection if one's attention is entirely fixed on the "peaceful" aims of the war.

However, we have not yet approached the main difficulty of our problem. For even if the above framework is accepted (and it *is* accepted by very many), the impasse still exists. The two halves of humanity are still poised for mutual extermination. And *in terms of the current analysis,* the only course of action appears to be through military strength and through threat of force. Appeasement and military weakness, it is maintained, lead to aggression and war. Therefore military strength and nonappeasement must be pursued.

But has it been established that military strength and nonappeasement are effective in preventing war? Hardly. Although there was appeasement of the fascist states in the 1930's, the acts immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II and the attack on Pearl Harbor (Britain's guarantee of Poland's territory and our firm stand against Japan) were acts of nonappeasement. Furthermore, even though Russia and the United States were rapidly arming during 1939–41, both countries were attacked. Whether earlier and more wholehearted rearmament would have prevented attack may be debated endlessly. On the other hand, there were cases where appease-

ment did seem to prevent war. A century ago we appeased Great Britain by abandoning our "firm" slogan "Fifty-four Forty or Fight!" Some years later Great Britain appeased us by abandoning her intention to intervene in our Civil War. Altogether it is not useful to speculate whether wars have been more often caused by appeasement or by nonappeasement. The policies of national states have been mixtures of the two extremes, and wars have been fought with such regularity that it seems reasonable to maintain that *every* policy has so far led to a war.

The current analysis of the international situation does not seem fruitful to us, and we propose to re-examine it. It may be said to be based on a "model" (as all analyses are). Just to give it a name, we shall call it the "chessboard" model, because a similarity between international politics and games like chess and go has been repeatedly observed. The resemblance was perhaps most striking throughout the nineteenth century, when alliances and counteralliances were welded and dissolved in the chancelleries of Europe. In those days the only factors in the game which were seriously considered were military strength, strategic position, and the sympathies and inclinations of the sovereigns. Today the game has been modified by the introduction of a new factor—public opinion. Accordingly, vast propaganda techniques have been developed to manipulate this factor. However, the basic orientation based on the chessboard model has remained. Our political leaders and diplomats continue to talk and think in those terms—the occupation of strategic areas, the exertion of "pressure," defense plans, etc. It can hardly be otherwise while history is taught as it is and while the highest loyalty demanded from a public figure in our culture is loyalty to the traditionally defined interests of a national state. However, in the light of what is happening A. N. Whitehead's warning concerning a culture that cannot burst through its own abstractions becomes ominous.

We propose a different model on which to base the analysis of the present situation. Let us call it the "psychiatric" model. It is based on extending psychiatric concepts to the analysis of group behavior.

Two aspects of un-sane mass behavior have been particularly aggravated in the present crisis. One is what is known in general semantics as false-to-fact identification or map-territory confusion. World events are thought of not in terms of social realities (e.g., the starving millions of Asia attempting to improve their living) but rather in terms of the geopolitical maps published in the weekly picture magazines. On these maps, changes of attitude toward land ownership are often represented by ominously growing batches of

red territory; the wallowing in the mud of thousands of young Americans thousands of miles from home shooting at people they don't know is represented by sturdy saw-toothed arcs and thrusting arrows; the danger of mass killings of civilians appears as air mileage, and so on.

The other aspect of un-sane behavior which has been brilliantly described by Edmund Taylor,[2] is the striking similarity between the behavior of people who think in terms of the struggle for power and the behavior of paranoiacs. To be sure, Taylor acknowledges that the analogy is not complete, because, as he says, "It's no delusion [to think that your wife is trying to poison you] when you actually find arsenic in the cup." The mutual suspicions with which populations of modern states are stricken cannot be summarily dismissed as delusions, because there do exist plots, espionage rings, and general staffs. Aggressions *are* planned and *do* happen.

The discrepancy occurs because the "real" paranoiac is, as a rule, isolated (i.e., the people he suspects are not paranoiacs). To pursue the analogy with modern states, one would need to suppose a case of two or more paranoiacs, each having delusions of persecution about the others. Since paranoiacs not only suspect plots against themselves but often devise counterplots against the "enemy," the delusions soon become "justified." As one paranoiac makes his preparations for defense or for counteraggression, the suspicions of the other immediately become reinforced. He, in turn, plots more intensively, reinforcing the suspicions of the first, and so on.

Such behavior is not limited to fullfledged paranoiacs. It is observable among normal individuals who find themselves in situations of rivalry, conflict, or insecurity. The analysis we propose is based on the assumption that the leaders and the populations of the hostile coalitions are in just such a situation. Russians behave aggressively, according to our analysis, because they are scared. We too behave as we do, because *we* are scared, and they interpret our behavior as they do, because *they* are scared.

Therefore, in the light of the "psychiatric" model, the course of action now pursued is more likely to aggravate the situation than to improve it. Nonappeasement and preparedness are frankly calculated to "scare" the enemy into abandoning his aggressive plans. There is a difference, however, between the effects of fear and those of rational apprehension. A man may be prevented from breaking into a well-guarded bank. This is a case of rational apprehension, where proba-

[2] Edmund Taylor, *Richer by Asia* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947).

bilities of success are carefully weighed. But a cornered desperado usually shoots it out with the cops no matter how "scared" he is. Since each of the Big Two believes that its very existence is threatened by the other, it is more proper to compare their behavior to that of scared gunmen than of scheming burglars. And a scared gunman is much more dangerous than a composed one, as any experienced policeman or thug will testify.

Another reason why the hope of "scaring" the opponent is a delusion has to do with the conviction of being right. Let anyone who is convinced of the justness of the American cause reflect for a moment how foolish it is of Russians to think that they can scare *us* into abandoning our policy, and he will see how foolish it is for us to think the same about them.

In this conviction of "righteousness" lies also the most fundamental difference between the respective motivations of the Nazis and the Communists. Invincibility rather than righteousness was the myth that drove the Germans into battle. Now invincibility can be refuted by a practical demonstration, namely, defeat. But righteousness cannot be refuted by defeat and does not depend on military victories. Both American and Soviet armies have suffered disastrous defeats. This is especially true of the Russian army, which has a long tradition of defeats, dating back to the Mongol invasions. To the Russians the prospect of serious reversals in battle is no more a deterrent to action than it is for Americans or for anyone who believes in the "righteousness" of his cause. Here, then, is another reason why it is unlikely that the Russians will be stopped by threats. They do not believe (as the fascists did) that might is right. They believe that *they* are right.

Thus the inadequacy of the present policies becomes apparent in the light of the psychiatric model. Moreover, an alternative course of action immediately suggests itself. It has been noted that in some situations techniques have been developed for breaking the self-reinforcing chain of hostility among groups. The basic step is the initial one, by which one of the parties to the conflict abandons the assumption that the other party is motivated by ill will. It is crucial to recognize that an *assumption,* not a conclusion, has been changed. When A says, "I shall assume that B is not my enemy," it simply means, "I shall act *as if* B were not my enemy." It is not the same as saying, "I now see that B is not my enemy." The latter statement may be refuted by evidence to the contrary. But the former statement, being a declaration of intention, is not subject to either proof or refutation.

If an improvement in relations does occur, it is reasonable to suppose that it results from a chain of events similar and opposite to that described in connection with the deterioration of relations. That is to say, a more friendly attitude on the part of A makes B less hostile, which in turn strengthens A's "suspicion" that B is not after all his enemy. Such "antiparanoid" interactions have actually been observed in cases where individual and social conflicts have been resolved (in race relations in some communities, for example).

An extension of this principle forms the basis for a positive proposal for action which, in the opinion of the authors, is more likely to promote peace and preserve sanity.

The keynote of the proposal is the renunciation of violence. It is emphasized, however, that submission to violence is likewise renounced. On the contrary, an organized action against violence is urged. But the success of the action should be measured by the extent to which violence is eliminated, not by the amount of violence done to the perpetrators of violence.

By violence we shall understand the imposition of the will of one individual on that of another, to the frustration of the latter. Thus we draw no sharp line between violence and coercion, and indeed in the light of modern psychology it is difficult to distinguish between them. Physical violence has appeared so often as a concomitant of its "mental" phase that it is pointless to confine the term to physical violence alone. Obvious systems of violence are wars, dictatorships, and most penal systems, in fact all institutions where conformity of behavior is insured primarily by threat of punishment or loss of status.

The focal point of an organized struggle against violence should be the mechanisms by means of which people are coerced. These mechanisms can usually be traced to semantic disturbances. Indeed the expression "people are forced to do this or that" is misleading if it evokes a notion of physical force. It is practically impossible to coerce anyone to do anything by physical force alone because an individual's muscles cannot be forcibly moved in a co-ordinated manner. Thus the expression "forced to do something at the point of a gun" is a figurative one. What actually happens is that an individual prefers to perform the commanded act rather than risk being shot. If, however, a person were willing to risk being shot, or if he preferred being shot to performing the act, it would be impossible to force him to perform it by threat of shooting. Instances where people preferred to die rather than commit certain acts have been numerous in history; so there is nothing fantastic in a proposal which involves situations where individuals may be required to sacrifice

their lives—at least no more fantastic than "to die in defense of one's country" in a conventional way.

The idea of nonviolent resistance is, of course, not new. Its philosophic and moral background is well-known, especially through the lifework of the most prominent leader of that movement, Mahatma Gandhi. What has not been generally recognized is that nonviolent resistance has potentialities as an effective defense against military action. If we define "defensive warfare" as an organized action aimed solely at the destruction of the enemy's ability to wage war, then nonviolent resistance may be viewed as a method of defensive warfare. It aims at a particularly sensitive mechanism in the war apparatus of the enemy, namely, the psychological grasp which war leaders have on the allegiance of the millions who perform the actual complex tasks of war.

The one military technique which resembles somewhat the method of nonviolent resistance is the comparatively new method of "psychological warfare." The effectiveness of psychological warfare, however, is all but neutralized by the conventional military acts. Thus the effectiveness of the broadcasts of Tokyo Rose during the last war was probably nil. The broadcasts consisted of friendly, humorous chatter accompanied by American popular music. Evidently, their aim was to weaken the fighting zeal of the Americans by exposing them to an atmosphere of warmth and friendliness coming from Japan. However, the program could not have the desired effect because the Americans were exposed much more to the "conventional" military acts of the Japanese, which completely overshadowed the possible effects of the broadcasts.

To illustrate how nonviolent resistance might be employed to destroy the war potential of the "enemy," let us imagine that Mr. Malik or Mr. Vyshinsky made the following speech in a session of the United Nations:

> I have been instructed by my government [Mr. Malik might begin] to make the following announcement. In a special session of the Politburo of the CPSU it was unanimously agreed that the policy of the USSR followed hitherto has been erroneous and dangerous. In particular, the maintenance of excessive armaments and a belligerent attitude toward our former allies have been major factors in aggravating the suspicions of the Western powers concerning the intentions of the USSR. In order to demonstrate to the inhabitants of this planet that the USSR is firmly devoted to the cause of peace, the following measures have been decided upon and are being carried out as of eleven o'clock last night, Moscow time:
>
> 1. The withdrawal of all military personnel (troops, officers, and military advisers) from all regions outside the borders of the USSR.

2. The dissolution of all secret service and espionage agencies.

3. The scrapping of all weapons except those which can be lifted by a single individual.

4. The reconversion of all war industries to peacetime production and the initiation of a consumer goods production program to double per capita consumption in the USSR within the next three years.

5. The demobilization of all military personnel except a militia to be trained in the technique of nonviolent resistance.

6. The reorganization of military academies to train personnel for nonviolent resistance only.

All nations are invited to undertake similar programs. The USSR invites inspection of its disarmament program by any UN commission.

All restrictions on foreign correspondents and on visitors in the USSR are hereby lifted. Any correspondent or visitor is free to visit any region or installation in the USSR. All data on production and all social statistics will henceforth be published. The concept of "state secret" is hereby abolished.

The results of scientific research in the USSR are offered to the world freely. Stipends are offered to ten thousand foreign students to study in any institution of learning in the USSR with all expenses paid for one to five years, and five hundred foreign scientists and scholars will be invited as guest professors to the USSR with salaries comparable to those they are receiving. The cost of this program will be defrayed by the savings effected through the dissolution of a single infantry division.

The USSR invites reciprocal offers from other countries, but if such offers are not forthcoming, we seek admission for ten thousand of our students to foreign universities, all expenses to be paid by the USSR. Our government will also pay the salary of any of our professors invited to teach at a foreign university. The cost of this program will be defrayed by the savings effected through the dissolution of an additional infantry division.

The USSR will henceforth participate in the UNESCO and in all the other agencies of the United Nations organized for the promotion of social welfare.

The USSR is ready to subscribe to a World Bill of Rights based on the freedom of the individual to develop fully his potentialities of creativity and experience. The specific rights which must be guaranteed to the individual for the realization of his potentialities cannot be stated in terms of metaphysical principles but must be made the object of investigation by science, particularly the sciences dealing with human behavior. Pending more definitive future discoveries, a provisional Bill of Rights is proposed in which the bourgeois-democratic civil liberties are guaranteed plus the right to work, which has been hitherto fully realized only in the USSR. As a sign of good faith, a general amnesty for all political prisoners is declared. The concepts "counterrevolution," "treason," and others which imply a breach of loyalty to a régime or an ideology are hereby liquidated.

The government of the USSR realizes that the radical measures it has taken will be interpreted in many quarters as "communist propaganda." My government wishes to state that this interpretation is entirely correct. We have embarked on a vast scheme aimed at paralyzing the military might of the bourgeois world so as to render it incapable of waging war against the USSR.

The first results of the new policy should be the alienation of the working classes and the intellectuals of the West from their present political leaders. So

far the USSR has been unsuccessful in effecting this breach. The Politburo has decided that the cause of this failure should be laid to the former policy of the USSR, especially in the period 1945–50. Because of our intransigence in political and philosophic matters, because of the atmosphere of fear and distrust of foreigners, because of a foreign policy which openly aimed at Soviet hegemony in certain areas, large sections of the working class and even larger portions of the Western intelligentsia have become susceptible to warmongering propaganda. Therefore the Politburo has decided to reverse its policy. It is recalled that the intervention in the USSR by bourgeois powers during 1919–22 failed largely because public opinion did not support the intervention. The USSR has decided to stake its security on the power of world public opinion. It is no longer possible to wage total war without total support of public opinion. Hence, as a measure of self-defense, the USSR has embarked on a program to win enlightened public opinion to the cause of peace.

The people who wield power in the Western world may also suspect that the USSR has not abandoned its aim of world social revolution. That is also correct. We believe that capitalism creates a type of society in which the energies of the individual are so strongly directed toward the accumulation of wealth (with which security and social prestige are psychologically identified) that his potentialities for creative, cognitive, and even sensual experience are stifled. The evils of imperialism and colonialism are recognized even by enlightened bourgeois opinion. We admit that we aim at the destruction of imperialism and colonialism. But we renounce violence as *ineffective*. Our method will be based exclusively on propaganda and example.

Until now our leaders were afraid of Western propaganda. They believed that the lure of higher material living standards and of civil liberties could alienate our masses from the task of building socialism. But now we see that we have underestimated the potential power of our own social and economic program. By establishing civil liberties surpassing those of the West and by discounting the appeal of bathtubs and television amidst anxiety neuroses and spiritual poverty we can now stake the future of world revolution on the effectiveness of our example. Imperialism, militarism, and probably capitalism as well are doomed. They will be superseded by international social democracy. But this will be done not by violence, as we have hitherto believed, but by more effective methods. We do not hope to usher in a utopia by this pronouncement. The problems confronting the world are as immense as ever. We do, however, see in this new policy a tool for the solution of those problems in the sense of a new outlook toward our own people and toward the people of the world.

This brings us to the defense plans of the USSR, which we hope will eventually form a model for other nations threatened by war and aggression. We realize that the militarists of the West may still be able to launch a "preventive war" against the USSR, where "prevention" can only now mean the prevention of the spread of socialist ideas. The militarists are warned that such a course will result in ultimate failure.

The general staff of the USSR is preparing a total defense of our country against which military force will be ineffective. Our military academies are developing a program for the training of specialists to lead the organization of this defense, and our curriculum of universal military training is being reconverted to make a "nonviolent soldier" of every inhabitant of the country above the age of five. All conquests of the past were based on the destruction of the military forces of

the country. Wherever security is based on military might alone, the destruction of this might results in demoralization and hence in fear and hence in submission. The USSR is discarding this dependence on military might in favor of another philosophy of defense based on the will to resist, made effective by the co-operation of every inhabitant. The resistance will be nonviolent but *total.* This means that the orders of occupying authorities will be ignored. *No matter what happens, they will be ignored.*

No method will be overlooked: sit-down strikes, demonstrations by women and children, boycotts of silence, sabotage. Our people have in the past willingly sacrificed their lives in guerrilla warfare. It will be easy for us, for example, to organize thousands of young girls for the specific task of lying down on railroad tracks in front of trains. How long will it take invaders to train engineers to drive their locomotives over the bodies?

No grain of wheat will be grown for the invaders. Not a wheel will turn for them. Instead of our present vast military army, we shall have a vast army of specialists in agricultural and industrial sabotage and in other tasks of nonviolent resistance.

Threats, executions, and tortures will only strengthen our will to resist, as has happened many times in our history. We have seen many invaders come and go. Though they were often stronger militarily, our people have never completely submitted to them. We will not submit in the future.

No violence will be done to the *person* of any invader. And this anomaly will result in his psychological collapse. The enemy army will find itself in the situation of Mark Twain's mongrel pup who had been winning all his fights by grabbing hold of the other dog's hind legs, until he was confronted with an opponent who had no hind legs to grab. The poor pup died of sheer frustration. An army invading a country and finding no army to fight will soon disintegrate. Our women will be trained to be friendly with the invaders and to propagandize them thoroughly against war. A nonfraternization policy will be as ineffective as it has been in Germany. It was easy enough to make Nazis of your soldiers. It will be far easier to make Communists of them.

To recapitulate: if we are invaded, victory will finally be ours, since we will fight the invader not on his terms but on ours. The military-minded men will not be able to cope with our methods of resistance. Their defeat will be ignoble and disastrous. Like the feudal aristocracy after the French Revolution and our bourgeoisie after the Russian Revolution, they will tumble from their position of prestige and power to one of ridicule and contempt.

The West must now choose whether they will follow our example and work out with us a common destiny of humanity or whether they will persist in the paranoid delusions of which we ourselves have been victims. If it chooses the latter path, it will throw the entire burden of world leadership on our shoulders. In the long run enlightened leadership will win. We ask the West to share in this victory.

Such might be Mr. Malik's (or Mr. Vyshinsky's) speech. At this point, the American reader may perhaps feel that were there any conceivable hope of inducing the Russians to take such a course of action, nothing should be left undone in the attempt. It is now proper to ask whether it is not in *our* power to take such action. An

affirmative answer to this question would be indicative of a willingness to ascribe to the "other side" motivations and aspirations similar to one's own. This need not be equivalent to ignoring the vast differences in political orientation in the two countries. The fact remains that dissenting opinions such as have been presented in this article can still be uttered in this country with comparative impunity while they cannot be uttered in Russia. Yet if we persist in looking *only* at these obvious differences, we lose the freedom to look at many other important things, such as the *consequences* of a policy instead of its justification, or the basic invariants of the aspirations of ordinary people all over the world. To forget for a time the obvious and self-flattering distinction, "We are a democracy—they are a despotism," would be indicative of that objectivity in appraising one's own standards which Ruth Benedict calls a "difficult exercise." It would be indicative of a cultural awareness which is synonymous with group sanity.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN OPPOSITION TO HITLER

Hans Rothfels

THE VARIOUS RESISTANCE movements which arose in the occupied countries during the last war were all a part of international politics. In varying degrees they contributed to, or were supported by, the Grand Alliance against Hitler. Some had considerable influence upon the outcome of the struggle. It is doubtful whether such an international viewpoint is valid for the German opposition. Certainly it is not, if one considers only support from outside, or the amount of practical co-operation. And yet it is possible, and may be of broad significance, to state that the resistance movement within Germany was in important respects more international than any other; that in an exceptional way it left behind, or broke through, conventional categories of political and social thought, that is, the interests of nations and classes. To this extent it foreshadowed the situation today, when "civil" or "human," or at any rate international, fronts cut across the boundaries of states and power blocs or of mutually exclusive social systems.

A threefold factual approach to this subject may be useful. The first aspect concerns certain actions in the international or diplomatic field—actions carried out by German opposition elements before and during the war. The second has to do with the response or lack of response which these overtures found in Great Britain and especially in the United States. The third is a brief analysis of ideas and potentialities which the German opposition to Hitler adumbrated or brought to the fore and which transcend in importance any merely domestic concerns.

A more basic factual question can only be touched upon, namely, the extent and general character of actual opposition in Germany.

It is well-known that for a long time this subject was "taboo," or at best loaded with serious misconceptions. And even though the truth or part of the truth has become known in the last three or four years, it still encounters a good deal of willful obstruction—or the most effective weapon of suppression, silence. Moreover, some of the witnesses, such as Mr. Gisevius, have done more to confuse than to enlighten the student of this movement.

It seems necessary, therefore, to sum up briefly what seem to be provable facts.[1] The German opposition was not only much broader than has been generally assumed or conceded, but also more extensive than could have been expected under the conditions of a thorough police state. It moved through various stages of nonconformity: from antagonism muted by prison walls and the silence of potential opposition, from humanitarian protest and clandestine aid to victims of persecution, to sabotage and subversive activities by illegal elements, to spiritual attack upon the very essence of totalitarianism, to active planning and political resistance. In addition it can be stated that the German opposition achieved definitive form long before the war and that it reached its first climax in an attempt to prevent war. It was not the threat of defeat or, as some critics have suggested, the desire "to preserve the General Staff for World War III," which made the opposition and specifically that of its military members articulate. Some were convinced that a triumph of Hitler would be the greatest of all possible catastrophes, a triumph of "the archenemy of the whole world"; they worked to forestall this danger at a time when a German victory still seemed possible. Moreover, while the spearhead of the opposition was military, as it is bound to be under a totalitarian system, its body and soul were civilian. Although the conspiracy was directed by top men—Colonel General Beck, the former Chief of Staff, and Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, a former Lord Mayor, as well as by other high officials and the head of the socialist trade-unions, Wilhelm Leuschner, and his associates—it comprised all elements of society: labor and church, business and intellectual, aristocratic and military. In its ranks were a number of persons prepared to take over the government of Germany if the Hitler régime were overthrown. There was to be no vacuum before lawful pro-

[1] See author's *The German Opposition to Hitler* (Hinsdale, Ill., Henry Regnery Company, 1948) and the revised German edition of the same book (Krefeld, Scherpe Verlag, 1949). New material has been used in this article, as indicated in the footnotes, but some repetition could not be avoided. It may perhaps be said that to plagiarize oneself is one of the more permissible sins of the historical profession.

cedures were restored. While the opposition, for obvious reasons, could not be a mass movement, it was equipped with a network of cells that reached far down into the small communities. It had a concrete program—not binding for all component elements, but one to which a broad coalition of opposition forces adhered and one that far exceeded merely negative ends.

Internationally, contacts between the German underground and the outside world were established early and maintained chiefly through exiled leaders or members of leftist and centrist parties. The Committee of Social Democrats, first in Prague and then in London—the so-called "New Beginners"—and individuals such as the ex-chancellors Joseph Wirth and Heinrich Brüning, did important liaison work. But all this was kept within narrow limits. No government in exile could be organized, nor would it have had the slightest chance of being recognized.

However, it is the "foreign policy" of the opposition within Germany with which this study is primarily concerned. Its communist branch, which set up a clandestine organization immediately after the Reichstag fire and excelled in propaganda during the early years, was in the main, of course, dependent on direction from Moscow. As long as the German communists felt sure that Hitler was working for their own ends, merely by accelerating the doom of bourgeois society, they served willingly or unwillingly as tools of a foreign government. Moreover, when the short-lived Nazi-Soviet liaison came to pass in August 1939, the close tie with Moscow forced upon the German communists—just as upon the French—a somersault from which they never fully recovered. Yet it would be unwarranted to assume, with Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, that the communist underground in Germany came to a complete standstill or that it was all Moscow-controlled. For instance, a conspiracy existed in Berlin in 1942—the so-called "Red Chapel." According to one testimony, more than four hundred of its members were executed, many of them intellectuals. The plotters had been in wireless contact with the Soviet Union, but there is no doubt about the genuineness of their convictions in terms of an ideally conceived communism. Additional light has been cast upon some of the leading personalities and their profoundly ethical motivations in a book called *The Last Hours,* published about a year ago by a prison chaplain in Berlin. As far as the German opposition to Hitler is concerned, it would certainly be erroneous to dismiss all those who looked for a new light and a final redemption in the revolutionary ideas of the East as mere oppor-

tunists or Quislings or gullible fellow travelers or lovers of a slave morale. This may also be said of similar views which are widely held today regarding the present situation in East Germany.

Yet it is true, of course, that the main body of the German opposition definitely looked to the West, to its political, and specifically, to its humanist and Christian traditions. Throughout 1936 and 1937 a new core of resistance gradually formed in loosely organized and overlapping groups which extended from right to left and cut across the border lines of parties, classes, and religions. "The dignity of the human personality," as one leaflet explained, was to be the rallying cry of all determined anti-Nazis. Though these men and women time and again had reason to feel "stabbed in the back" by the concessions granted or the admiration paid to Hitler from abroad, they nevertheless turned to the democratic countries in order to inform them about the real meaning and threatening character of the Nazi régime, both domestically and internationally. Goerdeler and others took a number of steps with this in mind. It was not before the critical year of 1938, however, that an action of greater scope, indeed an attempt to solve the German as well as the European crisis, was undertaken.

Initiative lay with the German Chief of Staff, Ludwig Beck, the head of the German counterintelligence, Admiral Canaris, and the Secretary of State (comparable to the Permanent Undersecretary in the British Foreign Office), Ernst von Weizsäcker. Goerdeler cooperated, and measures were taken which defy precedence in diplomatic history. The underlying assumption was one that had been clarified by a Führer Conference in November 1937 (Hossbach minutes), and by the purge of the Army and the Foreign Office in February 1938: there could be no doubt any more about Hitler's long-range war plans. Beck opposed these plans on military grounds[2] but also tried to make them the jumping-off-place for the overthrow of a criminal régime. He held the view, supported by Canaris—and indeed by all the evidence we have today—that the German people, just as much as any other, abhorred war. Hence the moment for disposing of Hitler would come once his dangerous course could be brought into the open. In anticipation of such a crisis plans were laid by the military to capture the Führer and put him on trial. But it also seemed necessary to contact foreign powers—especially Great Britain—so that Hitler could be publicly denounced as a warmonger, thus paving the way for the preservation of peace as well as for the *coup d'état.*

The first to appear in London as an emissary of the General Staff

[2] See Beck's memoranda of May 5 and 29 and July 16, 1938, in Wolfgang Foerster's, *Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg* (Munich, 1939), pp. 81–88, 90–95, 98–105.

was a private landowner, Ewald von Kleist-Schmentzien,[3] who had previously been imprisoned as an ardent anti-Nazi. (He died as a victim of the régime in April 1945.) On August 18, 1938, he had a secret conversation with Baron Vansittart, the chief diplomatic adviser of the British government. Von Kleist began by stating bluntly that Hitler's war plan was all set and would be carried out after September 27. He went on to say that the generals who opposed the extreme course could not act unless they received some "encouragement and help from outside." What he suggested was a firm British commitment to fight in case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, and an appeal to the opposition in Germany. If war could be avoided, he added, this would be the "prelude to the end of the régime." In his conversation with Winston Churchill, which followed similar lines, von Kleist made the hint somewhat stronger: if the generals insisted on peace a new government would be formed within forty-eight hours. In his written answer of August 19 Churchill went as far in the desired direction as an outsider could. He depicted the horror of a general slaughter which he felt sure would be the consequence of a German attack. Although his letter to von Kleist reached the Foreign Office in Berlin and was used there,[4] no official English step followed. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, who was, of course, informed of the exchange by Vansittart, expressed his uneasiness in a letter to Lord Halifax on August 19. He acknowledged that von Kleist was violently anti-Hitler but he did not seem to like the idea of civil disobedience. The significant historical parallel which came to his mind was that of the "Jacobites in France in William's time." Nor did he want to commit the British Government beyond his somewhat hypothetical statement of May 28. On the other hand he did not feel sure, as he put it, "that we ought not to do something." Within the next two weeks the idea of a personal visit to Berchtesgaden crystallized in his mind.

Before that, however, a second and even more striking secret mission was undertaken. This time it originated directly within the opposition group in the Wilhelmstrasse which tried to provide the spark for the military revolt. There were two brothers Kordt in the German foreign service. The one, Erich, was a close friend of von Weizsäcker and had been "planted" in Ribbentrop's bureau; the other, Theo, was chargé d'affaires in London. On September 5 a cousin of the two brothers, Miss Susanne Simonis, was given, through Erich, a message which she had to memorize. Before leaving Berlin, she

[3] See *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Series III (II, 683 ff.); also the references, pp. 101, 125 f., and III, 366.

[4] See *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, 1918–1945, Series D (II, 706).

stopped at Weizsäcker's house for last-minute instructions. Upon her arrival in London, Theo Kordt asked to be received by Lord Halifax in utmost secrecy. He was invited to come to the back door of No. 10 Downing Street on the night of September 7.

The message[5] which he passed on to the British Secretary of State began with the fitting words: "Unusual times require unusual means." He was speaking, Kordt continued, not as chargé d'affaires but as the representative of political and military circles in Berlin that wanted to prevent war by all means. According to their best information Hitler was planning to attack Czechoslovakia. "We think," Kordt went on to say, "that giving way to Hitler's policy of force . . . would definitely mean barring the way for the return to the conceptions of honor and integrity amongst European nations." The message urged a strong and unmistakable stand by the British government. Such a declaration would probably prevent war, and this diplomatic defeat would "practically mean the downfall of the Nazi régime." "Should, however, Hitler persist in his bellicose policy," said Kordt, he could assure Lord Halifax that the political and military circles for which he was speaking would "take arms against a sea of troubles and, by opposing, end them." While the quotation from Hamlet's great monologue underlines the unusual and dramatic character of this interview, Weizsäcker's plea for an international alliance of those working for peace ended with the following clear commitment: "If a statement as required would be issued, the army leaders are prepared to act against Hitler's policy. . . ."

In fact, all military measures had been taken in Berlin and the button needed only to be pressed when Chamberlain decided to fly to Berchtesgaden. Later on, Halifax is reported to have said to Kordt: "We were not able to be as frank with you as you were with us. At the time in question we were already considering a personal initiative of Chamberlain." Once more, however, when a critical deadlock occurred after the conference of Godesberg, there seemed to be a chance to strike. Beck's successor as Chief of Staff issued orders to seize Hitler in the early hours of September 29. This time the Commander in Chief of the German Army, von Brauchitsch, also agreed to the *coup d'état*. But at midday on September 28 word came that Chamberlain and Daladier had accepted the invitation for a conference at Munich, and the whole scheme collapsed.

Whether it could have been carried out and what its success would have meant for Germany and Europe are questions that cannot be dis-

[5] All evidence, direct and indirect, confirms the accuracy of Kordt's reconstruction of the message.

cussed here. Goerdeler in a letter to an American friend on October 11 gave an interpretation that one may find overly optimistic. Also, it is easy to understand that it was difficult for the British government not only, as Halifax pointed out, to "fight against self-determination," but to make a definite commitment which, for many reasons, it did not want to undertake and the risk of which did not seem to be counterbalanced sufficiently by the pledge of an opposition group within the enemy country. This co-operation across frontiers would have meant using very unconventional methods. But it is precisely with such a potential departure that the episode reaches its proper historical level. Here appeared a new principle in dealing with aggressive warfare which may be of utmost importance in times to come. The action of Weizsäcker was intended not only to prevent a war which Germany would lose but, as Kordt put it, "to prevent the greatest crime that had ever been committed in human history." It was meant to restore human decency in international as well as domestic affairs. And it was undertaken in a way which certainly does not correspond with what is assumed to be the submissive spirit of a bureaucratic and military caste. Rather was the claim established that universal standards ought to have precedence over professional ones.

Between September 1938 and September 1939 there followed other equally unorthodox endeavors to rouse London by revealing Hitler's and Ribbentrop's designs. Again, though not so dramatically as in the period before Munich, these warnings were coupled with a plan for a military coup. But their primary purpose was to avoid war by whatever means were available. Among the emissaries who went to London in secret were such men as Schlabrendorff, who in 1943 planted the bomb in Hitler's plane, Goerdeler, Pechel, von Trott, and von Hassell. Once more the two Kordts played an important part. Theo Kordt has testified that in 1938–39 he was in close, sometimes daily, contact with Baron Vansittart. And Lord Halifax has confirmed the fact that through Vansittart he received many messages which Erich Kordt brought from Berlin at the risk of his life. Through this channel Weizsäcker informed the British in June of the impending rapprochement between Hitler and Stalin (which would make war inevitable). When he urged an understanding with Molotov, Vansittart is said to have answered: "This time Hitler will have no chance. . . . Put your mind at ease. We are definitely concluding the agreement with the Soviet Union."[6]

It may come as a surprise to some readers that the dissenting

[6] See Erich Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten* (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 313–19.

elements in the German Foreign Office placed so much confidence in a man who may be regarded as one of the "spiritual fathers" of Morgenthauism, and is the one authority who still maintains that there was never a German opposition to Hitler worth mentioning. As late as August 1948, and in spite of all evidence on record, Baron Vansittart gave to the Nuremberg court two sworn affidavits in which he not only adhered to this view but also stated specifically that he had always considered Weizsäcker as "the chief executant of Ribbentrop's policy" and that he had never received from Erich or Theo Kordt any hint of importance. It must be left to a more detailed study and a closer examination of the available sources to clarify this regrettable case of obliviousness.

Nor is this the place to go into the various diplomatic actions and peace soundings which were carried out or attempted by members of the German opposition during the war. They were mainly attempts to secure a breathing spell so that some action could be taken, or to find out what terms a post-Nazi government would be granted. Leaving aside all smaller items, as well as the memorandum presented by von Trott in Washington in December 1939, and the meeting of two German pastors with the Bishop of Chichester in Stockholm in May 1942, we may single out one major move as an example.

Of the American correspondents in Berlin, the one who undoubtedly had the best contact with the underground was Mr. Louis P. Lochner of the Associated Press. One night he was taken to a meeting of the opposition elements that formed a sort of steering committee. Among the participants were representatives of the Socialist and the Christian trade-unions, the Confessing Church, the former Centrist, Democratic, Social Democratic, and German People's political parties, and one confidant each of Canaris and Beck. They all expressed the conviction that the United States would be in the war before long. In view of such a tremendous perspective Mr. Lochner was asked to make every effort, on his return, to see President Roosevelt, to inform him personally of the movement within Germany to unseat the Nazi régime, and to get a reply from him concerning what sort of political arrangement in the Reich would be acceptable. In fact Mr. Lochner was given a code for making direct radio communication possible between the American President and the conspirators.

When, after five months of internment, Mr. Lochner returned to Washington, he tried, of course, to discharge this mission. After several attempts had failed he stated in writing exactly why he desired a personal interview. The reply which he received was negative and suggested that he desist because of the nature of his request, which was called a "most embarrassing" one. It took Mr. Lochner some time

and some catching up with the Washington atmosphere to realize that the refusal was not accidental but part of an official policy—that it reflected an attitude not only of withholding the encouragement or advice requested by the German opposition as well as rejecting an opportunity which might have led to an important contact, but an attitude according to which even a mere recognition of the fact that elements of opposition existed in Germany, able and prepared to take over the government, and the offer of more intimate information about this fact, were obviously felt to be "most embarrassing."

Here it seems appropriate to turn from the diplomatic moves of the German opposition to the Allied response. There is not the slightest doubt, and this could be borne out in detail, that diplomats and statesmen of the Western world had a fairly accurate picture of the anti-Hitler trend in Germany. This was the case long before Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, as head of the Continental branch of OSS, went to Switzerland in November 1942 and established permanent contact with the underground. Early in the war the German opposition had supplied reliable information upon which an appraisal of its structure could be based. And their pleas for an alliance of all those who wanted real peace had reached beyond the foreign offices concerned and the men in striped pants. Churchill, for instance, had been repeatedly sought out by German emissaries and had other sources of information as well. In one broadcast, a month after Munich, he spoke of the great opportunity that might have arisen "for all the peace-loving elements in Germany and for the chiefs of the German army." If one knew of this inner front, why was its existence so embarrassing as to be more and more consistently denied?

Leaving aside the prewar period and the specific problems of the appeasement policy, there was not yet complete rigidity at the time of the Polish campaign. Chamberlain kept contact with Theo Kordt, whom Weizsäcker had moved as a liaison agent to neutral Switzerland. In a letter of October 12, 1939, the Prime Minister assured the German opposition diplomat that this was not going to be a war against the German people and that no vindictive peace was intended.[7] Before the attacks on Norway and Denmark, and on the Lowlands and France, contacts were maintained, and in fact the German opposition supplied the Allies with most important intelligence data.[8]

[7] See facsimile of the letter (which Theo Kordt managed to preserve) in Erich Kordt, *op. cit.*, App.

[8] This fact was first revealed in a statement by the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Colonel G. J. Sas. Corroboration is found in *Staaten-Generaal, Twede Kamer. Enquête-Commissie* (I, B, 115, 127, 136–7; I, C, 208–13), and in a document which the German Foreign Office itself discovered in the Hague when Holland was occupied.

But when Mr. Sumner Welles came to Berlin in February 1940, he kept strictly to official channels. And as the area of the war extended, the identification of Nazis with Germans was increasingly accentuated, until it became one of the main lines of propaganda. This, of course, helped to promote an entirely negative attitude towards the German opposition.

One can comment on this policy from various angles. One can find it understandable in view of horrible sacrifices and a life-and-death struggle. It seemed to be a dire consequence of total war. But by the same token it accorded with Hitler's propaganda and with his favorite thesis that the Allies intended to destroy Germany. In fact the two wheels drove one another. In a caustic remark in his diaries (April 24, 1943) Joseph Goebbels suggested erecting after the war a "Vansittart monument" with the inscription: "To the Englishman who helped the German cause most."

There are, of course, other factors to be considered. One is that of hesitation in terms of a cautiously calculating diplomacy. If one entered into any dealings with the German opposition, would that not endanger the Grand Alliance? Would not the Germans revive their old game of playing off the West against the East or vice versa? Such a view, however, could not possibly apply to von Trott's feelers in Washington, undertaken during the period of Nazi-Soviet cooperation. In fact, at that time President Roosevelt showed himself not unfavorably impressed with the honest and urgent suggestions of the German emissary until on the advice of Justice Frankfurter he discouraged further contact. It would appear, then, that there existed more than merely rational and diplomatic reasons for keeping aloof. Nor could the overtures through Mr. Lochner, which simply asked for advice, be mistaken as an intention of splitting the Allied front. No such tendency ever emerged in the subsequent years, although Mr. Dulles was misled by his liaison man Gisevius into suspecting such desperate tricks. Documentary evidence shows, for example, that the two German pastors who represented the opposition in its approach to the Bishop of Chichester understood very well that the Russians would have to be included, and that Berlin would have to be occupied jointly. It also shows that in the last phase those who plotted the attempt on Hitler's life, though naturally wishing to come to terms with the West first, were fully convinced that capitulation had to be total.

Thus the diplomatic angle hardly suffices to explain or justify the negative attitude, nor can a policy of "no action" be called good diplomacy by any standard. Other viewpoints, however, suggest them-

selves. Were not the aristocratic and military men who certainly played an important part in the anti-Nazi conspiracy "just as bad" as Hitler's gang? However much this belief contradicted proven facts, it can be readily assumed that misgivings about the social composition of the conspiracy and certain conventional views of German history were hard to overcome. They persist today in many quarters. Thus it was that during the war an oversimplified picture of "Prussianism" and "militarism" forced thinking into a fixed pattern. The same was true regarding certain lessons that Versailles seemed to convey. They were not taken as a whole but apparently centered around one basic failure of the 1919 settlement. Versailles had not been a Carthaginian peace or a dictated peace, in the literal sense of the word. Did not the German revisionist campaign largely succeed because it could refer to certain accepted principles, such as "national self-determination," which were embodied in the so-called "Pre-Armistice Agreement"? This time, since defeat was to be "brought home," not the slightest commitment should be entered into in advance.

It was a similar attitude that made the Atlantic Charter a pathetic document and eventually was epitomized in the Casablanca Declaration of January 1943. It has been stated recently by Winston Churchill and others that the formula of "unconditional surrender" was a mere improvisation by the American President rather than a true statement of Roosevelt's considered policy;[9] and it may have been addressed to Moscow more than to any other place. The Carthaginian peace which it implied was not actually endorsed before Mr. Morgenthau's short-lived triumph at Quebec in September 1944. However this may be, it cannot be doubted that Casablanca, by cutting off any thread of negotiation with the German opposition, had grave consequences. It "froze" Allied policy, as Mr. Dulles aptly states. He, as well as the military leaders, soon complained of the fetters which the demand for unconditional surrender imposed upon psychological warfare. Seen from the same tactical angle, the Declaration was an enormous handicap for the anti-Nazi front and a heaven-sent gift for Goebbels' propaganda machine.

This study, however, is not primarily concerned with the matter of tactical disadvantages and technical mistakes. Of course, the point could be labored that with a greater amount of flexibility the war might have come to a close much earlier—Badoglio-wise or in other

[9] This is the opinion of Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (rev. ed., New York, Harper, 1950), p. 696.

ways. And in view of the millions who were still to die—on the battlefields, in gas chambers, or in bombed cities—the importance of this point cannot be doubted. Yet there is a more fundamental problem involved of which the attitude of the Western Allies towards the German opposition is but a symptom. It is the problem, in brief, of transition from total warfare to constructive peace. One cannot help stating that the refusal to acknowledge any German partner for other purposes than unconditional surrender pointed logically to a vacuum. Or, as Mr. Harold C. Deutsch has said: "The Allied leaders, like their Nazi opponents, became victims of their own war propaganda which insisted that all Germans were in the same boat." Consequently it happened, or one may say a bitter irony of history willed, that the Western powers practically co-operated not with the German opposition but with Hitler—with his heaping of abuse upon the participants in the abortive attempt of July 20, 1944, as well as with his final aim of producing a maximum of destruction and chaos. They so nearly succeeded in this paradoxical sort of co-operation that they came close to defeating their own positive purposes.

As a matter of fact, it was not the existence, but the absence, of an anti-Nazi shadow government which at the end of the war proved to be "most embarrassing." Its original members, of course, had been killed off in the meantime. But with an official thesis and a policy of indoctrination which, for many months to come, still maintained that all Germans were basically untrustworthy, it was very difficult to activate in any way the forces which had gathered in the German opposition. A good many of the perplexities which the occupying powers had to face in Germany followed more or less logically from the negative attitude embedded in the formula of unconditional surrender—which was continued against the advice of those better informed.

With such a statement, however, the burden of the argument shifts from the diplomatic moves of the resistance and the negative response of the Allies to the third aspect—an analysis of the potentialities of the German opposition. In other words, the question inevitably arises whether or not there was any real prospect of a constructive policy to which all or most of the anti-Nazi elements would have been willing and able to contribute.

This is by its very nature a speculative question. And it is not intended that the reader be bothered with a history of the "ifs." All the plots—and there were a good many preceding July 20, 1944—fell short of the mark, mostly for accidental reasons. The historian may feel tempted to interpret this chain of failures in terms of a seemingly

underlying logic; or he may point out certain technical weaknesses because of persons inexperienced in conspiratorial methods, or the difficulty of a revolt under wartime conditions, or the influence of other adverse circumstances. He is certainly entitled to lay some stress upon the lack of physical or moral support from outside, which made the chances of the German resistance so different from that in any other country in Europe. But these considerations are hypothetical. This also applies to the question whether in case of a successful coup the shadow government would have been able to take over, whether the coalition of heterogeneous elements would have kept together, or whether the revolt would have got out of hand. There are some good reasons for answering the first and the second parts of this question with yes and the third part with no. This can be borne out to some extent—though, of course, not with anything like certainty—by referring to the body of ideas which the main groups had more or less in common and to that inner cement Goerdeler used to speak of as "the front of human decency."

Beyond such generalities the available documents give a fairly accurate picture of what the German and the European aims of the opposition were. They cannot be more than outlined here. Economic and social matters played a prominent part in the deliberations of a particularly important group, the so-called Kreisau circle which centered around Count Moltke. The circle was composed mostly of younger men, some of them aristocratic landowners, some ministers, Catholic and Protestant, some socialist leaders. They all agreed upon, and worked out in detail, a program of far-reaching reform, including the breaking-up of estates, de-cartelization, and the nationalization of key industries. They were very much aware of, and serious about, what was going on in Eastern Europe; and yet they were completely Western in their ethos, in their basic insistence on the freedom and dignity of man as well as in their fundamental opposition to any sort of totalitarianism, whether black or brown or red. They had some brushes with Goerdeler, who was slated to be chancellor; on occasion they called him a "reactionary," that is, in European terminology, a "liberal," a man still close to the ideas of the nineteenth century and of a competitive bourgeois society. These were ideals which the younger group had left behind, and thus significant differences existed in social concepts. But Goerdeler co-operated intimately with the trade-union leaders; he was convinced that in any future organization labor must have an important say. In his shadow cabinet important seats were assigned to Socialists, and the Kreisau ideas worked upon him and upon others like a leaven. On the whole, one

can say that the opposition took a reconciliatory yet firm stand between Western and Eastern principles—a very progressive stand which, in view of the present crisis of ideologies and social systems, is very much worth pondering.

Politically, the area of agreement was even broader. Young and old, left and right, agreed upon principles of a conservative and decentralized democracy, with checks and balances directed against bureaucratic excess, against loopholes in the parliamentary structure which had made dictatorship possible, and against the danger of mass tyranny. Without going into the details of the constitutional drafts, it may be noted that the plans which the various groups outlined—those, for example, for the dissolution of Prussia, the subdivision of Germany into self-governing units, and the confinement of German unity to loose federative forms—were not of a negative character, not dictated merely by the resentment and particularism which are running wild today. While the men of the German opposition acknowledged that the idea of a great power in the center of Europe was forfeited and that Germany had to accept her weakness, they thought at the same time in terms of an economically viable, but culturally and politically diversified Central Europe, including, of course, a free Poland and a free Czechoslovakia. They envisaged a German federation linked with other Continental federations as well as with a world federation.

This may be regarded by the hard-boiled "realists" of our day as a beautiful dream, but the question may well be asked: who are the illusionists? The German opposition had certainly left behind one illusion, that of building from above and from outside along the lines of a "master plan." They had learned a very realistic lesson in the fundamentals of politics and human life. What primarily concerned them was, as Moltke pointed out, "less a problem of frontiers and soldiers, of top-heavy organizations or grand plans, than a question of how the picture of man can be restored in the breast of our fellow citizens." In other words, they knew that all reconstruction, nationally and internationally, was dependent on certain moral preconditions, on a common front against any sort of "robotism."

Here, then—in the moral sphere—the over-all legacy and the most important international aspect of the German opposition comes to the fore. The opposition was not composed of particularly asocial elements or professional resisters. A good many had joined its ranks because they felt ashamed of the crimes committed in Germany's name. The wish to atone was a primary impulse. Only so was it possible for religious men to bring themselves to conceive of murder

as a duty. In fact, as every prospect of reaching a bearable peace faded away, there remained among the men of the twentieth of July the one final motive of clearing the German name and freeing the world from the evil. It is in harmony with this view that the problem of moral regeneration and re-education played a large part in the ideas of the opposition. Their concrete pedagogical proposals might have had a better chance of becoming a constructive German program than those resulting from military orders. Even more important were their views regarding a second problem which the occupation authorities would have to face, a specific problem of international morality: the punishment of war criminals. Goerdeler made very definite commitments in this respect, and Moltke, an international lawyer by profession, outlined two drafts dealing with what he called the "desecraters of law." He discussed very carefully the problem of retroactive legislation and the principle of *nulla poena sine lege*. While he suggested a way of overcoming this dilemma, he stressed as strictly as possible the necessity for stern judgment and for a lawfully ordered comity of nations. But just because of this ideal, he thought, an ethical solution must be found—one which could not be interpreted as vengeance of the victors, but which clearly represented the triumph of law. A fiction of justice was, in his view, bound to have a destructive effect. While these warnings have a fatal ring today, it seems only fair to acknowledge that they do not express a vague utopianism and perfectionism but rather a very precise awareness of, and insight into, a moral crisis which neither force nor self-righteousness can solve.

A last point may be added. It has been mentioned that the German opposition labored under an exceptional difficulty inasmuch as it was the only resistance movement not aided from outside. The same holds good in another more fundamental respect. Everywhere else the fighters for liberation from foreign oppression fought also for the liberation of their fatherland and for palpable rewards in national or social terms. In contrast, the German opposition found itself in, or came gradually into, the unusual position of realizing that there was no hope left for immediate delivery and that to work for freedom was to work for defeat. Not every anti-Nazi could accept the full consequences of such a realization. But a number of individuals did so; specifically, some aristocratic and military men professed and practiced the view (one of which they are least suspected) that there was a higher and ultimate loyalty beyond the rules of national discipline or conventional patriotism. During the war they drew the last consequence of co-operation with the enemies of their country, and

many Germans prayed for defeat. The only way of solving this bitter dilemma was to substitute a positive for a negative ideal, an ideal of international morality which transcended the struggle against the Nazis or against external oppression and which was not fulfilled with the overthrow of just one régime or the removal of tyranny from just one country.

All these potentialities were more than apparent opportunities missed during and immediately after the war. They still seem to point in decisive directions. They concern problems which have stayed with us or have come to descend upon us with ever increasing weight—problems of a European and supranational organization, of the rule of law to be re-established or the chain of evil to be broken; problems of the fundamental relationship between East and West, the terms to be taken in the broad and more than geographical sense and yet not in that of the "cold war" and of a "bipolarized" world; problems, in the last analysis, of a universally human and ethical character.

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

2. THE INTERRELATION OF AIMS

T. S. Eliot

So far, we have accepted as the most convenient starting point Dr. Joad's list of the three aims of education: the professional, or, in the humblest way of putting it, training to earn a living; the social, or, in Dr. Joad's way of putting it, preparation for citizenship; and the individual, or, in Matthew Arnold's way of putting it, the pursuit of perfection. But we cannot define education as merely the *sum* of these three activities; for if the term "education" is to cover all three and not be wholly applicable to any one of them separately, we must appreciate some relationship, or rather some mutual implication, between them, such that each, while it may still be called education, is not the whole of education by itself. We recognize that the choice of a livelihood is limited, first, by the capacities of the individual; and second, by the kinds of activity favored or discouraged by the society in which the individual finds himself, or in other words, the kinds of thing that people are prepared to pay a man to do. The choice of a livelihood involves some adaptation to the social milieu, although some men are willing to earn a very modest living in order to pursue a vocation which seems more worth while to them than it does to their neighbors. Furthermore, we observe that there are some ways of earning a living which are not in themselves commendable, and which we should not train people for: parasitical activities, which feed, at best, on the follies, and, at worst, on the vices of mankind. And this raises the question of moral criteria; so that the formula of earning a living is doubly inadequate, and we are led to both of the other aims on our list. Or, if we start from the formula "training for citizenship," that implies training to make a living; or, in a wider sense (including those persons, a few of whom still exist, who are

able to live on unearned income), training in some useful activity. We can stretch the term "useful" very wide so as to include activities which to the great majority of mankind seem quite useless; but I think we must agree that the man who is, according to *every* standard of measurement, completely useless to society, is hardly a successful product of education. And I think we must agree that the best citizens are likely to be those who develop "the latent powers and faculties of their nature"; or at least that any society which does not endeavor to make possible the development of the latent powers and faculties of those who have the best latent powers and faculties to develop has a very narrow and mediocre conception of citizenship, and will not be a society worth educating people for. Finally, the development of the latent powers and faculties depends upon the pursuit of the right activities, including the best occupation for a livelihood that the individual can find; and depends also upon the individual's finding himself in a society in which his powers and faculties can be nourished and can bear fruit. So each one of these aims of education leads to a process which can in the right context be called "education," though we cannot define education by any one of them alone. And each one of these paths leads inevitably to moral judgments and decisions which take us beyond the limits within which we should like to confine "education" if the subject is to be manageable.

The danger of the list, as a mere list, is that we cannot long retain all three of the items in equal balance in our minds, once we start trying to educate people. This is not only because, in consequence of attending to one, we are apt to overlook the others; it may be also that in practice the three aims happen sometimes to be incompatible, and we are forced to emphasize one rather than the other. And when we find we have gone too far to one extreme, the natural reaction is to go too far to the other.

When I first revisited universities, after the end of the war, I was told that the new generation—both of those whose higher education had been interrupted or deferred, and of those a few years younger coming straight from their schools—was much more serious than that which I had known in the thirties, and than that of undergraduates in my own time. I am speaking of universities in England, in America, and on the continent of Europe. And indeed, ocular evidence appeared to confirm this. On every quadrangle or campus, and in the streets of university towns, I saw earnest faces with concentrated expressions, of young people who seemed to be always in transit from lecture to lecture, from tutorial to their rooms, from their rooms to

the library. It was suggested to me that the anxiety visible on every face was the anxiety about a future livelihood. They were anxious to learn, to learn as much as possible in the shortest time, in order to qualify themselves for the jobs which they were out to get as soon as they had their diplomas in their hands. Now it seems to me that in my time we were far less concerned, during the earlier academic years at least, with what we were going to do afterwards. There were, of course, the minority who, unlike myself, had revealed a distinct bent, in scholarship or in some particular field of science, and were so devoted to their subjects that they looked forward already to a higher degree and to a lifetime of teaching the subject of their interest. But I do not think that even these were oppressed by the thought that they might have any difficulty in getting a job: they might not find a very good place to start with, but the future was open. They looked forward rather to earning a livelihood through their mastery of the subject they were interested in; but not so many of them were concerned simply with taking a degree as a necessary condition of getting a job of some kind they knew not what.

Now I am aware that many of my contemporaries left college having gained only the advantage of being three or four years older when they came to look for a job than they would have been had they not gone there. One profited, of course, from friendships, from extra-curricular activities, and from associating with men of one's own generation from various parts of America. But I am not at the moment concerned with incidental benefits, but with the formal tuition. And on the wrong side of the balance sheet, I must put the unrestraint of the free elective system as practiced in my time. By passing examinations in a certain number of wholly unrelated subjects one could, in three or four years, obtain the certificate of education—the diploma of bachelor of arts. The only limitation was that you could not follow two courses in the same year if their lecture hours coincided. I knew one man whose principle of choice of courses was that the lectures should all fall on Tuesdays and Thursdays, with no lecture on Saturday: thus, he was free to spend four days a week in New York. I should add that he did not follow even this course of study with sufficient application to qualify him for a degree, though he made a passing acquaintance with the appreciation of music, and with housing problems in mining communities. I am not, however, so much concerned with the effect of this system of education upon the idler, as with its effect upon the young man like myself, with a good deal of ill-regulated curiosity in out-of-the-way subjects, who took, for instance, a perverse pleasure in dabbling with

late Latin and Greek authors without having mastered the real classics. It is not the system of education promoted by those educators of the late nineteenth century whose notions had been developed in Germany that I am defending; what I regret is the disappearance of a state of mind among undergraduates themselves. Those who were fundamentally serious minded, and not triflers, were able to pursue their studies for their own sake, simply because they cared for them. The change came from economic, social, and perhaps political developments in the last forty years, which have been much accelerated in this decade; and, if conditions are the same today, one cannot urge students to abandon an attitude which has been forced upon them by circumstances. I only wish to make the point that while the three aims of education formulated by Dr. Joad are complementary to each other, they can also interfere with each other. This may become a little more intelligible if I suggest that the aim which a man sets before himself, in training himself to earn a living, and the aim he sets before himself, in working to develop and cultivate his mind and sensibility, are different in kind. The first is an aim in pursuing which you can keep consciously in mind both the end and the means. You decide on the general field in which you wish to find employment, and then follow the course of instruction laid down, or generally accepted as suitable preparation for that employment. But for that cultivation of powers and faculties which tends to make us educated men, apart from our professional occupations, disinterestedness is necessary: you have to pursue studies for their own sake, for the love of truth, or wisdom, or at least curiosity, ignoring any practical advantages which may come to you from mastering them.

Of course, I have oversimplified this problem. If a man is to excel in any profession, he must love the activity for its own sake; and its usefulness to society, and the financial and other rewards that it brings him, are merely justifications of it. Most of us, at least, find it necessary to persuade ourselves that the work we do is of some importance. But, on the other hand, the man who is narrowly concentrated in his own particular work is not wholly an educated man; he may be not only uncultivated, but in outside affairs an utter simpleton. Most of us have to sacrifice possibilities of educating ourselves beyond some point simply because we have not the time for it if we are to get our work done. On the other hand, the man who does not concentrate on work of his own, but pursues his education in various directions, will be only a dilettante. In the world there is room for both the narrow specialist and the dilettante. But the fact that there are different aptitudes and functions in a world in which we have to

be tolerant of others does not solve the educational problem. And it seems to me that often, in our attempt to balance special training with general culture, we incline to methods of education which produce men and women highly trained in some narrow interest of science or scholarship, and smatterers in everything else; we tend to put them through a course of study which attempts to combine the technical institute with the young ladies' finishing school. For if "training to earn a living" and the "development of all the latent powers and faculties" are treated simply as two unrelated disciplines to which every pupil must be subjected, the latter will be no more than useful as a kind of recreation. When we see that we perform our specialized work all the more intelligently because of seeing it in relation to the work of all sorts of other people, living and dead, who have devoted themselves to quite other types of work than our own, we are on our way to solving for ourselves—this means finding the right compromise for ourselves—the puzzle of the balance between those activities in which we participate, and those of which we can only hope to be an appreciative spectator.

Perhaps I can give this discussion more appearance of reality, or at least provide light relief in the way of something more apprehensible, by asking "What sort of education should a poet have?" I don't think any parents have ever brought up a child with a view to his becoming a poet; some parents have brought up their children to be criminals; but for good and loving parents a poet is almost the last thing they could want their child to be, unless they thought it was the only way of saving him from becoming a criminal. I suppose that poets, during their tender years, usually show an interest in language and expression, and give some indication of a bent for the study of languages rather than science. This is not always true; I have known men who in childhood seemed to their parents to give promise of becoming Humphry Davys or Clerk Maxwells, and suddenly shifted their interest to literature at fifteen or sixteen. Certainly, the fact that a child writes verses is no indication whatever that he will become a poet. Nearly everybody has written verses: a wise parent should not discourage the habit, but should attach no specific significance to it. But if the young poet is of the usual kind, he will probably excel in languages, particularly his own; and is likely to be of the type which flourishes on Latin and Greek. Certainly, the poet in later life ought to be equipped with a good knowledge of Latin and Greek literature, make himself fluent in one modern language besides his own, and have a reading knowledge of several others. How few of us, however, satisfy that qualification: I certainly do not.

But what else should he study, from the point at which it is evident at least that a literary education is the most suitable for him? In the first place, he usually has to make his living, and poetry is conspicuously the occupation by which no one can expect to make a living. For most men, there is the conflict between the claims of the occupation which they make their chief concern in life, and the claims of "the latent powers and faculties." But the poet has a threefold problem to solve: he must earn a living, he must practice and perfect himself in writing, and he must cultivate other interests as well. He must do the last, not merely in order to exercise latent powers, in order to become a cultivated man; but because he must have these other interests in order to have something to write about. Almost no form of knowledge comes amiss (besides, of course, the knowledge of as much of the best poetry in several languages as he can assimilate) because without other intellectual interests his experience of men and women will be very limited. The condition is that everything should be grist that comes to his mill; that he should have a lively curiosity in what men have thought and done, and be interested in these things for their own sake. He is perpetually engaged in solving the problem that every man must solve for himself, that of relating every human activity to his own; and he cannot tell how much, or what, of the subjects he investigates will be directly useful to him as a poet. But his poetry will inevitably be affected by his studies and interests, and the more he can assimilate the better. And finally, he has the problem of procuring a livelihood: he has sometimes to choose between a dull routine which provides little or no food for his mind, or an active and interesting one which leaves him very little time and energy. For some, this livelihood can be found in various forms of journalistic or paraliterary occupation; in teaching and lecturing. For others, something as remote as possible from their literary interests is desirable: something which uses none of the kind of energy that goes into poetry, and which brings them in contact with worlds far removed from those of literary and artistic circles. One cannot generalize about how a poet should earn his living in this or in any conceivable society. But the worst thing for him, perhaps, from every point of view, would be to do nothing and care about nothing, except writing poetry.

So far, we have seen that earning a living and cultivating one's latent powers are not altogether easy to reconcile; and I have cited the special case of the poet, who wants to write poetry as well as earn a living and cultivate his latent powers. We may now ask whether the process of equipment to play one's part as a citizen may present

any possible impediment to either of the other aims of education. It all depends on the content which we give to the idea of citizenship, and the means which we take to equip people for it. I think that the idea of the "good citizen" is a moral concept; if so, we should expect the good citizen to be simply the good man manifesting his goodness in the social context. But we can still, I think, speak of a man as a good citizen whom we may regard as in some respect or other not a good man. A man may be devoted to the interests of his country, his region, or his city; he may sacrifice pleasure, comfort, popularity, in the public interest; wear out his energies in toiling for the public good; and yet be in private life vicious and dishonorable. To what extent can we call such a man a good citizen? It is strange, to me, that this elementary question, that of the relation of good citizenship to goodness, of public to private virtue, has not received the attention of writers on education such as Dr. Joad. Possibly the cultivation of virtue is regarded generally as the responsibility—the only responsibility—which educators leave to the parents. But the question of how far a bad man can be a good citizen is an interesting one in itself, and one about which Socrates, if he were alive today, would not fail to have something to say. For Dr. Joad, at least, it is clear that the ethical problem is one to be passed over, and that for him education in citizenship is education in applying intelligence to public affairs.

This becomes clear when he tells us of what Education in Citizenship should consist. First, those things which seem to him obvious. A child should be taught history, constitutional history (including instruction in how he is governed and how his governors are elected, and the structure of local as well as national government); biology and physiology, so that he may be made free (that is Dr. Joad's phrase) of the main facts, including the sexual facts, relating to the working of his own body; geography, and international affairs. This is a formidable program for any child; and it is entirely training of the mind. I dare say that a knowledge of the main facts relating to the working of his own body might induce a child to brush his teeth morning and evening, if he were so rational a child as Dr. Joad must have been: most of us learn the habit first, and the reason for it later. There are perhaps a good many other things that the child could learn, merely in order to be a good citizen: jujitsu, to cope with burglars and footpads; first aid, in order to save the victims (for the Good Samaritan, from what little we know about him, seems to have had the makings of a good citizen). But my main comment on Dr. Joad's list of accomplishments is not that it is all simply book-learning,

but that it omits any mention of training in moral behavior and feeling. One would think that the good citizen was simply the well-informed citizen; but I am not convinced that a child who, in Dr. Joad's words, "carries at the back of his mind a political map of the modern world," will be better qualified to distinguish between good government and bad. Dr. Joad not only ignores what is generally called "private" in favor of "public" morality—thus ignoring the question whether we can ultimately draw any distinction between private and public morality; even his public morality appears to be merely a matter of being well-informed, and being trained to reason correctly.

Some of you may already have thought that I am devoting too much attention to Dr. Joad, who wrote a popular and very readable book called *About Education*. You may even have suspected that I have done this because his is the only book on the subject that I have read. You would somewhat exaggerate my illiteracy if you thought this: I have chosen Dr. Joad, partly because he puts a typical point of view so well—the point of view of the middle-brow intellectual who was reared on G. B. Shaw and H. G. Wells—for Dr. Joad is not very much younger than myself—and partly because his attitude towards education is implicit in statements sometimes made by more qualified educators. In a list of the aims of education by an authority whose name carries very much more weight in these matters than Dr. Joad's, I read that "every man has a function as a man." With this I do not disagree: every safety razor has a function as a safety razor. I then read, "every man has a function as a citizen or subject of the society in which he lives." With man's function as a man I shall try to cope later. Meanwhile, I may say that I do not see how his function as a citizen can be separated from his function as a man. I think the latter is the more important, but for reasons which I must postpone giving. But I return to my previous question, whether the really good citizen must not be also a good man; with the qualification that in certain contexts we are entitled to say that so-and-so is a "good citizen," without committing ourselves to the assertion that he is a "good man." When it comes to training a young person, or, as Dr. Joad says, a child, to be a good citizen, I still think that it is important first to train him to become a good man.

There are incidental questions which we may ask. Democracy is the best form of society: on that we are all agreed. The chief point on which we do not agree is, as I have said before, what is a democracy. Most of us agree that democracy is of the parliamentary sort: that is, there are two parties, one in, one out, and neither party should be

too long in or out. The government of our nation is, of course, rather more democratic when the party which we support is in, than when the other party is. I have been told that "the function of the citizen of a democracy is to rule in turn for the good life of the whole." Certainly, both parties, whether we call them Republican and Democrat, or Conservative and Labour, rule, when in office, for the good life of the whole: though none of them, when out of office, is likely to admit that the nation is being ruled for the good life of the whole. Certainly, in a democracy, every man should know how to rule and be ruled. To be wholly ruler, to be wholly ruled, is to lose humanity: and, in fact, the humblest worker needs to keep his own offspring in order, while the most powerful despot may be dominated, if by no constitutional powers, by wife, or mistress, or friends. The essential of a democracy is that there is no *total* rule: for total rule means that somebody is in control of affairs about some of which he is totally incompetent. In a democracy, scientists and scholars and artists should rule in their own spheres: it is not a democracy when a symphony can be deviationist, or a melancholy poem about an unhappy love affair defeatist and decadent, or a biological theory subversive.

It seems to me that we may raise the question, how far good citizenship can be an aim of a curriculum of education. To a large extent, surely, it must be the product of a training which is not consciously aimed at anything so comprehensive, and at the same time so narrowly defined, as citizenship. The habits of accepting authority, of being able to exercise responsible freedom, of being able to exercise authority when compelled to assume it, are acquired unconsciously in early years. If parents are public-spirited people, whose interests are not selfishly limited to themselves and their family, children will learn from their example (for the unconscious influence of parents is much more influential than their precepts) that they have a duty towards their neighbors, involving the assumption of responsibility and the exercise of self-control. And in so far as their mental capacities permit, they will learn that this duty involves not merely habitual responses, but thinking and making deliberate choices. In a school, they will learn adaptation to a larger community; and in a college, develop their public sense further in societies and voluntary activities.

Now when it is said that "in a democracy the good man and the good citizen are identical," I do not disagree, but I should prefer to put in more generally and say simply, "the good man and the good citizen are identical." For the former proposition seems to imply another to this effect: "in a state of society which is not a democracy one cannot be both a good man and a good citizen." Now, under an

evil system of government, the good man may sometimes realize his good citizenship by opposing that government. He will not, from the point of view of his rulers, be a good citizen; but then, from their point of view, he will not be a good man either. If good citizenship implies goodness, then there is something universal about good citizenship. Of course, we can say that the Christians martyred in the Roman persecutions were bad citizens; and from the point of view of their persecutors no doubt they were. Perhaps we may say, however, that in a democracy the good man has the greatest opportunity to exercise his goodness in citizenship; and the bad man the greatest opportunity to exercise his badness—or perhaps rather that in a democracy a greater number of good men, and a greater number of bad men, have this opportunity. This gives us a kind of definition of democracy, as the kind of society which offers these opportunities; but observe also that while we arrive at our definition of democracy by the aid of the term "citizenship," we are also implying a definition of good citizenship in terms of democracy.

I am afraid that when we pass from the term "good man" to the term "good citizen" we are insensibly passing from one shade of meaning of "good" to another. But the test of the degree of difference is not found within the proposition itself, but in the further conclusions we draw: the difference may not appear until we have gone quite a long way. Similarly in the sentence "since in a democracy all men are rulers, all men must have the education that rulers must have." Now we see what this means, and we do not disagree; but I think that there are here two different shades of meaning of the word "rulers." An eminent British civil servant, a couple of years ago, gave a broadcast talk to explain UNESCO to his fellow-citizens, and said that UNESCO was "a world club." Now, one sees what he meant to convey; yet I could not help making the comment that a club was by definition an organization of which some people were not members: if everybody in the world were a member, it would cease to be a club. The difficulty here is not so extreme. But even though we agree that all men are rulers, we must not overlook differences in kind and degree of rule. If we think of any particular type of ruler, we can see that some of them need an education differing from that of other men: a judge of the Supreme Court is one kind of ruler, the conductor of an orchestra is another; and they have both had very specialized training, as well as special native aptitudes, to qualify them for the exercise of rule.

The difficulty, and the source of danger, is the application of the general statement about the aims of education, with which everyone

can agree, to more concrete problems. From the general statement about education for citizenship we may pass, through the narrowing of the meaning to *political* activity, and through the narrowing of the meaning of education to what can be taught in classes and from books, to the putting of courses in citizenship into our curricula. I do not say that this is altogether a bad thing, though much could be transmitted by the intelligent teaching of history. It may even be necessary; but when it is, we should try to be quite clear as to why it is. It may be necessary as a palliative of conditions beyond the scope or control of the educational system. In so far as it is an attempt to educate the social conscience, to inculcate virtues, it is trying to supply a training which should be given by the family and the social environment, and is needed because the family and the social environment are not what they should be. In so far as it is the imparting of necessary or desirable knowledge and information, it may imply that the conduct of our society has become so complicated, the problems so interrelated, that it is beginning to make claims on the ordinary citizen greater than he can bear. For example, in earlier times foreign policy was the concern of only a very few persons in any nation; and it was only in relations with one foreign nation at a time—and with many foreign countries not at all—that the issues were so grave that it behooved every educated citizen to inform himself. Now we are all constantly concerned with what happens everywhere. The Spanish-American War was, it seemed at the time, nobody's business but that of the United States and Spain: nowadays, a war anywhere, even if of apparently small dimensions, is a matter of concern to everybody everywhere. I do not wish to pursue this minor question, but only to point the issue. By "education for citizenship" we may mean training in the essential faculties which are necessary both in the conduct of one's personal affairs and in forming an opinion about public policy: the ability to reason, to weigh evidence, to decide how much one needs to know in order to make up one's mind, and the ability to perceive the fundamental moral differences of right and wrong and apply them. And, so far as these things can be taught, they can be inculcated through the study of history. But we may also mean courses of study in all the manifold social problems of contemporary life: in political theory, in public finance, in economics, in municipal government, or in the whole field now covered by sociology, several very vital questions arise. At what age should these studies be begun? And how much time should be given to them at each stage? I do not believe that you can teach these things, beyond a point, to those who are not going to be individually concerned with them; because most

of us cannot study very deeply any subject which does not concern us as individuals, which concerns us only as *members*. I do not mean that nobody should be deeply concerned with these matters: that would be absurd. But those who are deeply concerned with them, and justifiably concentrate their attention on them, are those who are going to make their living thereby, and what is more important, to express themselves by making active contributions. That is, the subjects to which we can profitably give the most attention are those in which we hope to excel. The desire to vote always for the right candidate cannot become the ambition of a lifetime.

Education for citizenship, then, seems to mean first of all the developing of social conscience; and I have already suggested that "social" conscience can be only a development of "conscience": the moment we talk about "social conscience" and forget conscience, we are in moral danger—just as "social justice" must be based upon "justice." The separation in our minds which results simply from dwelling constantly upon the adjective "social" may lead to crimes as well as errors. In the name of social justice we can excuse, or justify to ourselves, or simply ignore, injustice; in the name of social conscience we can do the same by conscience. The same sort of substitutions can occur with the word "democracy." "Social democracy" sounds at first a phrase to which no one could object; but the denotation can be so manipulated that it can be made to point to something which to most of us, I think, may be anything but "democratic."

What I hope has emerged from this wild-goose chase is that our list of three aims of education—the professional, the social, and the development of all the latent powers and faculties—is one in which each aim is implicated with the others, and also that each one may be pursued in such a way as to interfere with the others. This is due to the applications we make of each of three undisputed propositions; and to the fact that in each step of the inferences we make, we may be applying narrower and questionable definitions of a word which in the original proposition did not need to be defined. I have so far said least about the incorrect inferences we may draw from "the development of the latent powers and faculties" or, if we are not merely thinking of hobbies and recreations, what Arnold called the "pursuit of perfection." I once knew a man who, being of independent means, planned a comprehensive humanistic education for himself. I am not quite sure to what studies he applied himself at an American university, but they did not include Latin and Greek, because he deferred these until he should get to Oxford or Cambridge, where he thought he would have them at their best; or modern lan-

guages and literatures, because he intended, after Oxford or Cambridge, to spend a year or two at universities in France, Germany, and Italy in turn. An extensive course of travel was to crown this culture. Needless to say he never completed the program. The pursuit of perfection, or of comprehensive culture, is not enough, because it is a by-product of our desire to *do* something. To perfect oneself, so far as one can, and in the ways in which one is perfectible, may be a duty, but only in relation to some aim beyond oneself. To this point I shall return later. I propose to turn now to the question of the general presuppositions, assumptions, or conscious social and political theories upon which any theory of education must be based. In closing, however, I should like to quote a contemporary French writer, Gustav Thibon; from his introduction to that very profound and original book *La Pesanteur et la grâce* by Simone Weil. It is the thought of Simone Weil which he is expounding:

> The soul devoted to the pursuit of the absolutely good meets in this world with insoluble contradictions. "Our life is impossibility, absurdity. Everything that we will is contradicted by the conditions or by the consequences attached to it. That is because we are ourselves contradiction, being merely creatures. . . ." If, for example, you have innumerable children: that tends to bring about overpopulation and war (the typical case is Japan). If you improve the material conditions of the people: you risk spiritual deterioration. If you devote yourself utterly to some person—you cease to exist for that person. Only imaginary goods imply no contradiction: the girl who desires a large family, the social reformer who dreams of the happiness of the people—such individuals do not encounter any obstacle so long as they refrain from action. They sail along happily in a good which is absolute, but fictitious: to stumble against reality is the signal for waking up. This contradiction, the mark of our wretchedness and our greatness, is something that we must accept in all its bitterness.[1]

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[1] "L'âme attachée à la poursuite du bien pur se heurte ici-bas à d'irréductibles contradictions. 'Notre vie est impossibilité, absurdité. Chaque chose que nous voulons est contradictoire avec les conditions ou les conséquences qui y sont attachées. C'est que nous sommes nous-mêmes contradiction, étant des créatures, ...' Ayez par exemple des enfants sans compter: vous favorisez la surpopulation et la guerre (le cas du Japon est typique à cet égard); améliorez le sort matériel du peuple: vous risquez d'altérer son âme; dévouez-vous entièrement à quelqu'un; vouz cessez d'exister pour lui, etc. Seul le bien imaginaire ne comporte pas de contradiction: la jeune fille qui désire une nombreuse posterité, le réformateur social qui rêve le bonheur du peuple, etc. ne se heurtent à aucun obstacle tant qu'ils ne passent pas à l'action: ils voguent à pleine voile dans un bien pur, mais fictif; le choc contre le réel est le signal du réveil. Cette contradiction, signe de notre misère et de notre grandeur, nous devons l'accepter dans toute son amertume." Thibon, quoting Weil, in his preface to *La Pesanteur et la grâce* (Paris, Plon, 1950), pp. xx–xxi.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF MAX WEBER

Leo Strauss

OUR SOCIAL SCIENCE[1] holds out the prospect of giving us reliable advice as to the means of reaching any objectives we might choose. It declares itself incompetent, however, to help us discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate, between just and unjust objectives. The reason for this limitation is the rejection of natural right. Natural right is rejected today on two different, though frequently combined, grounds. It is rejected in the name of history—that is, on the ground that all human thought is fundamentally historical—and it is rejected because it is held that there is a variety of transhistorical principles of right or of the good—of "timeless values"—that conflict with each other, none of which can be proved to be superior to the others.

The second of these views seems to be of particular importance to the social scientist. It was the view held by Max Weber. No one since Weber has devoted a comparable amount of intelligence, assiduity, and almost fanatical devotion to the basic problem of the social sciences. Whatever may have been his errors, he is the greatest social scientist of our century.

Weber never explained what he understood by values. He was primarily concerned with the relation of values to facts. Facts and values are absolutely heterogeneous; this is shown directly by the absolute heterogeneity of questions of fact and questions of value. No conclusion can be drawn from any fact as to its valuable character, nor can we infer the factual character of something from its being valuable or desirable. Neither time-serving nor wishful thinking is supported by reason. By proving that a given order is the goal of the historical process, one does not say anything as to the valuable or desirable character of that order. By showing that certain religious or ethical ideas had a very great effect, or no effect, one

[1] In its original form, this paper was part of a series of lectures on natural right and history, delivered at the University of Chicago in October 1949, under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation; these lectures will be published by the University of Chicago Press.

does not say anything about the value of those ideas. To understand a factual or possible evaluation is something entirely different from approving or forgiving that evaluation. Weber contended that the absolute heterogeneity of facts and values necessitates the ethically neutral character of social science: social science can answer questions of fact and their causes; it is not competent to answer questions of value. He insisted very strongly on the role played by values in social science: the objects of social science are constituted by "reference to values." Without such "reference," there would be no focus of interest, no reasonable selection of themes, no principle of distinction between relevant and irrelevant facts. Through "reference to values" the objects of social science emerge out of the ocean or morass of facts. But Weber insisted no less strongly on the fundamental difference between "reference to values" and "value-judgments": by saying that something is relevant with regard to political freedom one does not take a stand for or against political freedom. The social scientist does not evaluate the objects constituted by "reference to values"; he merely explains them by tracing them to their causes. The values to which social science refers, and among which acting man chooses, are in need of clarification. This clarification is the function of social philosophy. But even social philosophy cannot solve the crucial value problems. It cannot criticize value judgments that are not self-contradictory.

Weber contended that his notion of a "value free" or ethically neutral social science was fully justified by what he regarded as the most fundamental of all oppositions: the opposition of the Is and the Ought, or the opposition of reality and norm or value. But to conclude from the radical heterogeneity of the Is and the Ought that an evaluating social science is impossible is obviously not valid. Let us assume that we had genuine knowledge of right and wrong, or of the Ought, or of the true value system. That knowledge, while not derived from empirical science, would legitimately direct all empirical social science; it would be the foundation of all empirical social science. For social science is meant to be of practical value. It tries to find means for given ends. For this purpose it has to understand the ends. Regardless of whether the ends are "given" in a different manner than the means, the end and the means belong together; therefore, the end belongs to the same science as the means. If there were genuine knowledge of the ends, that knowledge would naturally guide all search for means. There would be no reason to delegate knowledge of the ends to social philosophy, and search for the means to an independent social science. Based on genuine knowl-

edge of the true ends, social science would search for the proper means for those ends; it would lead to objective and specific value-judgments regarding policies. Social science would be a truly policy-making, not to say architectonic, science and not a mere supplier of data for the real policy makers. The true reason why Weber insisted on the ethically neutral character of social science as well as of social philosophy was, then, not his belief in the fundamental opposition of the Is and the Ought, but his belief that there cannot be any genuine knowledge of the Ought. He denied to man any science, empirical or rational, any knowledge, scientific or philosophic, of the true value system: the true value system does not exist; there is a variety of values which are of the same rank, whose demands conflict with each other, and whose conflict cannot be solved by human reason. Social science or social philosophy can do no more than clarify that conflict and all its implications; the solution has to be left to the free, nonrational decision of each individual.

I contend that Weber's thesis necessarily leads to nihilism, or to the view that every preference, however evil, base, or insane, must be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference. An unmistakable sign of this necessity is given in a statement by Weber about the prospects of Western civilization. He saw this alternative: either a spiritual renewal with "wholly new prophets or a powerful renaissance of old thoughts and ideals," or else "mechanized petrification, varnished by a kind of convulsive sense of self-importance," that is, the extinction of every human possibility but that of "specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart." Confronted with this alternative, Weber felt that the decision in favor of either possibility would be a judgment of value or of faith, and hence beyond the competence of reason. This amounts to an admission that the way of life of specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart is as defensible as the way of life recommended by Amos or Socrates.

To see this more clearly, and to see at the same time how Weber could conceal from himself the nihilistic consequence of his doctrine of values, we have to follow his thought step by step. In following this movement toward its end, we shall inevitably reach a point beyond which the scene is darkened by the shadow of Hitler. Unfortunately, it does not go without saying that in our examination we must avoid the fallacy which in the last decades has frequently been used as a substitute for the *reductio ad absurdum:* the *reductio ad Hitlerum*. A view is not refuted by the fact that it happens to have been shared by Hitler.

Weber started with a combination of the views of Kant as they were understood by certain Neo-Kantians, and of the views of the historical school. From Neo-Kantianism he took his general notion of the character of science, as well as of "individual" ethics. Accordingly, he rejected utilitarianism and every form of eudaemonism. From the historical school he adopted the view that there is no possible social or cultural order which can be said to be *the* right or rational order. He combined the two positions by means of the distinction between moral commands (or ethical imperatives) and cultural values. Moral commands appeal to our conscience, whereas cultural values appeal to our feelings: the individual ought to fulfill his moral duties, whereas it depends entirely on his arbitrary will whether he wishes to realize cultural ideals or not. Cultural ideals or values lack the specific obligatory character of the moral imperatives; these imperatives have a dignity of their own with whose recognition Weber seemed to be greatly concerned. But precisely because of the fundamental difference between moral commands and cultural values, ethics proper is silent regarding cultural and social questions. Whereas gentlemen, or honest men, necessarily agree as to things moral, they legitimately disagree in regard to such things as Gothic architecture, private property, monogamy, democracy, and so on.

One is thus led to think that Weber admitted the existence of absolutely binding rational norms, namely, the moral imperatives. Yet one sees almost immediately that what he said about the moral commands is not much more than the residue of a tradition in which he was brought up and which, indeed, never ceased to determine him as a human being. What he really thought was that ethical imperatives are as subjective as cultural values. According to him, it is as legitimate to reject ethics in the name of cultural values as it is to reject cultural values in the name of ethics, or to adopt any combination of both types of norm which is not self-contradictory. This decision was the inevitable consequence of his notion of ethics. He could not reconcile his view that ethics is silent about the right social order with the undeniable ethical relevance of social questions, except by "relativizing" ethics. It was on this basis that he developed his concept of "personality" or the dignity of man. The true meaning of "personality" depends on the true meaning of freedom. Provisionally one may say that human action is free to the extent to which it is not affected by external compulsion or irresistible emotions, but guided by rational consideration of means and ends. Yet true freedom requires ends of a certain kind, and these ends have to be adopted in a

certain manner. The ends must be anchored in ultimate values. Man's dignity, his being exalted far above everything merely natural, or above all brutes, consists in his setting up autonomously his ultimate values, in making these values his constant ends, and in rationally choosing the means to these ends. The dignity of man consists in his autonomy, that is, in the individual's freely choosing his own values or his own ideals, or in obeying the injunction: "Become what thou art."

At this stage, we still have something resembling an objective norm, a categoric imperative: "Thou shalt have ideals." That imperative is "formal"; it does not determine in any way the content of the ideals, but it might still seem to establish an intelligible or nonarbitrary standard that would allow us to distinguish in a responsible manner between human excellence and depravity. Therewith it might seem to create a universal brotherhood of all noble souls, of all men who are not enslaved to their appetites, their passions, and their selfish interests, of all "idealists": of all men who can justly esteem or respect each other. Yet this is only a delusion. What seems at first to be an invisible church, proves to be a war of everybody against everybody else. Weber's own formulation of his categoric imperative was "Follow thy demon" or "Follow thy god or demon." It would be unfair to complain that Weber forgot the possibility of evil demons, although he may have been guilty of underestimating them. If he had thought only of good demons he would have been forced to admit an objective criterion that would allow him to distinguish in principle between good and evil demons. His categoric imperative actually means "follow thy demon, regardless of whether he is a good or evil demon." For there is an insoluble, deadly conflict between the various values among which man has to choose. What one man believes to be following God, another will consider, with equal right, following the Devil. The categoric imperative has, then, to be formulated as follows: follow God or the Devil as you will, but whichever choice you make, make it with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your power. What is absolutely base is to follow one's appetites, passions, or self-interest, and to be indifferent or lukewarm towards ideals or values, towards gods or devils.

Weber's "idealism"—his recognition of all "ideal" goals or "causes" —seems to permit a nonarbitrary distinction between excellence and baseness or depravity. At the same time, it culminates in the imperative "follow God or the Devil," and this means, in nontheological language, "strive resolutely for excellence or baseness." For to say that to choose value-system A in preference to value-system B means

less than to reject value-system B as base would amount to saying that Weber did not know what he was talking about when he spoke of a choice between God and the Devil, or that when he talked of a deadly conflict he meant a mere difference of tastes. It thus appears that for Weber, in his capacity as a social philosopher, excellence and baseness lost completely their primary meaning. Excellence, to him, now meant devotion to a cause, be it good or evil, and baseness meant indifference to all causes. Excellence and baseness thus understood are excellence and baseness of a higher order. They belong to a dimension that is exalted far above the dimension of action. They can be seen only after one has completely broken away from the world in which we have to make decisions, although they present themselves as preceding any decision. They are the correlates of a purely theoretical attitude toward the world of action. That theoretical attitude implies equal respect for all causes; but such respect is possible only for him who is not devoted to any cause. Now, if excellence is devotion to a cause and baseness is indifference to all causes, the theoretical attitude toward all causes would have to be qualified as base. No wonder, then, that Weber was driven to question the value of theory, of science, of reason, of the realm of the mind, as well as of both moral imperatives and cultural values. The same dignity that he had ascribed to moral commands and cultural values he was forced to ascribe to what he called "purely 'vitalistic' values." These values may be said to belong entirely to "the sphere of one's own individuality": they are purely personal and in no way principles of a cause. Hence they are not, strictly speaking, values. Weber contended explicitly that it is perfectly legitimate to take a hostile attitude toward all impersonal and suprapersonal values and ideals, and therewith toward every concern with "personality" or the dignity of man as previously defined; for, according to him, there is only one way to become a "personality," namely, through absolute devotion to a cause. At the moment when the "vitalistic" values are recognized as of equal rank with cultural values, the categoric imperative "thou shalt have ideals" is being transformed into the command "thou shalt live passionately." Baseness no longer means indifference to any of the incompatible great objects of humanity, but being engrossed with one's own comfort and prestige. But with what right except that of arbitrary whim can one reject the way of life of the Philistine in the name of "vitalistic" values, if one can reject the moral commands in the name of "vitalistic" values? It was in tacit recognition of the impossibility of stopping on the downward path that Weber frankly admitted that it is merely a subjective judgment of faith or value if

one despises "specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart" as degraded human beings. The final formulation of Weber's ethical principle would thus be "thou shalt have preferences" —an Ought whose fulfillment is fully guaranteed by the Is.

One last obstacle to complete chaos seems to remain. Whatever preferences I may have or choose, I must act rationally: I must be honest with myself, I must be consistent in my adherence to my fundamental objectives, and I must rationally choose the means required by my ends. But why? What difference can this still make after we have been reduced to a condition in which the maxims of the heartless voluptuary as well as those of the sentimental Philistine have to be regarded as no less defensible than those of the idealist, of the gentleman, or of the saint? We cannot take seriously this belated insistence on responsibility and sanity, this inconsistent concern with consistency, this irrational praise of rationality. Can one not very easily make out a stronger case for inconsistency than Weber has made out for preferring cultural values to the moral imperatives? Does one not necessarily imply the depreciation of rationality in every form when one declares it legitimate to make "vitalistic" values one's supreme values? Weber would probably have insisted that whatever preference one adopts one has to be honest, at least with oneself, and especially that one must not make the dishonest attempt to give one's preferences an objective foundation which would necessarily be a sham foundation. But should he have done so, he would merely have been inconsistent. For, according to him, it is equally legitimate to will or not to will truth, or to reject truth in favor of the beautiful and the sacred. Why, then, should one not prefer pleasing delusions or edifying myths to the truth? Weber's regard for "rational self-determination" and "intellectual honesty," is a trait of his character which has no basis but his nonrational preference for "rational self-determination" and "intellectual honesty."

One may call the nihilism to which Weber's thesis leads noble nihilism. For that nihilism stems, not from a primary indifference to everything noble, but from the alleged or real insight into the baseless character of everything thought to be noble. Yet one cannot make a distinction between noble and base nihilism unless one has some knowledge of what is noble and what is base. But such knowledge transcends nihilism. In order to be entitled to describe Weber's nihilism as noble, one must have broken with his position.

One could make the following objection to the foregoing criticism: what Weber really meant cannot be expressed in terms of "values" or "ideals" at all; it is much more adequately expressed by his

quotation "become what thou art," meaning "choose thy fate." According to this interpretation, Weber rejected objective norms because objective norms are incompatible with human freedom, or with the possibility of acting. We must leave it open whether this reason for rejecting objective norms is a good reason, and whether the nihilistic consequence would be avoided by this interpretation of Weber's view. It is sufficient to remark that its acceptance would require a break with the notions of "value" and "ideal" on which Weber's actual doctrine is built, and that it is that actual doctrine and not the possible interpretation mentioned which dominates present-day social science.

Many social scientists of our time seem to regard nihilism as a minor inconvenience, which wise men would bear with equanimity, since it is the price one has to pay for obtaining that highest good: a truly scientific social science. They seem to be satisfied with any scientific findings, although they cannot be more than "barren truths which generate no conclusions," the conclusions being generated by purely subjective value-judgments or arbitrary preferences. We have to consider, therefore, whether social science as a purely theoretical pursuit, but still as a pursuit leading to the understanding of social phenomena, is possible on the basis of the distinction between facts and values.

We think again of Weber's statement on the prospects of Western civilization. As we observed, Weber saw this alternative: a spiritual renewal or "mechanized petrifaction"; in other words, the extinction of every human possibility except that of "specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart." He concluded: "But by making this statement we enter the province of judgments of value and faith with which this purely historical presentation shall not be burdened." It is not proper, then, for the historian or social scientist truthfully to describe a certain type of life as spiritually empty, or to describe specialists without vision and voluptuaries without heart as what they are. But is this not absurd? Is it not the plain duty of the social scientist truthfully and faithfully to present social phenomena? How can we give a causal explanation of a social phenomenon if we do not first see it for what it is? Do we not know petrifaction or spiritual emptiness when we see it? And if someone is incapable of seeing phenomena of this kind, is he not disqualified by this very fact from being a social scientist, just as a blind man is disqualified from being an analyst of painting?

Weber was particularly concerned with the sociology of ethics and of religion. That sociology presupposes a fundamental distinction

between "ethos" and "techniques of living" (or "prudential" rules). The sociologist must then be able to recognize an "ethos" in its distinctive character; he must have a feel for it, an appreciation of it, as Weber admitted. But does not such appreciation necessarily imply a value-judgment? Does it not imply the realization that a given phenomenon is a *genuine* "ethos" and not a *mere* "technique of living"? Would one not laugh out of court a man who claimed to have written a sociology of art but who actually had written a sociology of trash? The sociologist of religion must distinguish between phenomena which have a religious character and phenomena which are a-religious. To be able to do this, he must understand what religion is. Now, contrary to what Weber suggested, such understanding enables and forces him to distinguish between genuine and spurious religion, between higher and lower religions; those religions are higher in which the specifically religious motivations are effective to a higher degree. Or shall we say that the sociologist is permitted to note the presence or absence of religion or of "ethos"—for this would be merely factual observation—but must not dare to pronounce on the degree to which it is present, that is to say, on the rank of the particular religion or "ethos" he is studying? The sociologist of religion cannot help noting the difference between those who try to gain the favor of their gods by flattering and bribing them, and those who try to gain it by a change of heart. Can he see this difference without seeing at the same time the difference of rank which it implies, the difference between a mercenary and nonmercenary attitude? Is he not forced to realize that the attempt to bribe the gods is tantamount to trying to be the lord or employer of the gods, and that there is a fundamental incongruity between such attempts and what men divine when speaking of gods? In fact, Weber's whole sociology of religion stands or falls on such distinctions as those between "ethics of intention" and "priestly formalism" (or "petrified maxims"), "sublime" religious thought and "pure sorcery," "the fresh source of a really, and not merely apparently, profound insight" and "a maze of wholly unintuitive, symbolistic images," "plastic imagination" and "bookish thinking." His work would be not merely dull, but absolutely meaningless, if he did not speak almost constantly of practically all intellectual and moral virtues and vices in the appropriate language—in the language of praise and blame. I have in mind expressions such as these: "grand figures," "incomparable grandeur," "perfection that is nowhere surpassed," "pseudosystematics," "absolutely unartistic," "ingenious explanations," "power, plasticity, and precision of formulation," "sublime character of the ethical demands,"

"perfect inner consistency," "works of art of the first rank." Weber paid some attention to the influence of Puritanism on poetry, music, and so on. He noted a certain negative effect of Puritanism on these arts. This fact (if it is a fact) owes its relevance exclusively to the circumstance that a genuinely religious impulse of a very high order was the cause of the decline of art, of the "drying up" of previously existing genuine and high art. For clearly, no one in his senses would voluntarily pay the slightest attention to a case in which a languishing superstition caused the production of trash. In the case studied by Weber, the cause was a genuine and high religion, and the effect was the decline of art: both the cause and the effect become visible only on the basis of value-judgments as distinguished from mere reference to values. Weber had to choose between blindness to the phenomena and value-judgments. In his capacity as a practicing social scientist, he chose wisely.

The prohibition against value-judgments in social science would lead to the consequence that we are permitted to give a strictly factual description of the overt acts that can be observed in concentration camps, and perhaps an equally factual analysis of the motivations of the actors concerned: we would not be permitted to speak of cruelty. Every reader of such a description who is not completely stupid would, of course, see that the actions described are cruel. The factual description would, in truth, be a bitter satire. What claimed to be a straightforward report would be an unusually circumlocutory report. The writer would deliberately suppress his better knowledge, or, to use Weber's favorite term, he would commit an act of intellectual dishonesty. The whole procedure reminds one of a childish game in which you lose if you pronounce certain words, to the use of which you are constantly incited by your playmates. Weber like every other man who ever discussed social matters in a relevant manner, could not avoid speaking of avarice, greed, unscrupulousness, vanity, devotion, sense of proportion, and similar things, that is, making value-judgments. He expressed indignation against people who did not see the difference between Gretchen in Goethe's *Faust* and a prostitute, that is, against those who failed to see the nobility of sentiment present in the one but absent from the other. What Weber implied can be formulated as follows: prostitution is a recognized subject of sociology; this subject cannot be seen if the degrading character of prostitution is not seen at the same time; if one sees the fact "prostitution," as distinguished from an arbitrary abstraction, one has already made a value-judgment. What would become of political science if it were not permitted to

deal with phenomena like narrow party spirit, boss rule, pressure groups, statesmanship, corruption, even moral corruption—in other words, with phenomena which are, as it were, constituted by value-judgments? To put the terms designating such things in quotation marks is a childish trick which enables one to talk of important subjects while denying the principles without which there cannot be important subjects—a trick which is meant to allow one to combine the advantages of common sense with the denial of common sense. Or can one say anything relevant on public opinion polls, for example, without realizing the fact that many answers to the questionnaires are given by unintelligent, uninformed, deceitful, and irrational people, and that not a few questions are formulated by people of the same caliber—can one say anything relevant about public opinion polls without committing one value-judgment after another?

Or let us look at an example that Weber himself discussed at some length. The political scientist or historian, for example, has to explain actions of statesmen and generals; he has to trace their actions to their causes. He cannot do this without answering the question of whether the action concerned was caused by rational consideration of means and ends, or by emotional factors. For this purpose he has to construct the model of a perfectly rational action in the given circumstances. Only thus will he be able to see which nonrational factors, if any, deflected the action from the strictly rational course. Weber admitted that this procedure implies evaluation: we are forced to say that the actor in question made this or that mistake. But, Weber argued, the construction of the model and the ensuing value-judgment on the deviation from the model are merely a transitional stage in the process of causal explanation. As good children, we are then to forget as soon as possible what, in passing by, we could not help noticing, but were not supposed to notice. But, in the first place, if the historian shows, by objectively measuring the action of a statesman against the model of "rational action in the circumstances," that the statesman made one blunder after another, he makes an objective value-judgment to the effect that the statesman was singularly inept. In another case, the historian arrives by the same procedure at the equally objective value-judgment that a general showed unusual resourcefulness, resolution, and prudence. It is impossible to understand phenomena of this kind without being aware of the standard of judgment that is inherent in the situation and accepted as a matter of course by the actors themselves, and it is impossible not to make use of that standard by actually evaluating. In the second place, one may wonder whether what Weber

regarded as merely incidental or transitional—namely, insight into the ways of folly and wisdom, cowardice and bravery, barbarism and humanity, and so on—is not more worthy of the interest of the historian than any causal explanation along Weberian lines. As for the question whether the inevitable and unobjectionable value-judgments should be expressed or suppressed, it is really the question of how they should be expressed, "where, when, by whom, and towards whom"; it belongs, therefore, before another tribunal than that of the methodology of the social sciences.

Social science could avoid value-judgments only by keeping strictly within the limits of a purely historical or "interpretive" approach. The social scientist would have to bow without a murmur to the self-interpretation of his subjects. He would be forbidden to speak of "morality," "religion," "art," "civilization," and so on, when interpreting the thought of peoples or tribes who are unaware of such notions. On the other hand, he would have to accept as morality, religion, art, knowledge, state, whatever claimed to be morality, religion, art, and so on. As a matter of fact, there exists a sociology of knowledge according to which everything that pretends to be knowledge—even if it is notorious nonsense—has to be accepted as knowledge by the sociologist. Weber himself identified the types of legitimate rule with what are thought to be types of legitimate rule. But this limitation exposes one to the danger of falling victim to every deception and every self-deception of the people one is studying; it penalizes every critical attitude; taken by itself, it deprives social science of every possible value. The self-interpretation of a blundering general cannot be accepted by the political historian, and the self-interpretation of a silly rhymer cannot be accepted by the historian of literature. Nor can the social scientist afford to rest content with the interpretation of a given phenomenon that is accepted by the group within which it occurs. Are groups less liable to deceive themselves than individuals? It was easy for Weber to make the following demand: "What is alone important [for describing a given quality as charismatic] is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his 'followers' or 'disciples.' " Eight lines later we read: "Another type [of charismatic leader] is that of Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, who, however, cannot be classified in this way with absolute certainty since there is a possibility that he was a very sophisticated type of swindler," i.e., that he merely pretended to have a charisma. It would be unfair to insist on the fact that the German original is, to say the least, much less explicit and emphatic than the English translation; for the problem implicitly

raised by the translator—namely, the problem concerning the difference between genuine and pretended charisma, between genuine prophets and pseudoprophets, between genuine leaders and successful charlatans—cannot be disposed of by silence. The sociologist cannot be obliged to abide by the legal fictions which a given group never dared to regard as legal fictions; he is forced to make a distinction between how a given group actually conceives of the authority by which it is ruled, and the true character of the authority in question. On the other hand, the strictly historical approach, which limits itself to understanding people in the way in which they understand themselves, may be very fruitful if kept in its place. By realizing this we grasp a legitimate motive underlying the demand for a nonevaluating social science.

It may be said to be trivial that the social scientist ought not to judge societies other than his own by the standards of his society. It is his boast that he does not praise or blame, but understands. But he cannot understand without a conceptual framework, or a frame of reference. Now, his frame of reference is more likely than not to be a mere reflex of the way in which his own society understands itself in his time. Accordingly, he will interpret societies other than his own in terms that are wholly alien to those societies. He will force these societies into the Procrustean bed of his conceptual scheme. He will not understand these societies as they understand themselves; and since the self-interpretation of a society is an essential element of its being, he will not understand these societies as they really are. Moreover, since one cannot understand one's own society adequately if one does not understand other societies, he will not even be able really to understand his own society. He has then to understand various societies of the past and present, or significant "parts" of those societies, exactly as they understand or understood themselves. Within the limits of this purely historical and hence merely preparatory or ancillary work, that kind of objectivity which implies the foregoing of evaluations is, from every point of view, legitimate and even indispensable. Particularly in regard to such phenomena as teachings, it is obvious that one cannot judge the soundness of a doctrine, or explain it in sociological or other terms, before one has understood it: that is to say, before one has understood it exactly as its originator understood it.

It is curious that Weber, who was so fond of the kind of objectivity that requires the foregoing of value-judgments, was almost blind regarding the sphere which may be said to be the home, and the only home, of nonevaluating objectivity. He realized clearly that the

conceptual framework which he used was rooted in the social situation of his time. It is easy to see, for instance, that his distinction of three ideal types of political legitimacy (traditional, rational, and charismatic) reflects the situation as it existed in continental Europe after the French Revolution, when the struggle between the residues of the prerevolutionary régimes and the revolutionary régimes was understood as a contest between tradition and reason. The manifest inadequacy of this scheme, which perhaps fitted the situation in the nineteenth century but hardly any other situation, forced Weber to add the charismatic type of legitimacy to the two types imposed on him by his environment. This addition did not remove but merely concealed the basic limitation inherent in his scheme. The addition created the impression that the scheme was now comprehensive, but in fact it could not be made comprehensive by any additions because of its parochial origin: not a comprehensive reflection on the nature of political society, but merely the experience of two or three generations had supplied the basic orientation. Since Weber believed that no conceptual scheme used by social science can be of more than ephemeral validity, he was not seriously disturbed by this state of affairs. In particular, he was not seriously disturbed by the danger that the imposition of his definitely "dated" scheme might prevent the unbiased understanding of earlier political situations. He did not wonder whether his scheme fitted the manner in which, say, the protagonists of the great political conflicts of history had conceived of their causes, that is to say, of the principles of legitimacy. For fundamentally the same reason, he did not hesitate to describe Plato as an "intellectual," without for one moment taking into consideration the fact that the whole work of Plato may be described as a critique of the notion of "the intellectual." He did not hesitate to consider the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians in Thucydides' *History* as a sufficient basis for asserting that "in the Hellenic polis of the classical time, a most naked 'Machiavellianism' was regarded as a matter of course in every respect and as wholly unobjectionable from an ethical point of view." To say nothing of other considerations, he did not pause to wonder how Thucydides himself had conceived of that dialogue. Similarly, his sociological explanation of Hindu thought is based on the premise that natural right "of any kind" presupposes the natural equality of all men, and perhaps even a blessed state at the beginning and at the end. Or, to take what is perhaps the most telling example, when discussing the question of what has to be regarded as the essence of a historical phenomenon like Calvinism, Weber said: by calling something the

essence of a historical phenomenon, one means either that aspect of the phenomenon which one considers to be of permanent value, or else that aspect through which it exercised the greatest historical influence. He did not even allude to a third possibility, which is in fact the first and most obvious one, namely, that the essence of Calvinism would have to be identified with what Calvin himself regarded as the essence, or as the chief characteristic, of his work.

Weber's methodological principles were bound to affect his work in an adverse manner. We shall illustrate this by glancing at his most famous historical essay, his study on Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. He contended that Calvinist theology was a major cause of the capitalist spirit. He stressed the fact that the effect was in no way intended by Calvin, that Calvin would have been shocked by it and—what is more important—that the crucial link in the chain of causation (a peculiar interpretation of the dogma of predestination) was rejected by Calvin, but emerged "quite naturally" among the epigones and, above all, among the broad stratum of the general run of Calvinists. Now, if one speaks about a teaching of the rank of Calvin's, the mere reference to epigones and the general run of men implies a value-judgment on the interpretation of the dogma of predestination which these people adopted: epigon and the general run of men are very likely to miss the decisive poi Weber's implied value-judgment is fully justified in the eyes everyone who has understood the theological doctrine of Calvin; th peculiar interpretation of the dogma of predestination that allegedly led to the emergence of the capitalistic spirit is based on a radical misunderstanding of Calvin's doctrine; it is a corruption of that doctrine or, to use Calvin's own language, it is a carnal interpretation of a spiritual teaching. The maximum that Weber could reasonably have claimed to have proved is, then, that a corruption or degeneration of Calvin's theology led to the emergence of the capitalist spirit. Only by means of this decisive qualification can his thesis be brought into even approximate harmony with the facts to which he refers. But he was prevented from making this crucial qualification because he had imposed on himself the taboo regarding value-judgments. By avoiding an indispensable value-judgment he was forced into giving a factually incorrect picture of what had happened. For his fear of value-judgments prompted him to identify the essence of Calvinism with its historically most influential aspect. He instinctively avoided identifying the essence of Calvinism with what Calvin himself considered essential, because Calvin's self-interpreta

tion would naturally act as a standard by which to judge objectively the Calvinists who claimed to follow Calvin.

The rejection of value-judgments endangers historical objectivity. In the first place, it prevents one from calling a spade a spade. In the second place, it endangers that kind of objectivity which legitimately requires the foregoing of evaluations, namely, the objectivity of interpretation. The historian who takes it for granted that objective value-judgments are impossible cannot take very seriously that thought of the past which was based on the assumption that objective value-judgments are possible, that is to say, practically all thought of earlier generations. Knowing beforehand that that thought was based on a fundamental delusion, he lacks the necessary incentive for trying to understand the past as it understood itself.

Almost all that we have said up to this point was necessary in order to clear away the most important obstacles to an understanding of Weber's central thesis. Only now are we able to grasp its precise meaning. Let us reconsider our last example. What Weber should have said was that the corruption of Calvinist theology led to the emergence of the capitalist spirit. This would have implied an objective value-judgment on vulgar Calvinism: the epigones unwittingly destroyed what they intended to preserve. Yet this implied value-judgment is of very limited significance. It does not prejudge the real issue in any way. For, assuming that Calvinist theology was a bad thing, its corruption was a good thing. What Calvin would have considered a "carnal" understanding could, from another point of view, be approved as a "this-worldly" understanding leading to such good things as secularist individualism and secularist democracy. Even from the latter point of view, vulgar Calvinism would appear as an impossible position, a halfway house, but preferable to Calvinism proper for the same reason that Sancho Panza may be said to be preferable to Don Quixote. The rejection of vulgar Cavinism is then inevitable from every point of view. But this merely means that only after having rejected vulgar Calvinism is one faced with the real issue: the issue of religion versus irreligion, that is, of genuine religion versus noble irreligion, as distinguished from the issue of mere sorcery or mechanical ritualism versus the irreligion of specialists without vision and voluptuaries without heart. It is this real issue which, according to Weber, cannot be settled by human reason, just as the conflict between different genuine religions of the highest rank (e.g., the conflict between Deutero-Isaiah, Jesus, and Buddha) cannot be settled by human reason. Thus, in spite of the

fact that social science stands or falls by value-judgments, socia science or social philosophy cannot settle the decisive value-conflicts It is indeed true that one has already passed a value-judgment wher speaking of Gretchen and a prostitute. But this value-judgment prove to be merely provisional when one comes face to face with a radicall ascetic position which condemns all sexuality. From this point o view, the open degradation of sexuality through prostitution ma appear to be a cleaner thing than the disguise of the true nature o sexuality through sentiment and poetry. It is indeed true that on cannot speak of human affairs without praising the intellectual an moral virtues, and blaming the intellectual and moral vices. Bu this does not dispose of the possibility that all human virtues woul ultimately have to be judged to be no more than splendid vices. I would be absurd to deny that there is an objective difference betwee a blundering general and a strategic genius. But if war is absolutel evil, the difference between the blundering general and the strategi genius will be on the same level as the difference between a blunde ing thief and a genius in thievery.

It seems then that what Weber really meant by his rejection o value-judgments would have to be expressed as follows. The object of the social sciences are constituted by reference to values. Referenc to values presupposes appreciation of values. Such appreciatio enables and forces the social scientist to evaluate social phenomena that is, to distinguish between the genuine and the spurious, and be tween the higher and the lower: between genuine religion an spurious religion, between genuine leaders and charlatans, betwee knowledge and mere lore or sophistry, between virtue and vice, be tween moral sensitivity and moral obtuseness, between art and trash between vitality and degeneracy, and so on. Reference to values i incompatible with neutrality; it can never be "purely theoretical." But nonneutrality does not necessarily mean approval; it may als mean rejection. In fact, since the various values are incompatibl with each other, the approval of any one value necessarily implie the rejection of some other value or values. Only on the basis o such acceptance or rejection of values do the objects of the socia sciences come into sight. For all further work, for the causal analysi of these objects, it must be a matter of indifference whether th student has accepted or rejected the value in question.

At any rate, Weber's whole notion of the scope and the functio of the social sciences rests on the allegedly demonstrable premis that the conflict between ultimate values cannot be resolved b human reason. The question is whether that premise has really bee

demonstrated, or whether it has merely been postulated under the impulse of a specific moral preference.

At the threshold of Weber's attempt to demonstrate his basic premise, we encounter two striking facts. The first is that Weber, who wrote thousands of pages, devoted hardly more than thirty pages to a thematic discussion of the basis of his whole position. Why was that basis so little in need of proof? Why was it self-evident to him? A provisional answer is supplied by the second observation we can make prior to any analysis of his arguments. As he indicated at the beginning of his discussion of the subject, his thesis was only the generalized version of an older and more common view, namely, that the conflict between ethics and politics is insoluble: political action is sometimes impossible without incurring moral guilt. It seems, then, that it was the spirit of "power politics" that begot Weber's position. Nothing is more revealing than the fact that, in a related context, when speaking of conflict and peace, Weber put "peace" in quotation marks, whereas he did not take this precaution when speaking of conflict. Conflict was for Weber an unambiguous thing, but peace was not: peace is phony, but war is real.

Weber's thesis that there is no solution to the conflict between values was, then, a part, or a consequence, of the comprehensive view according to which human life is essentially an inescapable conflict. For this reason, "peace and universal happiness" appeared to him to be an illegitimate or fantastic goal. Even if that goal could be reached, he thought, it would not be desirable; it would be the condition of "the last men who have invented happiness," against whom Nietzsche had directed his "devastating criticism." If peace is incompatible with human life, or with the truly human life, the moral problem would seem to have a clear solution: the nature of things requires a warrior ethics as the basis of a "power politics" that is guided exclusively by considerations of the national interest; or "the most naked Machiavellianism [would have to be] regarded as a matter of course in every respect, and as wholly unobjectionable from an ethical point of view." But we would then be confronted with the paradoxical situation that the individual is at peace with himself while the world is ruled by war. The strife-torn world demands a strife-torn individual. The strife would not go to the root of the individual if he were not forced to negate the very principle of war: he must negate the war, from which he cannot escape and to which he must dedicate himself, as evil or sinful. Lest there be peace anywhere, peace must not be simply rejected. It is not even sufficient to subordinate peace, as the necessary breathing time between wars,

to war. There must be an absolute duty directing us toward universal peace or universal brotherhood, a duty conflicting with the equally high duty that directs us to participate in "the eternal struggle" for "elbowroom" for our nation. Conflict would not be supreme if guilt could be avoided. The question whether one can speak of guilt if man is forced to become guilty was not discussed by Weber: he needed the necessity of guilt. He had to combine the anguish bred by atheism (the absence of any redemption, of any solace) with the anguish bred by revealed religion (the oppressive sense of guilt). Without that combination life would cease to be tragic, and thus lose its depth.

Weber assumed as a matter of course that there is no hierarchy of values: all values are of the same rank. Now, precisely if this is the case, a social scheme that satisfies the requirements of two values is preferable to one whose scope is more limited. The comprehensive scheme might demand that some of the requirements of each of the two values would have to be sacrificed. In this case, the question would arise whether the extreme or one-sided schemes are not as good as, or better than, the apparently more comprehensive schemes. To answer that question one would have to know whether it is at all possible to adopt one of the two values, while unqualifiedly rejecting the other. If it is impossible, some sacrifice of the apparent requirements of the two component values would be a dictate of reason. The optimal scheme might not be realizable except under certain very favorable conditions, and the actual conditions here and now may be very unfavorable. This would not deprive the optimal scheme of its importance because it would remain indispensable as the basis for rational judgment about the various imperfect schemes. In particular, its importance would in no way be affected by the fact that in given situations one has only a choice between two equally imperfect schemes. Last but not least, in all reflections on such matters, one must not be oblivious for one moment of the general significance for social life of extremism on the one hand, and moderation on the other. Weber pushed all considerations of this character aside by declaring that "the middle line is no whit more scientifically correct than the most extreme party ideals of the right and of the left," and that the middle line is even inferior to the extreme solutions since it is less unambiguous. The question, of course, is whether social science has not to be concerned with sensible solutions to the social problems, and whether moderation is not more sensible than extremism. However sensible Weber may have been as a practical politician, however much he may have abhorred the spirit of narrow

party fanaticism, as a social scientist he approached social problems in a spirit that had nothing in common with the spirit of statesmanship, and that could serve no other practical end than to encourage narrow obstinacy. His unshakable faith in the supremacy of conflict forced him to have at least as high a regard for extremism as for moderate courses.

But we can no longer delay turning to Weber's attempts to prove his contention that the ultimate values are simply in conflict with each other. We shall have to limit ourselves to a discussion of two or three specimens of his proofs. The first one is the example that he used in order to illustrate the character of most issues of social policy. Social policy is concerned with justice; but, according to Weber, what justice in society requires cannot be decided by any ethics. Two opposed views are equally legitimate or defensible. According to the first view, one owes much to him who achieves or contributes much; according to the second view, one should demand much from him who can achieve or contribute much. If one adopts the first view, one would have to grant great opportunities to great talent. If one adopts the second view, one would have to prevent the talented individual from exploiting his superior opportunities. We shall not complain about the loose way in which Weber stated what he considered, rather strangely, an insuperable difficulty. We merely note that he did not indicate any reason by which the first view can be supported. The second view, however, required an explicit argument. According to Weber, one may argue, as Babeuf did, in the following way: the injustice of the unequal distribution of mental gifts, and the gratifying feeling of prestige which attends the mere possession of superior gifts, have to be compensated by social measures destined to prevent the talented individual from exploiting his great opportunities. Before one could say that this view is tenable, one would have to know whether it makes sense to say that nature committed an injustice by distributing her gifts unequally, whether it is a duty of society to remedy that injustice, and whether envy has a right to be heard. But even if one would grant that Babeuf's view, as stated by Weber, is as defensible as the first view, what would follow? That we have to make a blind choice? That we have to incite the adherents of the two opposed views to insist on their opinions with all the obstinacy they can muster? If, as Weber contends, neither solution is morally superior to the other, the reasonable consequence would be that the decision has to be transferred from the tribunal of ethics to that of convenience or expediency. Weber emphatically excluded considerations of expediency from the dis-

cussion of this issue: if demands are made in the name of justice, he declared, consideration of which solution would supply the best "incentives" is out of place. But is there no connection between justice and the good of society, and between the good of society and incentives to socially valuable activity? Precisely if Weber were right in asserting that the two opposite views are equally defensible, social science as an objective science would have to stigmatize as a crackpot any man who insisted that only one of the views is in accordance with justice.

Our second example is Weber's alleged proof that there is an insoluble conflict between what he calls the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of intention. According to the former, man's responsibility extends to the foreseeable consequences of his actions, whereas, according to the latter, man's responsibility is limited to the intrinsic rightness of his actions. Weber illustrated the ethics of intention by the example of syndicalism: the syndicalist is concerned not with the consequences or the success of his revolutionary activity but with his own integrity, with preserving in himself and awakening in others a certain moral attitude and nothing else. Even a conclusive proof that in a given situation his revolutionary activity would be destructive, for all the foreseeable future, of the very existence of revolutionary workers, would not be a valid argument against a convinced syndicalist. Weber's convinced syndicalist is an *ad hoc* construction, as is shown by his remark that if the syndicalist is consistent, his kingdom is not of this world. In other words, if he were consistent, he would cease to be a syndicalist, that is, a man who is concerned with the liberation of the working class in this world, and by means belonging to this world. The ethics of intention, which Weber imputed to syndicalism, is in reality an ethics alien to all this-worldly social or political movements. As he stated on another occasion, within the dimension of social action proper "the ethics of intention and the ethics of responsibility are not absolute opposites, but supplement each other: both united constitute the genuine human being." That ethics of intention that is incompatible with what Weber once called the ethics of a genuine human being is a certain interpretation of Christian ethics or, more generally expressed, a strictly other-worldly ethics. What Weber really meant when speaking of the insoluble conflict between the ethics of intention and the ethics of responsibility was, then, that the conflict between this-worldly ethics and other-worldly ethics is insoluble by human reason.

Weber was convinced that on the basis of a strictly this-worldly orientation no objective norms are possible: there cannot be "abso-

lutely valid" and, at the same time, specific norms, except on the basis of revelation. Yet he never proved that the unassisted human mind is incapable of arriving at objective norms, or that the conflict between different this-worldly ethical doctrines is insoluble by human reason. He merely proved that other-worldly ethics, or rather a certain type of other-worldly ethics, is incompatible with those standards of human excellence or of human dignity which the unassisted human mind discerns. One could say, without in the least being guilty of irreverence, that the conflict between this-worldly and other-worldly ethics need not be of serious concern to social science. As Weber himself pointed out, social science attempts to understand social life from a this-worldly point of view. Social science is human knowledge of human life. Its light is the natural light. It tries to find rational or reasonable solutions to social problems. The insights and solutions at which it arrives might be questioned on the basis of superhuman knowledge or of divine revelation. But, as Weber indicated, social science as such cannot take notice of such questionings because they are based on presuppositions which can never be evident to unassisted human reason. By accepting presuppositions of this character, social science would transform itself into either Jewish or Christian or Islamic or Buddhistic or some other "denominational" social science. In addition, if genuine insights of social science can be questioned on the basis of revelation, revelation is not merely above reason but against reason. Weber had no compunction in saying that every belief in revelation is ultimately belief in the absurd. Whether this view of Weber's, who after all was not a theological authority, is compatible with an intelligent belief in revelation need not concern us here.

Once it is granted that social science or this-worldly understanding of human life is evidently legitimate, the difficulty raised by Weber appears to be irrelevant. But he refused to grant that premise. He contended that science or philosophy rests in the last analysis, not on evident premises that are at the disposal of man as man, but on faith. Granting that only science or philosophy can lead to the truth which man can know, he raised the question whether the quest for knowable truth is good, and he decided that this question can no longer be answered by science or philosophy. Science or philosophy is unable to give a clear or certain account of its own basis. The goodness of science or philosophy was no problem so long as one could believe it to be "the way to true being" or to "true nature" or to "true happiness." But these expectations have proved to be illusory. Henceforth, science or philosophy can have no other goal than to ascertain that very limited truth which is accessible to man. Yet in spite of this

tremendous change in the character of science or philosophy, the quest for truth continues to be regarded as valuable in itself, and not merely with a view to its practical results—which in their turn are of questionable value: to increase man's power means to increase his power for evil as well as for good. By regarding the quest for truth as valuable in itself one admits that one is making a preference which no longer has a good or sufficient reason. One recognizes therewith the principle that preferences do not need good or sufficient reasons. Accordingly, those who regard the quest for truth as valuable in itself may regard such activities as the understanding of the genesis of a doctrine, or the editing of a text, nay the conjectural correction of any corrupt reading in any manuscript, as ends in themselves: the quest for truth has the same dignity as stamp collecting. Every pursuit, every whim becomes as defensible or legitimate as any other. But Weber did not always go so far. He also said that the goal of science is clarity, that is, clarity about the great issues, and this means ultimately clarity, not indeed about the whole, but about the situation of man as man. Science or philosophy is, then, the way toward freedom from delusion; it is the foundation of a free life, of a life that refuses to bring the sacrifice of the intellect, and dares to look reality in its stern face. It is concerned with the knowable truth, which is valid regardless of whether we like it or not. Weber went up to this point. But he refused to say that science or philosophy is concerned with the truth which is valid for all men regardless of whether they desire to know it or not. What stopped him? Why did he deny to the knowable truth its inescapable power?

He was inclined to believe that twentieth-century man has eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, or can be free from the delusions which blinded all thought of the past: we see the situation of man without delusions; we are disenchanted. But under the influence of historicism, he became doubtful whether one can speak of the situation of man as man or, if one can, whether this situation is not seen differently in different ages in such a manner that, in principle, the view of any age is as legitimate or illegitimate as that of any other. He wondered, therefore, whether what appeared to be the situation of man as man was more than the situation of present-day man, or "the inescapable datum of our historical situation." Hence, what originally appeared as freedom from delusion presented itself eventually as hardly more than the questionable premise of our age, or as an attitude that will be superseded, in due time, by an attitude that will be in conformity with the next epoch. The thought of the present age is characterized by disenchantment, or unqualified "this-worldli-

ness," or irreligion. What claims to be freedom from delusion is as much and as little delusion as the faiths which prevailed in the past, and which may prevail in the future. We are irreligious because fate forces us to be irreligious and for no other reason. Weber refused to bring the sacrifice of the intellect; he did not wait for a religious revival or for prophets or saviors; and he was not at all certain whether a religious revival would follow the present age. But he was certain that all devotion to causes or ideals has its roots in religious faith and, therefore, that the decline of religious faith will ultimately lead to the extinction of all causes or ideals. He tended to see before him the alternative of either complete spiritual emptiness or religious revival. He despaired of the modern this-worldly irreligious experiment, and yet he remained attached to it because he was fated to believe in science as he understood it. The result of this conflict, which he could not resolve, was his belief that the conflict between values cannot be resolved by human reason.

Yet the crisis of modern life and of modern science does not necessarily make doubtful the idea of science. We must therefore try to state in more precise terms what Weber had in mind when he said that science seemed to be unable to give a clear or certain account of itself.

Man cannot live without light, guidance, knowledge: only through knowledge of the good can he find the good that he needs. The fundamental question, therefore, is whether men can acquire that knowledge of the good, without which they cannot guide their lives individually or collectively, by the unaided efforts of their natural powers, or whether they are dependent for that knowledge on divine revelation. No alternative is more fundamental than this: human guidance or divine guidance. The first possibility is characteristic of philosophy or science in the original sense of the term, the second is presented in the Bible. The dilemma cannot be evaded by any harmonization or synthesis. For both philosophy and the Bible proclaim something as the one thing needful, as the only thing that ultimately counts, and the one thing needful proclaimed by the Bible is the opposite of that proclaimed by philosophy: a life of obedient love *versus* a life of free insight. In every attempt at harmonization, in every synthesis however impressive, one of the two opposed elements is sacrificed, more or less subtly, but in any event surely, to the other: philosophy, which means to be queen, must be made the handmaid of revelation, or vice versa.

If we take a bird's-eye view of the secular struggle between philosophy and theology, we can hardly avoid the impression that neither

of the two antagonists has ever succeeded in really refuting the other. All arguments in favor of revelation seem to be valid only if belief in revelation is presupposed, and all arguments against revelation seem to be valid only if unbelief is presupposed. This state of things would appear to be but natural. Revelation is always so uncertain to unassisted reason that it can never compel the assent of unassisted reason, and man is so built that he can find his satisfaction, his bliss, in free investigation, in articulating the riddle of being. But, on the other hand, he yearns so much for a solution of that riddle, and human knowledge is always so limited, that the need for divine illumination cannot be denied, and the possibility of revelation cannot be refuted. Now, it is this state of things that seems to decide irrevocably against philosophy and in favor of revelation. Philosophy has to grant that revelation is possible. But to grant that revelation is possible means to grant that philosophy is perhaps not the one thing needful, that philosophy is perhaps something infinitely unimportant. To grant that revelation is possible means to grant that the philosophic life is not necessarily, not evidently, *the* right life. Philosophy, the life devoted to the quest for evident knowledge available to man as man, would itself rest on an unevident, arbitrary, or blind decision. This would merely confirm the thesis of faith, that there is no possibility of consistency, of a consistent and thoroughly sincere life, without belief in revelation. The very fact that philosophy and revelation cannot refute each other would constitute the refutation of philosophy by revelation.

It was the conflict between revelation and philosophy or science in the full sense of the term, and the implications of that conflict, that led Weber to assert that the idea of science or philosophy suffers from a fatal weakness. He tried to remain faithful to the cause of autonomous insight, but he despaired when he felt that the sacrifice of the intellect, which is abhorred by science or philosophy, is at the bottom of science or philosophy.

But let us hasten back from these awful depths to a superficiality which, while not exactly gay, promises at least a quiet sleep. Having come up to the surface again, we are welcomed by about six hundred large pages covered with the smallest possible number of sentences and the largest possible number of footnotes, and devoted to the methodology of the social sciences. Yet we notice very soon that we have not escaped trouble. For Weber's methodology is something different from what methodology usually is. All intelligent students of Weber's methodology have felt that it is philosophic. It is possible to articulate that feeling. Methodology, as reflection on the

correct procedure of science, is necessarily reflection on the limitations of science. If science is indeed the highest form of human knowledge, it is reflection on the limitations of human knowledge. And if it is knowledge that constitutes the specific character of man among all earthly beings, methodology is reflection on the limitations of humanity, or on the situation of man as man. Weber's methodology comes very close to meeting this demand.

To remain somewhat nearer to what he himself thought of his methodology, we shall say that his notion of science, both natural and social, is based on a specific view of reality. For, according to him, scientific understanding consists in a peculiar transformation of reality. It is therefore impossible to clarify the meaning of science without a previous analysis of reality as it is in itself, that is, prior to its transformation by science. Weber did not say much about this subject. He was less concerned with the character of reality than with the different ways in which reality is transformed by the different types of science. For his primary concern was with preserving the integrity of the historical or cultural sciences against two apparent dangers: the attempt to shape these sciences on the pattern of the natural sciences, and the attempt to interpret the dualism of natural and historical-cultural sciences in terms of a metaphysical dualism ("body-mind" or "necessity-freedom"). But his methodological theses remain unintelligible, or at any rate irrelevant, if one does not translate them into theses regarding the character of reality. When he demanded, for example, that interpretive understanding has to be subservient to causal explanation, he was guided by the observation that the intelligible is frequently overpowered by what is no longer intelligible, or that the lower is mostly stronger than the higher. In addition, his preoccupations left him time to indicate his view of what reality is prior to its transformation by science. According to him, reality is an infinite and meaningless sequence, or a chaos, of unique and infinitely divisible events, which in themselves are meaningless; all meaning, all articulation, originates in the activity of the knowing or evaluating subject. Very few people today will be satisfied with this view of reality, which Weber took from Neo-Kantianism, and which he modified merely by adding one or two emotional touches. It is sufficient to remark that he himself was unable to adhere consistently to that view. He certainly could not deny that there is an articulation of reality that precedes all scientific articulation: that articulation, that wealth of meaning, which we have in mind when speaking of the world of common experience, or of the natural understanding of the world. But he did not even

attempt a coherent analysis of the social world as it is known to "common sense," or of social reality as it is known in social life or in action. The place of such an analysis is occupied in his work by definitions of ideal types, of artificial constructs which are not even meant to correspond to the intrinsic articulation of social reality and which, in addition, are meant to be of a strictly ephemeral character. Only a comprehensive analysis of social reality as we know it in actual life, and as men have always known it since there have been civil societies, would permit an adequate discussion of the possibility of an evaluating social science. Such an analysis would make intelligible the fundamental alternatives which essentially belong to social life, and would thereby supply a basis for responsible judgment on whether the conflict between these alternatives is in principle susceptible of a solution.

EINSTEIN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS

C. F. von Weizsäcker

TO ANYONE seriously concerned about the relations between physics and philosophy, this book[1] on Einstein as a living philosopher is one of the most interesting publications of recent years. We must be grateful to the editor for having induced Einstein, and so many well-known physicists and natural philosophers of our time, to give this thorough explanation of their views. First, there is a most interesting scientific autobiography from Einstein's own pen (the German original of which is printed side by side with the English translation). This is followed by twenty-five descriptive and critical articles about Einstein's work, and his answer to these essays. The book concludes with a detailed bibliography of Einstein's publications up to October 1949. The index is unusually thorough, and several pictures of Einstein together with a sample of his handwriting constitute a valuable addition.

It is impossible, in a brief essay, to report on the multitude of topics touched upon in this book. It seems more advisable to select a small number of questions which might be regarded as basic themes, discuss them in some detail, and leave the others for individual study by the reader. Therefore, the present report refers to only three of the articles: Einstein's autobiography, Niels Bohr's report on his discussions with Einstein about epistemological problems in nuclear physics, and Einstein's answer. The factual question with which these articles deal is the philosophical interpretation of modern physics. This will be discussed with reference, first, to the theory

[1] *Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist,* ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp ("The Library of Living Philosophers," Vol. VII [Evanston, Ill., The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., 1949]).

of relativity, and second, to the quantum theory. In such debatable questions it is necessary, on the one hand, to report the conflicting opinions as truthfully as possible, but on the other hand, it is impossible to report the opinions of others without a viewpoint of one's own. For the sake of objectivity it seems advisable to make my own viewpoint quite clear. I may therefore be permitted to devote a few general remarks to an outline of my own opinion about the relations between physics and philosophy. I am greatly indebted to the controversy between Einstein and Bohr that has been much discussed among us physicists, but I have tried—while maintaining Bohr's starting point—to go beyond the positions taken so far.

It is an empirical fact that almost all leading theoretical physicists of our time philosophize. It is a second empirical fact that their philosophy is in general largely their own invention and sometimes does not agree with the traditional opinions of the philosophers. It seems to me that both empirical facts have arisen from a factual necessity: modern physics cannot be interpreted without the help of philosophical thought, but a philosophy which can furnish this adequate understanding does not exist. I believe that the so-called positivist philosophy cannot provide this understanding either, that on the contrary the discussion between the positivists on the one hand and the realists, apriorists and metaphysicists on the other has not penetrated to the core of the problem. Even Einstein has occasionally urged philosophers to pay more attention to the actions of physicists than to their words, and he is right. In contact with the object of his research the physicist develops methods of thought that are adequate to this object but often incompatible with the traditional statements of philosophy. He is aware of this and derives from it his instinctive aversion to philosophy. Consequently he knows philosophy only as a good sold to him by a suspect salesman, a good he feels he cannot use in its present form in his household. But he does not realize that every word with which he tries to explain to himself and to others what he does and what he means—such terms as truth, reality, nature, phenomenon, and the like—are already fragments of philosophy. He does not realize that in rejecting the professional philosopher he has not rid himself of philosophy, but has only become a philosophizing amateur. Unconscious philosophy is generally worse than conscious philosophy, and thus it is precisely the most profound thinkers in modern physics who infallibly philosophize. But this philosophical dilettantism often induces them to put new wine in old bottles, by formulating their insights in terms which these very insights have rendered obsolete.

The present volume, like many other discussions of this kind, creates the impression that the philosophical discussion of modern physics is primarily concerned with the philosophical system which today is usually called positivism. As a result, and to their own surprise, many physicists are led to believe that Einstein has followed the ideas of positivism in the theory of relativity, but—quite incomprehensibly—has rejected these same ideas in the discussion of the quantum theory. No doubt a difference of opinion exists between Einstein and nearly all other living theoretical physicists concerning the interpretation of the quantum theory. Einstein, in the somewhat melancholy words of his reply, explains this disagreement by regarding his opponents, but not himself, as positivists. It seems to me that one can understand the controversy only if one realizes that not only Einstein, but at least Bohr among his opponents—though they have admittedly learned much from positivism—have gone far beyond it. If Einstein's position is tragic, this seems to be due to the fact that many of his opponents (not including Bohr) have weakened their position by identifying themselves with positivism, thus necessarily giving Einstein the impression that his entirely relevant arguments against positivism are also arguments against the physics which these opponents represent. As is so often the case in the history of philosophy, one must understand the philosophizing physicists of our time better than they understand themselves if one wants to do them justice.

But what is this controversy about? Let us first consider the question about which there is no longer any disagreement, the theory of relativity. It is necessary to go back a little farther in history than is usually the case in physical discussions in order to understand the genesis of the problem. We shall limit ourselves to a single problem, the relation between space and matter.

Under the influence of Newtonian physics and almost all post-Newtonian philosophies, especially that of Kant, most of us have grown up with the notion that two realities exist, namely space and matter, and that they must be clearly distinguished from one another. Space, it is thought, exists even when not filled with matter, and Euclidean geometry is thought to be the evidently correct description of the properties of this space. The only point on which philosophers continued to argue was whether this space was a thing or a conceptional form, whether its properties were *a priori* or empirical. But it was generally agreed that space was an independent element of our cognition. A glance at the history of philosophy and physics will show that this space—which a century after Newton was considered an *a*

priori fact of our capacity of perception—was unknown a century before Newton. According to Aristotelian physics, there are bodies and the position of a body; but Aristotle defines this position as the inner surface of the other bodies surrounding a given body. Hence, position for Aristotle is the relation of one body to other bodies and, eventually, since his universe is finite, to the world as a whole. Where no body exists, there is no position; and hence the notion of position as the sum total of all positions, regardless of whether or not they are filled by bodies, is for Aristotle logically meaningless. There is no empty place and hence *a fortiori* no empty space, and nothing exists outside the universe. This "nothing" means: neither a body nor, consequently, a place since this place would have to be the place of a body.

Two insights which could not have been established without the co-operation of physics and astronomy have changed this situation: the discovery of the vacuum and the realization that the universe is larger than the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology had led one to believe, a realization that was soon linked with the doctrine of the infinity of the cosmos. If there is a vacuum there must also be a place in which there are no bodies, and in Guericke and Pascal one can easily detect the connection between their experiments about the vacuum and this philosophical question. If the universe is infinite the concepts of place and motion have no absolute meaning (that is, no meaning with respect to an absolutely fixed point like the center of a finite universe), and the question arises whether they might acquire an absolute meaning in some other way or if they are merely concepts regarding relations.

By his invention of absolute space Newton solves both problems. That this discovery is not self-evident is shown by the opposition of Leibniz who declared it to be meaningless to speak of the motion of a body relative to absolute space. According to him, space and motion are always referred to in relation to other bodies. In the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke devoted to this issue, Leibniz shows himself to have by far the more acute philosophical mind. Nevertheless it was Newton's opinion, as represented by Clarke, which prevailed. It had in its favor the weight of a physical system describing with mathematical correctness empirical reality in all its complexity; more especially, Newton himself had shown that an acceleration, though not a given position or velocity, can be measured without comparing the motion of the body observed with that of another body. This is due to the fact that according to the law of inertia the velocity of a body uninfluenced by other factors will main-

tain itself while acceleration is always coupled with a force. It is thus possible to measure accelerations by studying the effects of forces. Newton, for example, rotated a vessel containing water around its vertical axis and showed that, when the water rotated along with the vessel, the water surface rose near the rim of the vessel as a result of the centrifugal force, i.e., inertia. When the vessel rotated while the water was still at rest, the surface did not rise. In the first case, according to Newton, the water revolves in relation to absolute space and is at rest in relation to the vessel surrounding it. In the second case it is at rest relative to absolute space while revolving relative to the vessel surrounding it. Only rotation relative to absolute space generates centrifugal force. Rotation in Newton's terms is accelerated motion.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Leibniz' arguments were taken up again by Ernst Mach. He criticized Newton's argumentation by declaring that water rotates, while moved along with the vessel, not only relative to the hypothetical absolute space but also relative to the world surrounding the vessel, the room, the earth, and the cosmos. That centrifugal force or inertia cannot be the effect of rotation relative to the earth or a body on the earth is demonstrated to us today by every effect of inertia upon the earth, even by the oblateness of the earth or by Foucault's pendulum experiment. Today astronomers even know the effect of the centrifugal force upon the galactic system as a whole, effects which can be deduced from the law of the galactic rotation. But it is possible to understand Mach's criticism as meaning that inertia or centrifugal force is the effect of a motion relative to the most distant stars. Einstein has admitted that this criticism by Mach has had an important influence on him and led him to the formulation of his theory of relativity. Since Mach is one of the leaders of positivism, the accord between modern physics and positivism seems to be strikingly demonstrated. Newton's absolute space, it would seem, turns out to be a metaphysical construction from which empirical science must seek to free itself.

In point of fact, Mach's criticism is only partly sound, and we learn from Einstein's autobiography that the theory of relativity agrees only in part with the program of Mach. To nineteenth-century physicists it may have appeared astonishing that it never occurred to Newton that the rise of the water surface in his vessel was caused by rotation relative not to absolute space but to distant bodies. To be historically fair, it must be said, first of all, that seventeenth-century thinkers considered as inconceivable a physical causality communicated by means other than direct contact between two bodies. At that

time, this very opinion was precisely the expression of an attitude of the physicists which today is sometimes called their aversion to metaphysics. In Newton's time "metaphysics" in this sense of the word was the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of the causation of physical events by substantial forms and occult qualities. Newton himself considered the law of gravitation as not yet completely explained because he had not found a "mechanical" (in the strict sense of the word) interpretation of gravitation. It was only after the physicists of the nineteenth century had become accustomed to the state of physics which Newton had brought about—a state which he himself did not consider final—that the idea arose that actions at a distance could be recognized as final explanations of physical phenomena. This way of thinking Mach naively took for granted. At the same time, however—taking its departure from Faraday—a new physics had developed in electrodynamics. In this "field physics" effects can be caused from one point to its immediate neighbor only. Einstein's special theory of relativity brought this system of electrodynamics to completion; and it was therefore clear to Einstein from the beginning that even if he followed Mach's criticism of absolute space, he could do so only by means of this field physics. A direct effect of distant masses upon the water surface in Newton's vessel was as inconceivable to Einstein as it was to Newton.

In some respects Einstein's solution is an even more radical application of Newton's analysis; but, as so often happens where such radical applications are carried through consistently, Einstein's very solution also met what was legitimate in the demands of Leibniz and Mach. In his general theory of relativity, Einstein distinguishes between matter and space exactly as Newton did. But for him space is no longer an *a priori* given absolute quantity which—as for Newton—can cause but not undergo physical effects. In his theory space has a curvature changing from place to place that is produced by the matter present in the respective places, in the same way that matter produces electro-magnetic fields and similar physical entities. Hence, Leibniz and Mach were definitely wrong in thinking that "space" as a physical object did not exist. Conversely, the inconsistency which they detected in Newton's system is resolved if we consider space altogether as a physical object able to undergo as well as to cause effects.

But how about the controversy between Einstein and the atomic physicists regarding the interpretation of the quantum theory? Let us first of all consider the relations of atomic physics to Mach. It is a historical fact that Mach rejected the theory of the existence of

atoms. For him it was a typical example of metaphysical tendencies which, instead of simply describing sense perceptions and interrelating them according to laws, seek to explain them by "things that are behind them." It is all the more remarkable that modern atomic physicists, although they know that Mach denied the possibility of their science, nevertheless have a tendency to look upon him as their intellectual ancestor. They may feel justified in doing so inasmuch as their description of atoms is even farther removed from the realism of classical physics than is the phenomenological physics to which Mach wanted to confine himself. This deviation from classical physics has often been formulated as criticism of the law of causality. It would be more correct to explain this deviation as a criticism of the classical notion of an object that is completely detached from the subject observing it. Whether an electron has a certain position or a certain momentum depends on how the physicist arranges the experiment by which he observes one of these quantities. But it is precisely this dependence of so-called physical reality on its relation to the observer to which Einstein is most directly opposed. Bohr's report about the discussions he had with Einstein on this subject for more than a decade reads like a drama in which the hero, Einstein, is frustrated in every single one of his undertakings but nevertheless remains to the last faithful to himself. Einstein has sought in vain to demonstrate by a series of most ingeniously devised hypothetical experiments *(Gedankenexperimente)* the inner inconsistency of the quantum theory; in doing so he has only helped to clarify completely the conceptional structure of the quantum theory and has finally called this theory inadequate, relying no longer on arguments but merely on what he calls his instinct. For him the notion of reality that satisfies the quantum physicists is a repetition of Berkeley's *esse est percipi*. His hope rests on a future physics that will re-establish the concept of a physical reality existing *per se*. Let us try to examine his arguments.

Einstein is no naive realist. For him mathematical laws of nature are free inventions of the human mind which have proved adequate to give a description of, and bring order into, the multitude of sense perceptions. A thinker, steeped in the tradition of philosophical thought, will be struck by the positivist flavor of many of Einstein's formulations. Einstein, however, has a very vivid awareness of a point that is never sufficiently taken into account in positivist epistemology: namely, the fact that it is precisely the mathematically simplest laws that are best suited to describe the seeming chaos of the empirical world, a fact which must seem miraculous and unex-

plainable from the viewpoint of pure methodology. No principle o the economy of thought could explain that we can, with the help o the simple laws of Newtonian mechanics, predict accurately to th minute an eclipse of the sun. Even Einstein uses the criterion o mathematical simplicity, with the greatest success, as a heuristica principle in the formulation of his theory. The physicist who doe this must be convinced that with such statements he is describing reality, not made by himself—whatever the meaning of the wor reality in this sense may be. Einstein opposes—quite rightly, I think every attempt to remove this concept of reality from the realm of physics.

It seems to me that his tragic error lies in his notion that this i what happens in quantum mechanics. The reader of Bohr's very careful formulations will detect that what distinguishes his position from Einstein's is, in a certain sense, precisely his greater realism —which, it is true, necessitates a well-defined modification of the concept of reality itself. Bohr is most critical of a word like phe nomenon. For Mach, this word would be synonymous with sense impression. Bohr feels, with an infallible instinct, that this con cept of sense impression provides no solid foundation. He does not go into this question but it may be pointed out that for our consciousness it is always things perceived, not mere sensations that are given in the process of perception. We become aware of the so-called pure sensation only by a process of abstraction that separates this sensation from the datum which is given immediately to our consciousness, namely, the thing. The concept of a thing is by no means only a summation of sensations I have already had: when I say "this is a hammer and with it I can drive in a nail" I refer as a matter of course also to sensations I have not yet had and may per haps never have, that is, I refer to possible sensations as well. This concept of possibility is in turn meaningful because in each basic act of life I presuppose those facts which the physicists call laws of nature. The practical life of man is based on the fact that things last even though sensations may change. Now it is classical physics which is adequate for the description of the object of our daily life and it is for this reason that Bohr has emphasized again and again the fact that each experiment that man can really carry through must eventually be described in the language of classical physics. This is very clear in a sentence like the following: "As a more appropriate way of expression I advocate the application of the word phenomenon exclusively to refer to observations obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole experi

mental arrangement" (pp. 237–38). The compelling character of Bohr's argumentation is seen once this starting point is admitted. It seems to me that Einstein, when he speaks of the representation of sense impressions by mathematical laws, makes at this point a concession to positivism which causes him to overlook the precision of Bohr's argumentation.

It is impossible in this review to reproduce the content of Bohr's argumentations. Let me try at least to describe the results. How can the analysis of an experiment which starts from the assumption that every experiment can be described in the language of classical physics ever lead to nonclassical physics?

In the experiments of atomic physics the atom never appears as a thing in the sense in which, say, a hammer does. Our senses cannot directly perceive the atom, and each experiment brings but one aspect of the atom into the realm of immediate perception. Classical physics must be applied to the "macroscopic measuring instrument," but it need not be valid for the "microscopic object" of measurement. True, the object of measurement, in being measured, can show only such qualities as can be formulated in classical physics, e.g., position or momentum. But the connection between these properties in the atom is not of the same kind as in the object of classical physics. According to the laws discovered by the quantum theory, a measuring arrangement which enables me to know the position of an electron excludes the simultaneous presence of a measuring arrangement which enables me to know its momentum. When I have made a measurement justifying the statement that the electron has just had a definite position, I cannot, according to the laws of nature, simultaneously have made a measurement justifying the assumption that this electron has a definite momentum. This puts us at liberty to use a description of the electron in which an electron that has a certain position has no definite momentum whatever, and vice versa. Position and momentum are "complementary" modes of description because the experiments in which they become evident are mutually exclusive.

What modification of the concept of reality does this imply? The absolute separation between subject and object on which classical physics is based cannot be maintained. The really revolutionary character of this change appears only when we realize that the change originates in the very recognition of the concept of a thing. This concept is thus not rejected but restricted to a field of application. With the easy rejection of the concept of a thing in Mach's positivism, this way of thinking shares only the emancipation from the

naively realistic dogma without committing itself to an opposite dogma. It reminds us of the fact that the world is a whole in which a *res cogitans* cannot be neatly separated from a *res extensa.* Every experiment is a material act which is at the same time an act of perception. The quantum theory—to quote Bohr once more—reminds us of the "ancient wisdom that when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that in the drama of existence we are ourselves both actors and spectators" (p. 236).

If we interpret the quantum theory in this way we must understand it as a revision of our concept of matter not less but more radical than the positivism of Mach and his followers. In its consequences it calls into question that Cartesian dichotomy of the world on which even today the organization of the scientific disciplines rests. A physics that speaks of man, be it only in the still modest role of observer, is no longer a "pure" physics in the sense of the older scientific ideal. Perhaps many younger scientists for whom the quantum theory is already self-evident have a less clear notion of the importance of these consequences than Einstein who opposes them. We admire Bohr's courage to set foot in a new territory of science in full awareness of the radical consequences of his step; and we must follow him. But we shall not confuse this courage with the rashness of those who do not realize that in an intellectual revolution like that occurring in the physics of our century "to be or not to be" is the question. Much of what appears to nearly all of us as the undoubted possession of modern times would not withstand an analysis as rigorous as that which Bohr and Heisenberg have carried through in nuclear physics any better than did the classical concept of reality. A man like Einstein who risks complete isolation in order to call the attention of his contemporaries to the significance of such a decision deserves our reverence even if we do not follow him.

MAZZUCHELLI
PRIEST AND ARCHITECT
IN THE AMERICAN WILDERNESS

Earl H. Reed

On a hill in the ghost town of New Diggings, Wisconsin, stands a little Greco-Gothic wood church built in 1844. Though now falling into decrepitude, it is the best surviving example of the works of the energetic Dominican frontier missionary, Samuel Mazzuchelli, whose name is still a byword in the Lead Country.[1] As an important type of early Midwestern architecture, the church of St. Augustine at New Diggings (Fig. 1, see p. 248) is of considerable historical interest. The building is weatherbeaten and in need of paint; the cupola cresting and the side porch are gone; but the naive mixture of fret and tracery which graces the exterior is still delightful. Astonishing pointed windows with wooden louvers produce a mystical illumination, in the manner of the stained-glass of Gothic times. The simple interior is enriched with a white and gold altar of mixed Greek and Gothic style, designed by the priest and furnished with Staffordshire and bronze.

Mazzuchelli's building activities were prodigious, but they were secondary (though closely related) to the dominant concern of his life—the propagation of the Faith. With a missionary zeal rivaling Marquette's, he brought spiritual guidance and comfort to the frontiersman, stubbornly combated Calvinism, and labored endlessly for converts among the savages. Moreover, he witnessed and forwarded the transformation of a vast wilderness into settled regions. And, along with Jones, Doty, Dodge, Douseman, Martin and Dewey, he was one of the first citizens of the Territories of Wisconsin and Iowa. Indeed, the religious and political aspects of Mazzuchelli's life on the

[1] One of the best accounts of the life of Mazzuchelli is Sister Rosemary Crepeau's *Un Apôtre Dominicain aux États-Unis* (Paris, 1932).

American frontier are fascinating and important; but this paper must be limited for the most part to an examination of his work as an early Midwestern architect.

Samuel Charles Gaétan Mazzuchelli was born in Milan in 1806, the sixteenth child of a distinguished and well-to-do family. In 1823, following a childhood in the era of Napoleonic turmoil, the youth entered a Dominican cloister at Faenza. Two years later he went to Santa Sabina on the Aventine, where he met the man who later became Pope Gregory XVI (an acquaintance who proved of some importance to Mazzuchelli in subsequent years). Podesti's contemporary portrait[2] of Mazzuchelli as a young man shows a slender handsome youth, with dark, wavy hair, pointed chin, and unusually strong nose and mouth; his eyes were large and luminous. He was later described by one of his frontier pupils as "a small man, broad of shoulder, dark complexion and dark eyes—active in his movements and quick in his speech."

Had he not chosen the priestly vocation, it is quite possible that his deep interest in architecture would have led Mazzuchelli to become an architect of considerable distinction. But in 1827, fired by the eloquence of Vicar Rese, who was in Italy to enlist new missionaries for the work of Bishop Fenwick of Cincinnati, the young Italian made up his mind to go back with him to America.

The trip to Le Havre to embark for the New World took him through Florence, Bologna, Milan, Genoa, Turin, the Tyrol, Lyons and Paris, and the inspiration which he drew from the fine churches and public buildings he saw there remained with him for the rest of his life. The influence is plain in his American projects, and the nostalgia which sometimes overcame him is revealed in a brief passage in his *Memoirs,* where he declared that "memory vivified by Faith [in the country of the infidel] bears the lonely spirit into the temple of the living God," and then continued (always speaking of himself in the third person):

"When he was in the forests and vast solitudes of the heart of North America often did he imagine himself present at the sacred rites of the European churches—when he was obliged to celebrate the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass in a log hut, or in the wigwam of a savage upon an altar not deserving even the name of table—it was impossible

[2] Now hanging at St. Clara Convent in Sinsinawa, Wis. Other mementoes of the priest-architect kept there are a fine set of Italian drawing instruments, a collection of remarkable electrical and other science teaching apparatus, and a stained ascetic's steel chain found around his body after death.

to express in words the holy anxiety which overcame the great difficulties involved in the building of a church."[3]

This anxiety—and the unremitting exertion bred by it—to create worthy places of worship in the new land constitute the leitmotif of this short account. Inspired by European memories the cultured Mazzuchelli succeeded through adaptive constructional ability, an artistic attitude, and the practical good sense noted by the architect Beltrami, in producing a notable series of pioneer buildings in spite of great obstacles.

Arrived in New York after a stormy passage, he found it, in November 1828, little to his liking. But the young missionary liked "the beautiful, beautifully planned, city of Philadelphia," Baltimore he liked even more. It was in these Colonial-Federal style cities that he first saw and admired American architecture, especially the Greek and Gothic revivals then flourishing. A Midwestern lawyer often lived and had his office in a Greek temple, and pleaded cases in a Parthenon-like courthouse. The church he attended was Greek or Gothic—or both! Both modes—Gothic and Greek (the latter introduced in Philadelphia by Latrobe in 1798)—received special development in America. Most often expressed in wood or brick, they were in accord with the classical enthusiasms of the times and spread rapidly westward. Mazzuchelli's later Midwestern work reflected the influence of the buildings he undoubtedly saw in the East—buildings like Thompson's Doric-style church in New York (a style he later used with a fair degree of purity in Galena and with an admixture of Gothic at New Diggings), Latrobe's Baltimore cathedral, and other buildings by Latrobe and Strickland such as the Bank of Pennsylvania and the Branch Bank of the United States, as well as the designs of Robert Mills in Philadelphia.

After an arduous six-hundred-mile journey the new missionary finally reached Cincinnati, where he was warmly received by Bishop Fenwick. After spending some time learning the English language, he labored briefly at St. Rose's church in Bardstown, Kentucky, going by water to Louisville and from there thirty-eight miles on horseback—his "first riding lesson and [it] was so dear a one that when he arrived he was obliged to keep his bed for two days."

The young missionary was ordained priest at Cincinnati in 1830, and then sent eight hundred miles away to Mackinac, the farthermost point of the diocese. Here, amid Indians, traders, and trappers, the

[3] *Memorie Istoriche* (Milano, 1844). This edition is rare; only three copies are known to exist in America. A vivid account of his missionary labors, the Memoirs were written during an enforced rest. An English translation by Sister Kennedy was published in 1915.

slender enthusiastic son of the Old World began his work as frontier priest and architect for the New. He established himself in the little cedar log church of Ste Anne (now demolished). Among the other buildings on the Straits island which he found on his arrival were a Latrobe-like fort and a Federal-style Old Mission Church and Agent's House. Mazzuchelli's contribution was a fifteen-foot addition to the church, together with an adjacent house for the priest. This work took one hundred days and cost $200.00. While performing his normal duties as a frontier priest, the vigorous young pastor assumed the additional tasks of fund-raiser, designer-architect, and building supervisor—a pattern which pretty well typified his entire life in the American wilderness. Whenever possible, he also visited Green Bay and other neighboring stations, including Arbre Croche, where he saw the mission which Father Barraga had built for the Ottawa Indians. This was a log church constructed in the familiar horizontal log house manner with plank floors and wooden ceilings, "wrought out and shaped by the axe alone," and built with the help of the Indians. Mazzuchelli's travels even took him 250 miles beyond Green Bay, to Prairie du Chien, where he first saw the Mississippi River.

The industrious priest penetrated as much of the wilderness as he could, all the while converting the savages and learning their language and customs. He regarded the Indians as "superstitious rather than idolatrous" and was earnestly concerned with their welfare. He founded schools for both children and adults. He believed that the Indians were exploited and neglected, and he frequently pressed for improvements on their behalf—even writing to President Andrew Jackson on one occasion. He also translated the prayers of Father Barraga from the Ottawa language into the Winnebago tongue and traveled six hundred miles to arrange for publication. Meanwhile he absorbed new experiences eagerly. He learned, for instance, how to place slender poles in the ground, bend them together, and cover them with mats to form a simple lodge church, complete with low side door, smoke and light holes, and bark altar and candlesticks. As he once commented, "The missionary was always mechanic, workman and cleric." But never, in all his manifold activities, did he lose sight of his real purpose—the salvation of souls and the propagation of the Faith.

It was at Green Bay that the young priest made his real architectural debut. There he designed and supervised the building of the Church of St. John the Evangelist (a "Gothic Church" he described it in a letter to Pope Gregory), completed in 1832 at a cost of 20,000 francs

A school formed an L with it. The construction of the church resembled that of any early Midwestern barn, with its roughhewn, mortised-and-tenoned, peg-fastened, heavy timber work. It was during this time that Mazzuchelli learned from the Canadian-American carpenters at Green Bay the timber construction which he used in his later churches, for example, at New Diggings, where both the roof trusses and the floor timbers were sawed, many lower members left roughhewn, and the center supported on loose rocks. In his *Memoirs* the missionary describes this "frame house" construction. He tells how oak beams were laid on the stone foundation, uprights fitted to meet a horizontal frame above, and floor and ceiling timbers added. The outside was overlaid with overlapping $6 \times 1/2$ inch planks and the roof covered with shingles. Included were a bell tower and a small gallery. The interior was finished with lath, plaster, and paint.

Mazzuchelli sometimes fretted about poor workmanship and the failure to provide for proper maintenance, but he was generally impressed with the skill and thoroughness of American carpenters. And about frontier houses (usually believed to be crude and uninspired) he once pointed out that "genuine elegance and the following of the various orders of architecture are readily adapted to these buildings, and furthermore, outlay of wealth and elegance are not unknown among many of these families whose houses are built spacious, of several stories, and embellished with porticoes and lofty pillars."

The determined priest carried on a ceaseless drive for co-operation and support from the populace, and his infectious zeal was directly responsible for many donations—of material, money, or labor, according to the means and inclination of the givers. Bishop Fenwick supplied him with funds necessary for travel and similar expenses.

Mazzuchelli expressed his determination in the following words: "Experience has taught this lesson that unless he [the missionary] sacrifices everything, sometimes depriving himself of what might be considered necessaries, he will find it impossible to secure the desired result." Nevertheless, he was usually in debt.

In 1835 Mazzuchelli visited Galena—already a lead mining center of eight hundred persons in northwest Illinois. He was distressed to find that there were "about 300 Catholics who had neither Priest nor Church," and that Dubuque, across the river, was in a similar situation. He must have impressed the Catholics of Galena because they sent a special plea to Rome to ask for him as their pastor. The request was finally granted, and after a second brief period of missionary work in the Michigan woods, Mazzuchelli moved to Illinois and be-


Geografia delle Missioni nel illustrare il secondo libro delle Memorie
TERRITORIO DI WISCONSIN
Diocesi di Milwaukee eretta nel 1843.
TERRITORIO DELL'IOWA
Diocesi di Dubuque eretta nel 1837.
STATO DELL'ILLINOIS
Diocesi di Chicago eretta nel 1843.
Missouri
Diocesi di St Louis eretta nel 1825
Principali Rifferenze al IIde Libro
Prairie du Chien ..... XXXI.
Peloza ..... XXI.
Dubuque ..... III.VII.XII.XXIII.XXIV.
St Agostino ..... XLII.
Galena IV.VII.XVII.XXIII.XXV.XXXII.
Shelesburg ..... XXXVI.
St Patrizio ..... XXVIII.
Davenport ..... V.
Iowa-City ..... XXXIII.XXXIV.
Bloomington e Bellevue XXXVII.
Burlington ..... XXVII.XXXII.XLIII.
Nauvoo ..... XLIV.
Territorio di Wisconsin VIII
Territorio dell'Iowa ..... XIV.XXXIII.

Map from Mazzuchelli's "Memoirs" of the Dioceses of Milwaukee and Chicago in 1843

came engrossed in the challenging life of the upper Mississippi region, where settlement was just beginning.

For the next four years the new priest in Galena worked tirelessly —and alone, for the most part (the nearest priest was 250 miles away). By means of difficult trails, he visited widely separated stations, journeying down river to St. Louis for infrequent confessions. (It is apparent from the design of some of his later churches that he must have examined carefully Bishop Rosati's superb cathedral, which had just been built by the professional architects, Morton and La Veille.)

During this period the State of Michigan was formed from a part of the Territory of Michigan (1836), and the Territory of Wisconsin was cut up to provide for the Territory of Iowa (1838). Mazzuchelli and his friends were active in these developments. In fact, the priest gave a fiery opening address before the first legislature of the Territory of Wisconsin (which met at Belmont in a plain frame building that still exists). Mazzuchelli was also named Chaplain of the Legislature, regarding which he declared: "It would be difficult to find in the history of any other country a diplomatic body where the Protestants outnumbering the Catholics eighteen to one have conferred upon the Minister of the Altar the office of Chaplain." Through the influence of friends Mazzuchelli later arranged to have a session of the legislature meet in his uncompleted Church of St. Paul at Burlington; the rental money he received was applied on the church debt.

By the time he settled in Galena, Mazzuchelli had had ample opportunity to develop a rough-and-ready architectural skill based on experience. He was confronted with the immediate necessity of erecting churches at widely separated points in order to meet the spiritual needs of a rapidly increasing Catholic population. But the obstacles were formidable. In a moment of discouragement, Mazzuchelli complained, "The scarcity of necessary means, the inability to procure on-the-spot materials that are absolutely indispensable, the exorbitant charges of the workmen with various other circumstances, put to the test the perseverance and application of one who strives to build a House of God, however small. . . . God knows the anxieties, the bitterness, the toils necessary for such an undertaking."

Despite these problems, two new churches were well under way by the summer of 1836—St. Raphael's in Dubuque and St. Michael's in Galena—as the result of intensive planning and money-raising by the priest. As usual, he drew his own plans to save the expense of an architect, and hired whatever workmen were available though they were few in number and unskilled in construction techniques. Mazzu-

chelli was particularly impressed with the financial support which came from the Protestants. "Not only Catholics but many Protestants gave the impulse to this noble enterprise, contributing from five to even twenty dollars," he wrote in his *Memoirs*.

A Galena newspaper of the period describes St. Raphael's in Dubuque as being constructed entirely of stone and having a great apse, vault, Doric pilasters, and beautiful Roman windows; it was then believed to be the largest and most beautiful church in the region. Rather poor sketches made at the time show a flat front and Roman arches like those in the St. Louis Cathedral, without narthex, spire, or portico. During construction, Mazzuchelli lived for two years in a poor cellar room of the cathedral-to-be, moving later to a makeshift church in Galena where he had a cot "hidden away in a tiny closet near the altar, having the honor and privilege of abiding in common with the Lord." By the time it was consecrated in 1838 by Bishop Loras of the new Dubuque diocese, St. Raphael's had cost $5000. Illness prevented Mazzuchelli from attending the dedication of his handiwork. Meanwhile, work on neighboring St. Michael's encountered unusual difficulties involving material and labor, and even the land was hard to get; consequently, it was not finished until 1842. By then it had cost an exorbitant sum of $14,000.

As early as 1836 a site had also been acquired in Prairie du Chien. But it was not until 1839 that the cornerstone of St. Gabriel's was laid. Like St. Raphael's and St. Michael's, this church was named for an archangel protector of river travelers. St. Gabriel's and St. Patrick's (built at Benton, Wisconsin, in 1852) are all that remain of the four great stone churches erected by the priest. And only the fine Gothic arched sides of St. Gabriel's remain unchanged today. The stone work and magnificent wood trusses of the church at Prairie du Chien reveal the excellence of early Midwestern architecture, but considerable tampering with the early design, especially the addition of an ignoble narthex front and interior changes made during the years 1907-17, have badly marred a fine creation.

Although Mazzuchelli was chiefly interested in supplying churches for his parishioners, he was also involved in several projects of a secular nature. The first recorded instance was his appointment to help design and construct (with John L. Slaymaker, joiner-architect) the Jo Daviess County courthouse in Illinois. County records of 1838 show that the priest was "to supervise and oversee the architectural work which will be required in the building" and that "Mr. Massuchilli" was to be allowed $100 for such services as superintendent. Apparently he was not satisfied with the conduct of the work, for it

Fig. 1 St. Augustine's Church—*Designed and built by Mazzuchelli at New Diggings, Wisconsin in 1884*

Fig. 2 The Jo Daviess County Courthouse—*Restored by Briggs Dyer from an early photograph, with the permission of the Galena Museum*



Fig. 3 *View of roof construction of Jo Daviess County Courthouse*

is known that he roundly denounced certain authorities for their management of the project.

An early photograph (restored by Dyer) of the courthouse (Fig. 2) shows the well-laid masonry of the main portion of the building, and a wood Doric front of the type known to the Greeks as Prostylar. This was possibly designed by Mazzuchelli, but upper interior portions are Slaymaker's. Ill-advised additions in the early 1900's obliterated the portico and raised the height—revealing the original roof under the later one, supported by skillfully fashioned wood trusses (Fig. 3). Designed by rule of thumb before exact engineering truss techniques had been developed, they are heavier than those of today. But for all their crudeness, they have safely borne their load for a century—testimony to the structural good sense of the designer.

After twelve years of constant travel under all kinds of conditions, numerous hardships, endless toil and anxiety—during which time he had managed to secure land, money, and labor for the erection of ten churches while carrying on regular clerical and missionary duties—Mazzuchelli's health finally gave way. By 1843, although he had convalesced somewhat, he was still in need of a rest, and Bishop Loras granted him permission to return to Italy for a visit, with the understanding that this would be combined with a mission for him —to look for new missionaries and try to get badly needed funds from sympathetic European sources.

Fortunately for his meager purse, part of Mazzuchelli's expenses were taken care of by his appointment as theologian for Bishop Loras, who was obliged to attend a meeting of high church officials at Baltimore that year. Mazzuchelli was delighted with the trip east, a part of which he describes as follows: "The rapid motion of the boat, accelerated by the current, made the view of the hills and valleys, the meadows, the woods, the vaste solitudes, the numberless islands, and at intervals, the rising towns, glide before the eye with swift disapparenace [*sic*], to lose themselves in the distance." He traveled by steamer, stage, and railroad, marveling at the train trip from Cumberland. "This mode of travelling," he wrote, "seems to have attained the last limit of speed, for in eight hours we reached the city of Baltimore, a distance of one hundred and seventy-five miles."

When the Council of Baltimore adjourned, he continued his journey to Milan, stopping at Lyons on the way. Bishop Loras had provided Mazzuchelli with credentials to the Society of the Propaga-

tion of the Faith at Lyons and at Vienna. The letter to the authorities at Lyons, after declaring that the priest had "built nearly all the churches in our regions," promised that Mazzuchelli would give a full report of religious activities in America, and asked that he be given all possible financial assistance for the work of the missions in the New World. After completing his mission in Lyons, the priest continued to Italy to visit his home, as well as to find missionaries and procure additional funds for his Bishop.

But Mazzuchelli had something else to do in Italy. He had great faith in the future of America and had recently become an American citizen. With the rapid expansion of the Catholic Church in the new country, he was anxious to provide facilities for the education of the young and for the preparation of American missionaries. For this reason he was intensely interested in establishing a new Dominican province in the Midwest, hoping to have it centered at his Church of St. Michael in Galena. Accordingly, very soon after his arrival in Italy he wrote to the Holy See, outlining his project. Another priest, Thomas Grace, from Joseph Province in Ohio, was in Europe at that time and learned of Mazzuchelli's proposals. He immediately registered a strong protest in Rome, charging Mazzuchelli with planning to establish unorthodox practices in the proposed province. Mazzuchelli defended his position by pointing out that American frontier life demanded flexibility if priests were to be effective in their work, and that undue adherence to outmoded traditions of dress and custom were a handicap in a vital and growing community. To further acquaint both the Dominicans and the laity with his attitude and with his missionary experiences, he wrote his *Memoirs*. Mazzuchelli did not eliminate opposition, but in January 1844, after a personal appeal to Pope Gregory XVI, he was empowered to establish the Province of St. Charles at Galena.

A third period of the priest's life began with his return to America —a period marked by his normal building activity, but devoted principally to education. As a result of the conflict in Rome, his immediate superior, Bishop Quarter of the new Chicago diocese, refused to let Mazzuchelli stay at his own St. Michael's Church in Galena. In the fall of 1844, therefore, he purchased from a friend, General George W. Jones, Sinsinawa Mound in Wisconsin—eight hundred acres costing $6500.00. Here, with the permission of the Holy See, he established his Province of St. Charles, comprised of four churches—at Shullsburg, Sinsinawa, Hazel Green, and (later) New Diggings—in the Milwaukee diocese (p. 246). A small church at Sinsinawa, built

in 1842 before the priest's trip to Italy, was taken apart and rebuilt at a total cost of $1400. The church was a Greek type, with a belfry resembling the one on the church at New Diggings. The Jones house nearby was used temporarily as a school.

In the spring of 1846, fifteen hundred persons, "mostly Protestants," witnessed the laying of the cornerstone of St. Thomas College —which still exists. Finally completed in 1857, it was solidly constructed of Niagara stone and timbers from the Mound; it had a Greek pedimented roof and windows, and was surmounted by an Italianesque belvedere. A rich, jigsawed, central motif with balconies and iron-columned openings survives today at Sinsinawa, and exemplifies the trend of architectural taste in the 1850's away from Greek austerity and toward French-Italian decadence.

But in 1849, when success was perhaps within reach, Mazzuchelli was faced with a new problem. Charges were made to the authorities at Lyons that the new province was financially unstable and that it should be abandoned. Mazzuchelli disproved these charges; but this and the trouble he had in securing enough qualified and devoted teachers, led him to approach the Province of St. Joseph for help and co-operation. After prolonged negotiations, the priest decided to turn the College of St. Thomas over to St. Joseph's, at the same time fully renouncing the provincial powers which he had received in Rome five years earlier. He then returned to the simple life of a parish priest (which he preferred) at Benton and New Diggings. "If the Saviour is not very unhappy about me," he wrote Bishop Loras, "He will permit me to labor on forgotten."

Nevertheless, he labored on undismayed. Among other things, in 1852 he replaced the wood structure of St. Patrick's Church at Benton with the present stone one (sadly altered since then). An early photograph shows the original front of St. Patrick's with an Italian grouping of pointed niches and arches surmounted by an over-heavy cornice and end returns. Sturdy Greek stone doorways have survived, as have the side windows (Fig. 4) and the excellent inside ceiling woodwork embellished with the Dominican star. Recent color stencil work now confuses a once simple interior. Interesting early furnishings and an altar resembling the one at New Diggings can be seen in the rear chapel.

Mazzuchelli's last project was the "House of St. Clara." First, the earlier frame structure of St. Patrick's Church at Benton was moved across the road and remodeled to house a "Female Academy." Photographs show attractive landscaping—the beginning of an ambitious

architectural scheme. Though the plans for the second and larger building have disappeared, original contracts and specifications can still be seen at St. Clara Convent in Sinsinawa. These, with a plat published in *The Mining Times* (Benton, 1896), give some idea of the U-shaped, two-story, high-basement stone building, 75×112 ft. It was begun in 1863 and was unfinished at the time of Mazzuchelli's death. A contract still in existence called for completion of stone work (at a cost of $3500) in September 1863. It also contained many modern provisions covering penalties, arbitration, and substandard work —a reflection of the priest's previous difficulties. Other contracts were let the following year—increasing the cost to $6600. Sister Rosemary Crepeau has said, "It was the most imposing [building] with which Father Samuel had up to this time occupied himself, conceived like European religious establishments with a rectangular court enclosing a cloister, and a sign of the prosperity of the convent." This ensemble — the stone St. Patrick's, the porticoed first Academy used by the Sisters, and the massive new Academy behind it—was a composition of unusual interest for the time and place. But the demon of destruction seemingly appointed to pursue Mazzuchelli's architectural work at last overtook this too; it was destroyed by fire in 1896. No picture of the stone structure is known to exist.

The annals of St. Clara Convent reveal that Mazzuchelli was a devoted and inspired teacher in and out of classes. He gave courses in astronomy, rhetoric, and natural philosophy, and lectured on church history and the Holy Bible. A quaint prospectus of 1858 states that "young ladies of any denomination are received as pupils, and their religious principles are not in the least interferred." His prose, like his speech, sometimes reflected his Italian origin.

The priest died in 1864, after a brief illness. Here is a partial account by Sister Rosemary: "The morning of the 15th of February—Father Mazzuchelli was called to attend a moribund 'habitant' four miles from Benton. In spite of the extremely cold weather, Father Mazzuchelli did not at all take the precautions necessary to protect himself against the severities of the season—he celebrated Mass on his return." For eight days doctors tried to save him from the double pneumonia which he had contracted. "When we made him understand his last hour had arrived," said Mother Joanna, his attendant, "he raised his arms to heaven and replied, 'Blessed be the Sacred Will of God.' " So the priest died on the morning of February 23, at the age of fifty-seven, with a benediction on his lips.

Mazzuchelli, wholly immersed in the rigorous life of the frontier, had great qualities of devotion, selflessness, courage, and talent, and he was unsurpassed as an organizer. His eager spirit was sometimes irked by the chores of ecclesiastical administration; but he found deep satisfaction in teaching and in missionary work in the wilderness, as well as in the planning of the many buildings, sacred and secular, needed in a community destined for greatness.

Evaluation of the priest's architectural work is not easy. One must agree with Colton that his real contribution was as a church organizer. Unlike many of his Eastern contemporaries, Mazzuchelli's opportunities for architectural education were severely limited. Certainly, the numerous and hurried works of the pitifully few architects, joiners, builders, and carpenter-architects in the upper Mississippi valley during the 1830's, '40's, and '50's do not measure up in quality to the best work of the same period along the Atlantic seaboard or in the older areas bordering on the east and south—where the necessary means, skills, and especially time, were available. St. Louis, Cincinnati, Dayton, Columbus, Frankfort, and Bardstown, have examples of early architecture which are of superior quality, though perhaps not quite on a par with similar work in the East. But certainly the priest-architect takes a creditable place with his peers in the "Heart of North America." His severe limitations make his achievements truly remarkable.

Note: The early churches and schools at Mackinac and Green Bay, St. Raphael's and the Bishop's Residence at Dubuque, St. Michael's of Galena, St. Paul's of Burlington, St. Andrew's of Belleville, St. Mary's of Iowa City, and other works of Mazzuchelli have disappeared. In altered form, surviving examples, in addition to those previously mentioned, include: St. Rose's of Cuba City, the Convent of St. Rose at Galena, St. Anthony's of Davenport, and St. Matthew's of Muscatine. They were photographed by Briggs Dyer in 1947. These and related Americana were photographed by Mr. Dyer under a grant of the Newberry Library (Fellowships of Midwestern Studies) and during a survey by the author.

—E.H.R.

CONTRIBUTORS

QUINCY WRIGHT, Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, was technical adviser to the American member of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945. He is the author of *A Study of War.*

H. STUART HUGHES is Assistant Professor of History at Harvard University, and the author of *An Essay for Our Times.*

ANATOL RAPOPORT is Assistant Professor of Mathematical Biology at the University of Chicago.

GWEN GOODRICH RAPOPORT is Associate Director of the Union Officers' Program, University of Chicago.

ALFONSO SHIMBEL is Research Associate in the Committee on Mathematical Biology, University of Chicago.

HANS ROTHFELS, formerly Professor of History at the University of Koenigsberg, is now Professor of Modern History at the University of Chicago. He is the author of *The German Opposition to Hitler.*

T. S. ELIOT's article is the second of a series on "The Aims of Education," given at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Committee on Social Thought.

LEO STRAUSS, Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Chicago, is the author of *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, On Tyranny,* and other works.

C. F. VON WEIZSÄCKER is Professor of Physics at the Max Planck Institut, University of Göttingen, and author of *History of Nature* and the forthcoming *The World View of Physics,* to be published by the University of Chicago Press.

EARL H. REED, a practicing Chicago architect, has done considerable historical research on Midwest pioneer architecture and served on the national advisory board of the Historic American Buildings Survey.